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Summary 
This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters concerning the determination 
of 'equilibrium industrial structures' in 'international oligopolies'. In each model 
presented in the thesis rival oligopolists in the industry concerned choose their 
'corporate structures' and then compete to serve the national product markets 
(either via local production following foreign direct investment (FDI) or via 
imports). Our analyses are united by the general types of 'corporate structure' 
choices considered and by the broad features of 'industrial structure' that are 
cndogenously determined in equilibrium. We emphasise, the roles played by the 
following three phenomena in shaping 'equilibrium industrial structures': the 
distinction between greenfield-FDI ('greenfield investment') and acquisition-FDI 
(cross-border mergers and acquisitions); R&D investments and technology flows 
('technology transfer') both within and between firms; and the potential entry 
into the industry of "outside' firms, and incumbent firms' strategic reactions to 
the entry threat. 
The distinction between greenfield-FDI and acquisition-FDI is both empirically 
and theoretically important: whereas greenfield-FDI adds an extra plant to the 
host country, acquisition-FDI changes only the ownership pattern of existing 
plants. Despite this, previous game-theoretic models of equilibrium FDI flows 
have concentrated exclusively on one type of FDL Therefore, allowing theform 
of FDI to be endogenously selected as part of the 'equilibrium industrial 
structure' is both a novel and an interesting feature of our analysis. It also allows 
us to investigate the differential relationships between the two types of FDI and 
industry R&D spending (and therefore to test a popular 'failing firm' defence of 
inward acquisition-FDI: that it fosters 'technological development', the benefits 
of which outweigh the welfare costs of increased 'concentration'). A further 
novel feature of our analysis is the potential for (de novo) entry into the industry 
(at a global level): previous work assumed blockaded entry. We show that a 
credible entry threat by 'outside' firms has significant consequences for 
'equilibrium industrial structure'. 
At a general level, the results derived in this thesis provide a perspective on the 
relationship between MNEs' behaviour and industrial structure in 'globalized' 
industries that contrasts with that offered by Dunning's 'OLI paradigm'. It is also 
hoped that this thesis will be viewed as having made a useful contribution to 
unpicking the aggregation, which frequently occurs in public debate, of 
greenfield-FDI and acquisition-FDI into a (supposedly homogeneous) flow of 
'inward investment'. 
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Introduction 
This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters. The purpose of this brief 
introduction to the thesis as a whole is to highlight some of the common features 
of the following chapters. Our analyses all concern the determination of 
"equilibrium industrial structures' in industries that are often described as 
'international oligopolies': concentrated global industries that span several 
(segmented) national product markets (i. e. consumers are perfectly immobile 
internationally, so each country has a well-defined national market demand curve 
that is independent of foreign prices). In each model presented in this thesis rival 
oligopolists in the industry concerned choose their 'corporate structures' (from a 
well-specified set of alternatives) and then compete to serve the national product 
markets (via either local production or imports). Our chapters are united by the 
general types of 'corporate structure' choices considered and by the broad 
features of 'industrial structure' that are endogenously determined in equilibrium. 
We emphasise the roles played by the following three phenomena in shaping 
'equilibrium industrial structures: 
* the distinction within foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between 
greenfield-FDI ('greenfield investment') and acquisition-FDI (cross- 
border mergers and acquisitions, M&As) as distinct means of establishing 
local production facilities to serve national product markets; 
I 
* investments in technology upgrading (i. e. R&D investments), and 
technology flows ('technology transfer') both within and between 
('spillovers') finns; 
9 the potential entry into the industry of 'outside' firms, and incumbent 
finns' strategic reactions to the entry threat. 
The distinction between greenfield-FDI and acquisition-FDI is empirically 
important (i. e. neither type of FDI flow is empirically trivial): for example, 
UNCTAD (2000) estimates that the ratio of acquisition-FDI to greenfield-FDI in 
aggregate global FDI flows was 4: 1 in the late 1990s (and since then cross- 
border M&A flows have collapsed). Furthermore, from an industrial-economic 
perspective, there are reasons to hypothesize that inflows of greenfield-FDI and 
acquisition-FDI will generate distinct host-country market structures (at least in 
the short run) with (possibly) distinct welfare properties: whereas greenfield-FDI 
adds an extra plant to the host country, acquisition-FDI changes only the 
owners ip pattern of existing plants. Despite these empirical and theoretical 
observations, previous game-theoretic models of equilibrium FDI flows have 
concentrated exclusively on one type of FDI (implicitly assuming that it 
represents the general case? ): see, e. g., Horstmann and Markusen (1992) on 
greenfield-FDI and Hom and Persson (2001b) on acquisition-M. Therefore, 
allowing theform of FDI to be endogenously selected as part of the 'equilibrium 
industrial structure' is both a novel and an interesting feature of our analysis. 
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It is often suggested (e. g. in Dunning's (1977) 'OLI paradigm') that a positive 
relationship should exist within an industry (at a global level) between FDI flows 
and R&D spending. By allowing firms' investment levels in R&D to be 
endogenously determined, we are able to investigate this hypothesis formally. 
Furthermore, because both greenfield- and acquisition-FDI flows are modelled, 
we are able (in chapter 2) to explore the differential relationships between the 
two types of FDI and industry R&D spending. This last feature allows us to test 
(an aspect of) the frequently-invoked 'failing finn' defence of acquisition-FDI 
inflows: that inward investment in the form of acquisition-FDI fosters 
'technological development' in the host industry (i. e. increased R&D spending in 
our context), the benefits of which outweigh the welfare costs of (possibly) 
increased 'concentration'. 
Our recognition of the distinction between greenfield- and acquisition-FDI also 
allows us to examine additional channels of 'technology transfer' between plants 
in an industry to those usually highlighted in the theoretical literature. Previous 
work (e. g. Fosfuri and Motta, 1999; Siotis, 1999) on technology flows between 
plants in international oligopolies has focussed on the 'spillovers' that can occur 
between the foreign branch plant of a multinational enterprise (MNE) and 
indigenous firms in the host country following inward greenfield-FDI. However, 
inward investment in the form of acquisition-FDI can be associated with 
'technology transfer' between plants within the (newly-fonned) NINE. (For 
example, if the acquirer's own pre-takeover 'technology stock' is superior to that 
embodied in the production plant of the purchased firm, the acquirer may 
upgrade the target plant's technology following the takeover. ) We are able (in 
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chapter 3) to consider both the inter-firm ('spillovers') and intra-firm varieties of 
'technology transfer', and to investigate the role of each in shaping national 
'productivity distributions' across plants, precisely because we acknowledge the 
distinction between greenfield- and acquisition-M. 
The final theme that unifies the three chapters in this thesis is consideration of 
the impact of potential entry into the industry (at a global level) on 'equilibrium 
industrial structures'. The canonical models of 'equilibrium industrial structure' 
in international oligopolies that significantly inform the modelling frameworks 
used in this thesis (e. g. Horstmann and Markusen, 1992; Rowthom, 1992) 
assume that the entry of 'outside' firms at a global level is blockaded. (Of course, 
incumbent firms can 'enter' foreign markets via greenfield-FDI in those models, 
but the number of firms in equilibrium is assumed to be fixed at two. ) However, 
we show (in chapter I especially) that there are often incentives for 'outside' 
firms to establish plants in the industry at equilibrium, and that the responses of 
incumbent firms to these credible entry threats have important consequences for 
'equilibrium industrial structure' (whether entry is 'accommodated' or 'deterred' 
in equilibrium). Therefore, the popular assumption of blockaded entry is not 
innocuous and - if it is to be adopted - must be thoroughly justified. 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter I ('Entry, Location 
and R&D Decisions in an International Oligopoly') examines the relationships 
between rival finns' greenfield-FDI, process R&D and de novo entry decisions 
in an international oligopoly. The models developed contain two countries, two 
incumbent firms (which orilginate from different countries) and one potential 
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entrant firm. The impact of the entry threat on 'equilibrium industrial structure' 
is systematically documented and found to be significant. Chapter 2 ('Greenfield 
Investment versus Acquisition: Alternative Modes of Foreign Expansion') 
extends the analysis in chapter 1 by introducing the distinction between 
greenfield- and acquisition-FDI formally. We find that greenfield-FDI and 
acquisition-FDI are theoretically quite distinct in terms of both the positive and 
the normative aspects of the industrial structures that they are associated with. 
Finally, chapter 3 ('Inter- and Intra-Firm Technology Transfer in an International 
Oligopoly') analyses technology flows both within and between firms in the 
context of the distinction between greenfield- and acquisition-M. We examine 
the roles of the two types of FDI and of the two types of technology now in 
shaping the national 'productivity distribution' across plants within an industry. 
At a general level, the results derived in this thesis provide a perspective on the 
relationship between N4NEs' behaviour and industrial structure in 'globalized' 
industries that contrasts with that offered by Dunning's (1977) 'OLI paradigm'. 
We explore these contrasts in depth in chapter 3. It is also hoped that this thesis 
is viewed as having made a useful contribution to unpicking the aggregation, 
which frequently occurs in public debate, of greenfield-FDI and acquisition-FDI 
into a (supposedly homogeneous) flow of 'inward investment'. 
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Chapter 1 
Entry, Location and R&D Decisions in an 
International Oligopoly 
1.1. Introduction. 
This chapter examines the relationships between three firm-level decisions in an 
international oligopoly: (i) whether to serve foreign product markets by exporting 
from a domestic production base or by undertaking FDI to establish local 
production facilities (the TDI decision'); (ii) whether to undertake R&D 
investment with the aim of discovering process innovations (the 'R&D 
decision'); and (iii) whether to diversify production into new industries (the 
'entry decision'). It is the fundamental contention of this chapter that these three 
decisions are intimately interrelated, so that all three should be made 
endogenously in a theoretical model that seeks to explain the equilibrium 
industrial structure of an international oligopoly. While some authors, whose 
contributions are reviewed below, have examined the bilateral relationships 
between two of the three decisions outlined above, none have developed a 
unified analysis of finns' FDI, R&D and entry decisions. 
6 
Our analysis grows out of the game-theoretic models of foreign expansion in an 
international oligopoly pioneered by Rowthorn (1992) and Horstmann and 
Markusen (1992). ' Because of this, we briefly review their common structure. 
Both Rowthom and Horstmann/Markusen use a two-firm, two-country modelling 
structure, where one firm originates from each country and national product 
markets are perfectly segmented. Furthermore, both use similar two-stage games, 
which are solved backwards to isolate subgame perfect Nash equilibria: in the 
first stage the two rival firms simultaneously choose how many plants to 
establish from a strategy space of {0,1,2); 2 and in stage two the firms compete a 
la Courriot to serve both national product markets. (A key trade-off in these 
models is that, in choosing 2 plants rather than 1, the firm enjoys a fall in its 
marginal cost abroad - because the trade cost is eliminated - but suffers a 
doubling of plant-specific fixed costs. ) The authors the examine the effects of 
changes in a variety of parameters on the firms' equilibrium location decisions: 
Rowthorn focuses on the interplay between 'market size' and trade costs (the 
'trade barrier ratio') in creating a 'tariff-jumping' motive for greenfield-FDI; 
Horstmann and Markusen analyse how the relative sizes of firm- and plant- 
specific fixed costs affect location decisions. 
In terms of our initial taxonomy of firms' decisions, Rowthom and 
Horstmann/Markusen provide a rich framework for analysing the FDI decision. 
However, their models do not incorporate the R&D and entry decisions: 3 both 
assume a given population of two firms with fixed production technologies. A 
number of attempts have been made to analyse the three bilateral relationships 
between the FDI, R&D and entry decisions. On the relationship between FDI and 
7 
4 
entry decisions, Smith (1987) and Motta (1992) are key contributions. Both 
present three-stage models of duopolistic rivalry to serve a single host-country 
product market: in stage one a foreign firm (the potential MNE) chooses between 
exporting and greenfield-FDI; in stage two a domestic firni chooses whether to 
enter the market; and in stage three market equilibrium is established either via 
monopoly pricing (if the domestic firm stays out) or via Cournot competition (if 
both firms enter). Because decisions in earlier stages of the game become 
common knowledge, the outcome is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The 
entrant's stage-two decision can therefore interact with the MNE's decision in 
two ways. If the entrant's optimal choice is conditional on the MNE's decision, 
the MNE can use greenfield-FDI strategically to deter entry in stage tWo. 5 
However, if the entrant possesses a dominant strategy, then it is natural to 
consider how the inclusion of stage two affects the MNE's optimal decision. It 
can be shown that certain entry reduces the profitability premium for the MNE of 
FDI over exporting, compared to a situation where entry will certainly not 
occur. 6 This is essentially because entry dissipates the rent earned by the MNE. 
An important simplification in the models of Smith and Motta, relative to those 
of Rowthorn and Horstmann/Markusen, is the assumption that domestic finns in 
the host country cannot undertake reciprocal FDI in the MNE's home country. 
This simplifying assumption implies that the Smith and Motta models cannot be 
used to analyse FDI cross-hauling. However, relative to the Rowthom and 
Horstmann/Markusen models, the Smith and Motta models are analytically 
tractable, and they do succeed in partially endogenising industrial structure 
(although one firm is constrained to remain 'domestic'). A consideration of the 
8 
benefits of moving from a one-way (Smith, Motta) model of FDI flows to a two- 
way one (Rowthom, Horstmann/Markusen) is in order. Models that permit two- 
way FDI flows are necessary when firms' equilibrium location strategies vary 
with those of their rivals; and these connexions are created in general by the 
presence of fixed costs other than those associated solely with geenfield-FDI 
(e. g. the costs of maintaining head offices and home plants and the costs of 
financing R&D). 7 
Two brief examples will illustrate these effects. First, consider an international 
duopoly where finns choose both production locations and process R&D. If a 
foreign rival undertakes greenfield-FDI in the domestic market (instead of 
exporting), then ceteris paribus this will increase the domestic firm's incentive to 
invest in process R&D in search of drastic innovations. In turn, this increased 
R&D investment may make international production via greenfield-FDI 
profitable for the domestic firm by reducing its marginal production costs. 
Second, consider an international duopoly with high firm-specific fixed costs 
(e. g. for head offices) relative to plant-specific fixed costs, where finns choose 
production locations. 8 A two-plant finn (MNE) could be forced to exit the 
industry if the foreign rival undertakes greenfield-FDI in its home market, 
because this would dissipate its variable profits at home (which were essential to 
financing its firm-specific fixed costs). These two examples of international 
duopolies illustrate how firms' equilibrium international location strategies can 
be interconnected. The models we develop in the following sections have 
similarities to the first example above (i. e. the focus on endogenous R&D), and 
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therefore we must model all firms' location decisions endogenously in order to 
derive robust predictions for equilibrium industrial structures. 
The relationships between finns' FDI and R&D decisions have been analysed by 
Dunning (1977) and Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (1998,2000). Dunning's (1977) 
OLI framework investigates how R&D decisions affect FDI decisions. MNEs 
producing abroad via FDI incur higher fixed costs than do their local rivals 
because of the difficulties inherent in co-ordinating business across national 
- boundaries (e. g. created by the necessity of learning the host country's language 
and legal system). If product markets are generally monopolistically competitive 
(so the 'representative firm' earns normal profits in equilibrium), then the MNE 
must possess some proprietary 'ownership advantage' to offset its additional 
fixed cost burden. Dunning argues that R&D investment is key to creating 
cownership advantages': therefore R&D investment enables international 
expansion via FDI (perhaps by lowering the MNE's marginal production cost). 
A common element in the contributions of Petit and Sanna-Randaccio is the 
argument that two-way relationships can exist between R&D and FDI when 
market structures generate supernormal profits in equilibrium. Their 1998 paper 
focuses on a monopolist's choice between FDI and exporting in a two-country 
world; the monopolist can also invest in process R&D to reduce its marginal 
production cost. If the costs of international technology transfer are sufficiently 
low (so that technological knowledge approximates a public good within the 
firm), then 'there is a two-way relationship between R&D and multinational 
expansion by the firm, since the presence of R&D activities makes the FDI 
10 
choice more likelY, and the FDI choice produces a higher level of R&D' (Petit 
I, 
and Sanna-Randaccio, 1998, p. 22). R&D promotes FDI via an OLI-type 
mechanism of enabling the monopolist to finance the fixed costs of an additional 
plant abroad, and FDI promotes R&D because an MNE's global output is larger 
than a national finn's (so the value of a given process innovation is greater to the 
MNE). 
In Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) R&D/FDI linkages are explored in the 
context of an international duopoly, which creates the possibility of 'strategic', as 
well as 'pure', incentives for R&D and FDI. The model is similar to those of 
Rowthom and Horstmann/Markusen with an additional stage, where the firms 
simultaneously decide how much to invest in process R&D, inserted between the 
location and output decisions. Unfortunately, the model's complexity makes it 
impossible for Petit and Sanna-Randaccio to derive analytical solutions via 
backwards induction; instead, a set of illustrative numerical simulations is 
presented. 10 However, the results suggest that the intuition on the bilateral 
relationship between R&D and FDI gained from the (1998) monopoly case does 
carry over to oligopoly. A key benefit of our modelling structure is that it enables 
us to derive closed-fonn solutions. 
The third bilateral relationship is between finns' R&D and entry decisions. Of 
course, this relationship is not specifically connected to MNEs, and it has been 
extensively analysed in the theoretical literature. Dixit (1980), who develops a 
model of an incumbent monopolist's investment decision in anticipation of entry 
and Cournot competition, is particularly relevant to our purpose. (In. the one-way 
11 
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FDI models of Smith (1987) and Motta (1992) the FDI/entry relationship is a 
special case of Dixit's model because FDI is a discrete, rather than a continuous, 
investment decision. ) Dixit's model was generalised and located within a broad 
taxonomy of incumbents' investment strategies by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), 
who confirmed Bain's classic (1956) view that incumbents' equilibrium 
strategies crucially depend on whether entry is to be deterred or accommodated. " 
VAlile our modelling structure is not exactly analogous to Fudenberg and 
Tirole's, we shall attempt to relate equilibrium behaviour in anticipation of entry 
in our model to their 'animal spirits' taxonomy. 
Our modelling structure captures formally the relationships between FDI, R&D 
and entry decisions outlined above. A key contention of our approach is that, 
because any one of those three decisions is intimately connected to the other two, 
focussing on one of the three possible bilateral relationships (and thus implicitly 
holding the third decision fixed) will generate partial results. For example, 
analysing the relationship between the FDI and R&D decisions without 
modelling the entry decision excludes a priori a potentially important set of 
causal linkages: a credible entry threat may prompt incumbents to undertake 
cntry-deterring FDI and (additional) R&D, thus altering the equilibrium 
FDVR&D relationship. 12 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 1.2 the tools 
necessary for our analysis are developed. In particular, precise meanings are 
given to terms like market size and R&D, which have (for the sake of brevity) 
been used rather loosely in this Introduction. We also set out the extensive forms 
12 
of the two games that form the core of our analysis. The blockaded-entry (BE) 
game excludes the possibility of entry and acts as a benchmark case. The BE 
game assumes the familiar two-country, two-firni world and consists of two 
stages. In stage one the firms simultaneously and irreversibly choose between 
four possible 'corporate structures': (1, N), (1, R), (2, N) and (2, R). The first 
element of a corporate structure refers to the number of plants and the second to 
whether or not process R&D is undertaken. R&D investment is a binary variable: 
for a fixed cost of Ia firm purchases a probability p that its marginal production 
cost will fall to 0. (Because the only fixed costs a firm incurs are for greenfield- 
FDI and R&D, the inactivity strategy of 0 plants can legitimately be ignored. ) In 
stage two of the BE game market equilibrium is established via Bertrand 
competition (marginal costs are common knowledge and the firms' products are 
homogeneous). Our second game is the potential-entry (PE) game. We assume 
that a third firm exists (the 'potential entrant') with access to production facilities 
in both countries. However, these facilities are initially productively inefficient 
relative to the incumbents' (their marginal production cost exceeds the monopoly 
price of an incumbent). For a fixed cost of I the entrant can equip her plants with 
the best-practice technologies initially possessed by the incumbents. (The entrant 
can also engage in process R&D on the same basis as the incumbents. ) 
Therefore, our model of entry can be interpreted as one of entry by 
diversification. 13 In the PE game an entry stage is inserted between stages one 
and two in the BE game: it is assumed that the entrant can observe the 
incumbents' adopted corporate structures (but not whether their R&D 
investments have been successful). 
13 
In Section 1.3 we solve the BE and PE games. Both games are solved backwards 
to isolate subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies. The equilibrium 
properties of the BE and PE games are explored. The key findings are: (i) that 
two-way relationships exist between greenfield-FDI and R&D in international 
oligopolies; (ii) that equilibria in international oligopolies can exhibit Prisoner's 
Dilemma characteristics; and (iii) that by making R&D endogenous FDI can be 
explained in equilibrium in a homogeneous-product international oligopoly under 
Bertrand competition. 14 
In Section 1.4 we investigate the effect of the entry threat by comparing the 
equilibria of the PE game to those of the BE game. Two broad conclusions 
emerge. First, the incumbents in the PE game do engage in strategic entry- 
deterrence, using both grcenfield-FDI and R&D. Second, not only does the 
possibility of strategic entry-deterrence make equilibria involving FDI and R&D 
'more likely', it also produces equilibria in the PE game that are qualitatively 
different from those in the BE game. Therefore, the 'fundamental contention' 
that firms' FDI, R&D and entry decisions are intimately interrelated, which 
motivated this chapter's analysis, is validated. 
The BE and PE games are built on some very particular assumptions. Therefore, 
in Section 1.5 we discuss potential modifications of our analysis. We consider 
the effects of allowing the firms to use mixed strategies when selecting corporate 
structures; of having the firms select corporate structures sequentially, rather than 
simultaneously; and of varying our 'information assumptions'. We also consider 
the effects of assuming differentiated, rather than homogeneous, products and of 
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substituting Cournot for Bertrand competition. 15 The effects of modifications to 
our assumptions about entry are explored. Finally, we consider some possible 
extensions to our analysis. 
1.2. The Modelling Structure. 
1.2.1. Corporate Structure Choices. 
We adopt the simplest model necessary to illustrate the implications of an entry 
threat for incumbents' greenfield-FDI and process R&D decisions. We consider 
a three-firm, two-country world, where national product markets are of identical 
'size' and perfectly segmented and the product is homogeneous. Product markets 
may be served either by local production or by international trade from a plant 
, 111, . broad, which incurs a per-unit trade cost of t. There are initially four production 
plants, two in each country. Firms I and 2 (the 'incumbents) initially own one 
plant each, and these plants are located in different countries. (Hence the 
incumbents 'originate' from different countries. ) Firm 3 (the 'potential entrant') 
initially owns the remaining two plants, which are located in different countries. 
Firms can establish additional plants in either country at a sunk cost of G. Plants 
have constant marginal production costs, which are determined by the firm's 
stock of technical knowledge. (Technology is assumed to be a public good within 
the finn, which can costlessly be applied to production in every plant, but a 
proprietary good between finns. There are no interfirm technological spillovers. ) 
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Therefore, there are plant-level economies of scale and no firm will optimally 
maintain more than one plant in either country. 
Initially finns I and 2 possess the same level of technology, which sets their 
marginal production costs at CE (0,1). Firm 3's initial marginal production cost 
is strictly greater than the monopoly price associated with c, which we define 
below as xm(c). Technological progress occurs in steps, and each step incurs a 
sunk cost of L The technological laggard (firin 3) can purchase the industry's 
best-practice technology (i. e. a marginal production cost of c) in one step. For 
firms on the technological frontier (i. e. finns I and 2 initially, and firm 3 after 
sinking an investment of I to catch up) I purchases a process R&D investment 
with a risky outcome. With probability p (=- (0,1) R&D investment 'succeeds' 
and the firm's marginal production cost falls to 0; however with probability (I - 
R&D investment 'fails' and the firm's marginal production cost remains at c. 
In the early stages of our model firms choose their 'corporate structures'. A 
finn's corporate structure choice represents its strategic ('long-tertn') decisions 
vis-a-vis the location of production and the level of technology. Given the 
assumptions on initial conditions and sunk investments outlined above, firms I 
and 2 can both choose between four corporate structure pairs: (1, N), (1, R), (29 
N) and (2, R). The first component of the pair indicates how many plants the firm 
will maintain. A choice of 1 plant incurs no sunk cost because the plant is pre- 
existing; a choice of 2 plants represents a decision to sink G and establish an 
additional plant abroad. G is the international flow of greenfield-FDI. The second 
component of an incumbent's corporate structure pair indicates whether the firm 
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undertakes process R&D. Note that loss-making in equilibrium is ruled out by 
the inclusion of the (1, IV) strategy, which incurs no sunk costs, and so an 'exit' 
(or 'inactivity') strategy may legitmately be ignored. 
Because firm 3 initially owns one plant in each country and marginal production 
costs are constant, its corporate structure choice only contains a technological 
element. This is an extremely useful simplification. Firm 3 chooses between 
three corporate structures: 0, E and R. 0 represents a decision not to invest in 
technological progess. Despite making no sunk investments under the 0 strategy, 
firm 3 will also earn zero profits in the industry because the step onto the 
technological frontier represents a drastic innovation. Therefore by choosing 0 
firm 3 is effectively choosing not to 'enter' the industry. E and R both represent 
Ogentry' by firm 3, potentially with production in both countries. The E strategy 
represents a decision to step onto the technological frontier at a sunk cost of L 
Under the R strategy firm 3 attempts to take two steps at a sunk cost of 2-1: one 
onto the technological frontier, and an additional step via process R&D. 
Clearly, 'entry' by finn 3 via corporate structure choices of E or R has a rather 
stylized meaning in our model. Von Weizsdcker (1980) argues that entrants into 
an industry must pay sunk costs not incurred by incumbents: whether to pay 
these costs is the essence of the entry decision. 16 By assuming that firm 3 
possesses pre-existing but highly (productively) inefficient plants in both 
countries, our model incorporates a von Weizslicker-type entry decision for firm 
3 without introducing a location decision. This restriction on finn 3's strategic 
choices, implied by the assumptions of pre-existing plants and constant marginal 
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production costs, both simplifies our analysis and generates a significant interest 
(because the credibility of the entry threat is increased relative to a model where 
firm 3 must sink an investment of G to establish each plant). However, the 
question of how to interpret entry by firm 3 remains. A neat interpretation is to 
view firm 3 as a diversifying MNE entrant (rather than a de novo entrant), whose 
pre-existing plants produce for a 'related' industry (in terms of production 
processes) and can be adapted to produce the good under analysis. 
The assumptions on corporate structure choices outlined above imply that an 
active firm's marginal cost of serving either national product market can take 
four values: 
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10 if the firm! sR&D succeeds and it produces locally 
marginal cost 
t if the firm's R&D succeeds and it produces abroad 
Ic if the firm's R&D fails and it produces locally 
c+t if the firm's R&D fails and it produces abroad 
Throughout our analysis we maintain the following assumption (which seems 
intuitively reasonable) on tc: 
(A) O<t<c<l 
1.2.2. Market Size. 
There are two countries in the world. Demand conditions in both are identical, 
and the product is homogeneous. Market demand in either country is 
18 
Qj =, u - (1 - xj) 
Qj and xj are demand and price in country j respectively, jE 11,2}. National 
product markets are assumed to be perfectly segmented, so consumers in country 
are constrained to make purchases only on their home market; thus, xj (the 
market price abroad) does not influence Qj. p measures the 'size' of either 
national product market: increases in p rotate the demand function anticlockwise 
around (0,1) in (Qjxj)-space, increasing demand at any price equiproportionately. 
Therefore, u can be interpreted as an index of the number of homogeneous 
consumers in each country, all of whom have a reservation price of 1. The 
specification of demand in (1) is formally identical to that used by Motta (1992), 
as is the definition of market size. However, our definition of market size differs 
from Rowthorn's (1992) 'idiosyncratic measure of market size', which measures 
market size relative to economies of scale in production. 
1.2.3. Net Revenue. 
Net revenue equals revenue minus variable costs. 18 If either national product 
market is monopolised by firm i with a constant marginal cost of ci, the 
monopoly price will be 
I 
xm (ci) =-. (I + Ci) 2 
The monopolist's net revenue is 
Rm(c) =. 
E. 
(I - ci )2 
4 
4 
(1) 
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If a national product market is served by a duopoly, then firm Ps net revenue 
function is R(ci, cj), where ci is firm Ps marginal cost and cj is its rival's marginal 
cost. (The symmetry across countries - i. e. identical market demand ftinctions - 
implies that Rm(cj) and R(cj , cj) apply to both countries. ) The exact functional 
form of R(ci , cj) depends on the assumed form of duopolistic competition. At 
Bertrand equilibrium and if marginal costs are common knowledge 
0 for c, E [cj, 1) 
R(c,, cj)= li-(I-cj). (cj-c, ) for cc=[(xm)-'(cj), cj] (2) 
R"(c, ) for cir=(O, (xm)-(cj)] 
The results in (2) are standard. (Note that (x'ý)-'(qj) gives the marginal cost that is 
associated with a monopoly price of cj. ) If ci > qj then firm Ps rival optimally sets 
a price below ci and captures the entire market. If ci = cy the Bertrand equilibrium 
price equals the common level of marginal costs. A conventional assumption is 
that the market is divided equally between the two firms. If ci < cj there are two 
possibilities. If the gap between ci and cj is 'small' (x-"(ci) > cj) firm i optimally 
sets a price below qj, but the gap between the two firms' marginal costs is not 
large enough to allow firm i to charge its monopoly price. Therefore, i sets a 
price of cj - c, earns net revenue per unit of cj - ci and serves the entire market 
with p(l - cj) units. 
19 This 'undercutting equilibrium' is shown in the second 
line of (2). However, if the gap between ci and cy is 'large' (x-"(ci) < cj) firm i 
optimally sets its monopoly price, which is still less than cj. This 'monopoly- 
pricing equilibrium' is shown in the bottom line of (2). If it is assumed that both 
firms initially have marginal costs of qj, then the distinction between 'small' and 
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'large' levels of (cj - ci) can be linked directly to the size of firm i's process 
innovation (i. e. nondrastic or drastic). Furthermore, net revenues at a Bertrand 
equilibrium with more than two firms can be straightforwardly described using 
(2) if cj is reinterpreted as the minimum of firm i's rivals' marginal costs (i. e. cj a 
min{cl, c2, ..., Ci- b Ci+ 11, ---1, CA). 
The R(ci, cj) function is not well-behaved: it is continuous but not smooth. R(. ) is 
decreasing in ci and increasing in qj. R(-) is plotted against ci and cj in Figures 1.1 
and 1.2 below. In Figure 1.1 we assume cj > 0.5 so that (x")-'(cj) = 2. cj -I>0, 
and firm i can monopoly-price for low levels of ci. Reducing cj would shift the 
R(-) function leftwards. R(-) has kinks at ci = (xu)-'(cj), where monopoly-pricing 
and undercutting generate the same net revenue for i, and at ci = cy, where 
undercutting generates zero net revenue. 
[FIGURES 1.1 AND 1.2 ARE OVERLEAF] 
In Figure 1.2 R(ci, cj) is plotted against qj, the behaviour of which can be derived 
from (2). For cy E (0 , cj] and cjE [X"(ci) , 1), R(-) does not vary with cj: 
in the 
former case i is undercut byj in equilibrium, and in the latter case i monopoly- 
prices. For cj c= [ci , 
? (ci)], i undercuts j in equilibrium and R(-) is strictly 
concave in cy. As in Figure 1.1 R(-) has kinks at cj = ci and at cy = x"(ci) (i. e. at ci 
= (Xlf)-, (Cj)). 
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R(. ) 
Ci 
RA'f(O) 
0.5 
0 
Figure 1.1: R(ci, cj) against ci for cj > 0.5 
R(. ) 
xm(ci) 
0.5 
M(ci) 
0 
Figure 1.2: R(ci, cj) against cy 
ci 
Cj 
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(xm)-, (Cj) Ci 1 
ci xm(ci) 1 
There are sixteen distinct realisations of the duopoly net revenue function, 
because ci, cy can take four values (i. e. 0, t, c or c+t). In comparing the 
profitability of different corporate structures (to derive 'best responses'), it will 
be necessary to rank the various realisations of the net revenue function . 
20 The 
functional form of R(ci, cj) creates both advantages and disadvantages for this 
procedure. The advantages are (i) that certain realisations will always be equal to 
zero; and (H) that because of the monotonicity of R(-), realisations for given qj 
can be ranked using the restrictions in assumption (A) as 
R(O, 0) = R(t, 0) = R(c, 0) = R(c + t, 0) =0 
Rm (0) ý' a R(O, t) >0 and R(t, t) = R(c, t) = R(c + t, t) =0 (3) 
Rm (0) 2: R(O, c) > R(t, c) >0 and R(c, c) = R(c + t, c) =0 
Rm(0)2: R(O, c+t»R(t, c+t»R(c, c+t) >O andR(c+t, c+t)=Oj 
Likewise, it is possible to rank R(ci, cj) for given ci and different values of cj. 
However, with only loose restrictions on t, c as in (A), it is impossible to rank 
R(-) definitively for different values of ci and cj. This is the disadvantage created 
by the badly-behaved functional form of R(-). We return to this problem when 
solving the BE and PE games below. 
From the rankings in (3), qualitative conclusions can be drawn about industrial 
structure. In the two-country, two-firm world of the BE game, there are two 
distinct possibilities vis-a-vis industrial structure in each country: 21 
(i) Both firms produce locally to serve a product market. The relevant 
realisations of the net revenue function for either firin are R(O, 0), R(O, c), 
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R(c, 0) and R(c, c). A firm will only make strictly positive net revenue if it 
innovates successfully but its rival does not. The maximum possible market 
price is c and the minimum is 0. 
(ii) One firm serves the market from abroad (and the other produces locally). 
The net revenues of the local firmare given by R(O, t), R(O, c+t), R(c, t) and 
R(c, c+t). The net revenues of the foreign firm are described by R(t, 0), R(t, 
c), R(c+t, 0) and R(c+t, c). Because of the asynunetry between the finns in 
this case, the possible outcomes are more complex than those in (i). The 
foreign firm will only be able to cam strictly positive net revenue if it 
innovates successfully but the local finn does not. For the local fimi, the 
converse is true. The maximum possible market price is minfxm(c), c+t), 
which arises when neither firm innovates successfully. The minimum 
possible market price is minf? (O) = 0.5, t}, when both firms innovate 
successfully. 
The comparison of industrial structures in (i) and (ii) above suggests two final 
points. First, outcomes when both firms produce locally are more 'competitive' 
than when one firm produces abroad, in the sense that both the maximum and the 
minimum possible market prices are lower. This reflects the fact that the foreign 
firm becomes a more aggressive competitor for the local firm when it substitutes 
greenfield-FDI for exporting (because the trade cost is eliminated from its 
marginal cost). This finding was confirmed by Petit and Sanna-Randaccio 
(2000); however, note that it assumes that undertaking greenfield-FDI does not 
alter the form of duopolistic competition in the product market (Bertrand 
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competition), a point to which we return in Section 5. This assumption was 
questioned by Hymer (1960), who saw FDI as facilitating collusion. 
Second, within our framework of Bertrand competition, cross-hauling of 
international trade flows will never occur in equilibrium, although FDI cross- 
hauling may occur. (This contrasts with the predictions of the Rowthorn and 
Horstmann/Markusen models, which are based on Cournot competition. ) Trade 
cross-hauling could only arise if neither firm undertook greenfield-FDI, and in 
that case firm i would serve its rival's home market with exports if ci + t: 5 cj. 
However, note that this condition cannot hold simultaneously with cj + t: 5 ci (i. e. 
it is impossible for both firms to possess a marginal cost advantage), so one firm 
at most will export in equilibrium. 22 
1.2.4. Sequence of Moves and Equilibrium Concepts. 
The three-stage PE game is shown in Figure 1.3. In stage one the incumbents 
simultaneously and irreversibly choose their corporate structures. Stage two is 
firni 3's entry decision. Firm 3 can observe the incumbents' chosen corporate 
structures but not whether their R&D investments (if undertaken) succeeded or 
failed. In stage three the incumbents learn what their rivals' corporate structure 
choices were, and the success/failure of all R&D investments previously 
undertaken becomes common knowledge. 23 The three firms then compete a la 
Bertrand to serve both national product markets. For convenience we term this 
three-stage game the potential-entry (PE) game to distinguish it from the 
blockaded-cntry (BE) game, which acts as a benchmark case in Section 1.4. The 
25 
BE game consists of stages one and three of the PE game and omits the 
possibility of entry (stage two). 
[FIGURE 1.3 IS OVERLEAF] 
The result in Lemma I simplifies the analysis of equilibrium behaviour in the PE 
and BE gwnes. 
Lemma 1. (i) In the PE and BE games an incumbent will never optimally choose 
a corporate structure of (2, N) because it is strictly dominated by one of (1, 
N). (u) In the PE game the entrant will never optimally choose a corporate 
structure of E because it is strictly dominated by one of 0. 
Proof (i) Because the two countries' product markets are perfectly segmented, 
choosing (2,, N) rather than (1,, N) has no effect on an incumbent's revenues 
from its home market: it continues to sell at home with a marginal cost of c. 
Its marginal cost abroad falls from c+t to c, and it sinks G into greenfield- 
FDI. However, the incumbent's expected net revenues abroad in Bertrand 
equilibrium remain 0 because its foreign rival has a plant abroad with a 
marginal cost of c at most. Therefore, choosing (2, IV) over (1, N) will 
reduce an incumbent's expected profits by G, so (1, N) strictly dominates 
(2, IV). 
(H) If the entrant chooses E it sinks I to move onto the technological 
frontier and can produce at both its plants with a marginal cost of c. 
However, because both countries contain incumbents' pre-existing plants 
with marginal costs of c, the entrant's expected global net revenues in 
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Stage 1. Finns I and 2 simultaneously and 
irreversibly choose their corporate structures. 
Stage 2. (Entry stage. ) Firm 3 observes the 
incumbents' adopted corporate structures but not 
whether their R&D investments were 
successful/failures. Firm 3 irreversibly chooses 
its corporate structure. 
Stage 3. (Market stage. ) All firms' adopted 
corporate structures become common 
knowledge, as does the success/failure of any 
R&D investments undertaken. The firms 
compete a la Bertrand to serve the two national 
product markets. 
Figure 1.3: Sequence of moves in the PE game 
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Bertrand equilibrium remain 0. Therefore, choosing E over 0 will reduce 
the entrant's expected profits by I, so 0 strictly dominates E. QED. 
Lemma I contains simplifications implied by the assumption of Bertrand 
competition in the market stage. It allows us without loss of generality to restrict 
the incumbents' and the entrant's strategy spaces to [(I, N), (1, R), (2, R)l and 
{O, R} respectively. This simplification makes our analysis considerably more 
tractable; for example, the normal form of the BE game is reduced from four-by- 
four to three-by-three, which (given the symmetries across incumbents and 
countries) reduces the number of distinct industrial structures to consider from 10 
to 
The result in Lemma I (i) captures the greenfield-FDI/R&D link in OLI models. 
In order to make greenfield-FDI profitable, the 'ownership advantages' generated 
by process R&D are necessary. However, as is shown below, there also exist 
'feedback' linkages from greenfield-FDI to R&D. 
Definitions I and 2 formally describe the pure-strategy subgame, perfect Nash 
equilibria of the BE and PE games. 
Definition 1. JSý , 
S2 ; 0) is the equilibrium industrial structure of the BE game 
iff 
sBR Sý = SB" (S2 ) and S2 2 
sl 
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where the SBR(. ) functions 
BR 
max Eir, (S,, S2; 
0) Sj' (S2) arg 
S, 
S2" (S) arg max Eir2 (SI, S2; 0) 
S2 
for all S,, S2 E {(I, JV), (1, R), (2, R)) 
give an incumbent firm's best responses to its rival's corporate structure choice. 
Because the incumbents move simultaneously in the BE game, each treats its 
rival's behaviour as given in equilibrium. 
Definition 2. (SI S2 ; S3 I is the equilibrium industrial structure of the PE game 
iff 
BR * BR * BIR 
** 
S, = Sl' (S2 ); S2 = S2' (SI ); and S3 = 
S3 (SI A) 
where the SBR(. ) functions 
SR)= arg max Eir, 
(S, S ; SBR(S, S (S2 -12312 
S, 
SBR (S )= arg max Eir2 (S1, S2; 
SBR(S, S » 
21312 
S2 
S BR(S'S arg max Er3 (SI, S2; S3) 312 
S3 
for all S,, S2 E: {(I, N), (1, R), (2, R)) and S3 E 10, R) 
give the firms' best responses to their rivals' corporate structure choices. Because 
firm 3 is the second-mover in the PE game, it takes the incumbents' corporate 
BR 
structures as given when deriving its best response; therefore, S3' depends on 
S,, S2. However, firms I and 2 must take account of the knock-on effects of their 
sBR - 
own corporate structure choices on firin 3's behaviour; therefore, 3 is 
endogenized within SI BR S2"'. From this formulation of the PE game's 
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equilibrium it is clear that the incumbents can potentially use their corporate 
structure choices to influence firm 3's behaviour to their own advantage. 
1.3. Analysis. 
1.3.1. Expected Profits. 
We now define the firms' expected profit functions in the BE and PE games. 
BE Game (S3 =0) 
In the BE game there are six distinct industrial structures to consider, three of 
which are symmetric and three asymmetric. Expected profits in the industrial 
structures {(I, R), (I, N); Ol, ((2, R), (I, N); Ol and ((2, R), (I, R); Ol may be 
derived by straightforward analogy given the underlying symmetric modelling 
structure. 
{(I, N), (', ]V); Ol 
E7r, = E; r2=R(c, c+t) 
Each firm supplies only its home market and influences the equilibrium of the 
foreign product market only by setting a price ceiling of c+t. 
{(I, N), (I, R); O) 
E, Tj =(1-p). R(c, c+t) 
E7r2= p -[R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)]+(1-p)-R(c, c+t)- I 
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If firm 2's R&D investment succeeds, then it alone supplies both countries' 
product markets, earning R(O, c+ 1) at home and R(t, c) by exporting to country 
1. In this case firm 2's domestic net revenues exceed its net export earnings. 24 
(We adopt the convention throughout of writing domestic net revenue as the first 
term in square brackets and foreign net revenue as the second. ) If firm 2's R&D 
investment fails, then market outcomes are identical to those under 
IV), (1, IV); 0) - 
{(I, N), (2, R); Ol 
E7r, =0 
Eir2= p . [R(O, c+t) + R(O, c)] +(I -p) - R(c, c+t) -G- I 
Regardless of whether finn 2's R&D succeeds, I's expected profits are zero 
because by undertaking greenfield-FDI finn 2 can serve country I's product 
market with a marginal cost of c at most. If firm 2's R&D succeeds, it alone 
supplies both countries' markets and earns more abroad than under 
N), (1, R); 01 because undertaking greenfield-FDI eliminates the trade cost. If 
2's R&D fails, it earns strictly positive net revenue only at home. 
{(1, R), (1, R); ø} 
Eir, = Eir2= p-(I-p)-[R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)]+ P2 R(O, t)+ (I _ P)2 -R(c, c+t)-I 
With probabilityp-(I -p) a finn's own R&D succeeds and its rival's fails. In this 
case the successful innovator earns R(O, c+ t) at home and R(t, c) abroad, 
whereas the failing firm is undercut on both markets. If both firms' R&D 
investments either succeed or fail, with probabilities of p2 and (I _ P)2 
respectively, then the firms serve only their home markets. 
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{(I, R), (2, R); O) 
Er, =p- (I - p) - [R(O, c) + R(t, c)] -I 
E; r2= p-(1-p)-[R(O, c+t)+R(O, c)] +P2 -R(O, t) + 
(1 
_ P)2 -R(c, c+t)-G-I 
Because firm 2 has a local plant in country 1, firm 1 must possess a marginal 
production cost advantage if it is to earn strictly positive net revenue. This occurs 
with probability p-(I - p) when I's R&D investment succeeds but 2's fails. On 
the other hand, firin 2 can earn strictly positive net revenue at home when the 
firms' marginal production costs are the same because the trade cost insulates its 
domestic plant from foreign competition. 
1(2, R), (2, R); O) 
E; rl = Eir2= 2. p-Q- p) - R(O, c) -G-I 
Because both firms own two plants, the trade cost is irrelevant to expected 
profits. When a finn's own R&D succeeds and its rival's fails with probability 
p-(l -p), then the firm eams net revenue of R(O, c) in both countries. 
Lemma 2 uses the following definition to surnmarise the effects of an 
incumbent's corporate structure choice on its own and its rival's global net 
revenues in the BE game. 
Definition 3. Ri (S,, S2; S3) is finn Ps, iE {1,2,3), global net revenue when the 
three finns choose corporate structures of S,, S2, S3. Global (expected) net 
revenue is expected profits gross of sunk investment expenditures. 
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Lemma 2. (i) R, ((2, R), S2; 0) > R, ((I, R), S2; 0) > R, ((I, N), S2; 0) for all S., and 
likewise (by straightforward analogy) fo r firm 2. 
R, (SI, (1, N); 0) > R, (SI, (1, R); 0) > R, (SI, (2, R); 0) for all S,, and likewise 
(by straightforward analogy) for firm 2. (The result extends directly to 
Eirl. ) 
Proof. By inspection of the expected profit functions and use of the rankings in 
(3). 
Two implications of Lemma 2 are noteworthy. First, if the incumbents chose 
their corporate structures sequentially, rather than simultaneously as in the BE 
game, then Lenuna 2 suggests that the leader could potentially use sunk 
investments in greenfield-FDI and R&D to pre-empt similar investments by the 
follower. (Given the follower's corporate structure, the leader can both increase 
its own global net revenues - Lemma 2(i) - and decrease its rival's - Lemma 
2(ii) - by sinking investments in greenfield-FDI and R&D. In turn, this will 
make the follower 'less likely' to undertake sunk investments. ) We explore this 
possibility in Section 1.5. The second implication of Lemma 2(i) is purely 
technical: it allows us to investigate the effects of changes in p on the relative 
profitability of different corporate structures in Section 1.3.2. 
PE Game with Entry by Firm 3 (S3=R) 
In the PE game there are twelve distinct industrial structures to consider. The 
incumbents' choices form six distinct pairs (as above), and for each pair firm 3 
can choose either 0 or R. Of course, if firm 3 chooses 0, then expected profits in 
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the PE game are identical to those in the BE game (and 3 earns zero). Therefore, 
we have six industrial structures to consider; expected profits in the industrial 
structures ((I, R), (1, N); R), ((2, R), (1, N); R) and 1(2, R), (1, R); R) may be 
derived by straightforward analogy. 
Because firm 3 owns two plants and the incumbents initially own one plant each 
(in different countries), the smallest possible number of plants in either country 
when finn 3 chooses R is two. Therefore, a necessary (but insufficent) condition 
for a firin to earn strictly positive net revenue is that it innovates successfully, 
because there will always exist a local rival with a marginal cost of c at most. For 
this reason p is a common factor in the net-revenue components of all the 
expected profit functions below. 
[(I, N), (I, N); R) 
Ez, = E; r2 =0 
E; r3=2. p. R(O, c)-2-I 
The incumbents earn zero expected profits because firm 3 can serve both 
countries' product markets from local plants at a marginal cost of c at most. If its 
R&D is successful, firm 3 can undercut the incumbents to earn R(O, c) in both 
countries. 
{(I, N), (l, R); Rl 
E; rl =0 
E; r2= p. (I -p)-[R(O, c)+R(t, c)] -I 
E; r3=2-p. (I-p). R(O, c)+ P2 R(O, t)-2-I 
Firm I earns zero expected profits for the same reasons as above. Firm 2 requires 
a marginal production cost advantage over firm 3 to earn strictly positive net 
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revenue (because finn 3 owns a plant in country 2), which occurs with 
probability p-(I - p) when 2's R&D succeeds but 3's fails. Conversely, if 2's 
R&D fails but 3's succeeds, 3 earns R(O, c) in both countries. If both firms 2 and 
3 innovate successfully, 3 earns R(O, t) in country 1. 
((I, N), (2, R); R) 
Er, =0 
Eir2= 2-p-Q- p) - R(O, c) -G-I 
E; r3= 2-p- (I - p) - R(O, c) -2-I 
Because firms 2 and 3 both own two plants, neither will gain protection from 
trade costs if the rival's R&D succeeds. To earn strictly positive net revenue both 
require a marginal production cost advantage. 
Eir, = E; r2 = P_(I_P)2 . [R(O, c)+R(t, c)] +P2 -(I-p). R(O, t)-I 
E7r3=2-p . (I _ P)2 -R(O, c)+2 P2 -(I-p)-R(O, t)-2-I 
Because firm 3 owns plants in both countries, the incumbents must innovate 
successfully to earn strictly positive net revenue. Given R&D success, an 
incumbent can earn R(O, c) at home and R(t, c) abroad if both its rivals' R&D 
efforts fail with probability (1 _ P)2; if the rival incumbent's R&D succeeds but 
firm 3's fails with probabilityp. (l -p) the incumbents both earn R(O, t) at home. 
Finn 3 earns R(O, c) in both countries if its R&D alone succeeds. If the R&D 
investments of firm 3 and one incumbent only succeed with probability 2-p 2. (1 - 
then firm 3 earns R(O, t) in the failing incumbent's home market. 
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{(I, R), (2, R); R) 
Eir, =P_(I_P)2 . [R(O, c)+R(t, c)]-I 
E; r2=2. p . 
(I_P)2 
- R(O, c) +, P2 -(I-p). R(O, t)-G-1 
E; r3=2-p . (I _ P)2 -R(O, c) +P2 -(I-p)-R(O, t)-2-I 
Finn 1 faces two local rivals and must possess marginal production cost 
advantages over both with probability p. (I _ P)2 to earn R(O, c) at home and R(t, 
c) abroad. If firin 2 alone innovates successfully, it earns R(O, c) in both 
countries; additionally, because firm 2 faces only one local rival (firm 3), if both 
incumbents' R&D investments succeed but 3's fails, then firm 2 earns R(O, t) at 
home. If firm 3 alone innovates successfully, then it earns R(O, c) in both 
countries; if only firm 2's R&D fails, then finn 3 earns R(O, t) in country 2. 
{(2, R), (2, R); R) 
Eir, = Ez2= 2 P. (I_P)2 -R(O, c)-G-I 
E; r3=2-p . (l_P)2 -R(O, c)-2-I 
All three finns are MNEs with plants in both countries. With probability p-(I - 
P)2 a firm will gain a marginal production cost advantage over both its rivals and 
earn R(O, t) in both countries. 
Lemma 3 extends the comparisons of global net revenues under different 
corporate structures in Lemma 2 to the PE game. 
Lemma I (i) R, ((2, R), S2; R) > R, ((I, R), S2; R) > R, (Q, N), S2; R) =0 for all S., 
and likewise (by straightforward analogy) for finn 2. 
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(ii) R, (SI, (1, N); R) ý: R, (SI, (1, R); R) 2: R, (SI, (2, R); R) for all S,, and 
likewise (by straightforward analogy) for firm 2. (The result extends 
directly to E; r,. ) 
(iii) RI(S,, S2; 0) ý!: R, (SI, S2; R) for all S,, S2, and likewise (by 
straightforward analogy) for firm 2. (The result extends directly to Eir,. ) 
R3((I, N), S2; R)>R3 ((I, R), S2; R) > R3((2, R), S2; R) for all S2, and 
likewise if S2 is varied while holding S, fixed. (The result extends directly 
to E; r3, ) 
Proof. By inspection of the expected profit functions and use of the rankings in 
(3). 
Parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3 directly extend Lemma 2 to the PE game. Note that 
an incumbent choosing (1, N) in the PE game will always earn expected profits 
of zero, so R, ((I, N), S2; R) =0 for all S2, and this accounts for the weak 
inequalities in part (ii). (For S, E {(I, R), (2, R)) the inequalities in part (ii) would 
be strict. ) Therefore, our general conclusion that by sinking investments in 
grccnfield-FDI and R&D an incumbent can both increase its own global net 
revenues and decrease the rival incumbent's carries over to the PE game. Parts 
(iii) and (iv) of Lemma 3 relate to the effect of entry by firm 3 (i. e. a choice of 
R). Entry weakly reduces the incumbents' net revenues; indeed, the inequality in 
part (iii) holds strictly in all cases except S, = (1, N), S2 = (2, R) when firm I 
earns zero in both the BE and PE games. Furthermore, firm 3's net revenues are 
reduced when an incumbent undertakes greenfield-FD1 or R&D (part (iv)). 
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Lemma 3(iii) and 3(iv) together illustrate the potential for investments in 
strategic entry-deterrence by the incumbents in the PE game. From part (iii) it is 
clear that the incumbents will generally prefer firm 3 to choose 0 over R. Part 
(iv) suggests how the incumbents may induce firm 3 to do this: by undertaking 
greenfield-FD1 and R&D to reduce firm 3's expected profits if it chooses R 
below the minimum R3(S,, S2; 0) =0 for all S,, 
S2. 
An important implication of Lemma 3(iii) is that it allows us to connect the 
incumbents' optimal behaviour in the PE game to that in the BE game. The result 
is given in Lemma 4. 
Lemma 4. (i) Let S, " be firm I's best response to S2 in the BE game. If firm 3's 
best response to a choice by the incumbents of the pair {S, "", S2) is 0, then 
S BR ; remains a best response to S2in the PE game. 
Corollary. Let (S, , S2 ; 0) be the equilibrium industrial structure of the 
BE game. If firm 3's best response to the pair {S, 
*, S2 I is 0, then 
JSIIS2 ; 01 is also the equilibrium industrial structure of the PE game. 
SBR Proof. Part (i). Given S2, I is by definition such that 
E (SBR, S ; 0) 7r, 12ý: Ex, (SI, S2; 0) for all SI. Because finn I's sunk costs are 
exclusively deten-nined by SI, Lemma 3(iii) implies that 
E7r, (Sj, S2; 0)ý! E; r, (Sj, S,; R). Combining these two relations gives 
E; rl (S I 
DR, S2; 0) ý: Eirj(S,, S,; R). Therefore E;; in the PE game is 
maximised under the industrial structure {SBR, 
S2 ; 0); so if 
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S BR BR (SBR, S.; 0} 
3' (Si , S2) = 
0, which is necessary for to arise in 
equilibrium, firm 1 will optimally choose SB' in response to S2 under 
potential entry. (Of course, the result extends to firm 2 by straightforward 
analogy. ) 
Part (ii). Assume that firm 2 plays S, and that SB" (S, , S2 0 where S, 
is I's best response to 
* in the BE game. Then from (i) above, S, 
* is also S2 
* in the PE game. By symmetry, analogous 1's best response to S2 
arguments apply to 2's best responses, and so the equilibrium ( 
*, * SI S2; 01 
endures under potential entry. QED. 
The results in Lemma 4 greatly simplify the analysis of equilibrium industrial 
structures in the PE game once those in the BE game are known. The general 
upshot is that finn 3's entry threat can only carry weight when 3 will credibly 
choose R at the equilibrium of the BE game; otherwise, the BE game's 
equilibrium will endure into the PE game. 
It is not immediately obvious what happens when firm 3 optimally chooses R at 
BR( 
the BE game's equilibrium, i. e. S3 S, S2)=R. Clearly the equilibrium j 
industrial structure of the BE game is undennined because it was premissed on 
entry not occurring. Two possibilities deserve mention. The equilibrium 
industrial structure of the PE game may involve the incumbents investing more 
in greenfield-FDI and R&D relative to the BE equilibrium in order strategically 
to deter entry by firm 3. (Recall from Lemma 3(iv) that increasing the 
incumbents' sunk investments reduces Ts net revenues. ) Alternatively, if for 
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example 3 optimally chooses R regardless of the incumbents' choices, the 
incumbents may accommodate entry by undertaking fewer sunk investments than 
in the BE equilibrium. (Recall from Lemma 3(iii) that ceteris paribus entry 
reduces the incumbents' net revenues, thus making the financing of sunk costs 
more difficult. ) We shall see below that both of these possibilities do indeed 
arise. 
1.3.2. Best Responses. 
The first step in determining equilibrium industrial structures is to isolate the 
firms' best responses to given corporate structure choices of their rivals, 
conditional on the six exogenous parameters p, p, t, c, G, L Below we define 
critical p-values p(p; t, c, G, 1) which, given the actual p, allow us to rank the 
various corporate structures in tenns of profitability. 
BE Game (S3 =0) 
The following results derive from comparisons of the expected profit functions in 
the BE game. 
In response to (1, N) 
(1, R) >- (1, N) iff 
(IBE) 
[R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)-R(c, c+t)]-p 
p 
(2, R) >- (1, R) iff 
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> 
[R(O, c) 
G 
R(t, c)] -p 
(2BE) 
p 
(2, R) >- (1, N) iff 
G+I 
(3BE) 
. [R(O, c+t) + R(O, c) -R(c, c+t)] -p p 
Because p enters R(-) multiplicatively, +] in the RHS of (IBE), (2BE), (3BE) 
is independent of u. Therefore the RHS of each inequality defines a critical p- 
value /0; t, c, G, 1) such that two corporate structures are equally profitable. In 
(p, p)-space RHS(1BE), RHS(2BE) and RHS(3BE) are all rectangular 
hyperbolas; intuitively, this is because a fall in p can be counterbalanced by a rise 
in A which increases the payoff to successful R&D. 
In response to (1, R) 
(1, R) >- (1, N) iff 
P> 111 
(4BE) 
- [R(O, c +t) + R(t, c) -R(c, c+t)]- p -(I -p) +-. R(O, t) - p' pp 
(2, R) >- (1, R) iff 
P> IG 
(5BE) 
[R(O, c) - R(t, c)] -p p) 
(2, R) >- (1, N) iff 
P> I. 
G+I 
I. 
P2 
(6BE) 
[R(O, c+t)+R(O, c)-R(c, c+t)]-p-(I-p)+- R(O, t) 
JU p 
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RHS(5BE) is a U-shaped parabola in (p, p)-space, which is symmetric around p 
= 0.5 with asymptotes at p=0 and p=1. Investing in greenfield-FDI only pays 
off if the firm acquires a marginal production cost advantage over its foreign 
rival. When both finns undertake R&D this occurs with probability p-(I - p), 
which approaches 0 asp approaches 1, so p must be large to compensate for high 
p. RHS(4BE) and RHS(6BE) are both strictly convex onp E [0,1], possibly with 
minima on pc (0.5,1 ]. 
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In response to (2, R) 
(1, R) >- (1, N) iff 
P> 11 
(7BE) 
[R(O, c) + R(t, c)] -p- p) 
p 
(2, R) >- (1, R) iff 
G 
>1. 
[R(O, c) - R(t, c)] -p- (I - p) 
(5BE) repeated 
P 
(2, R) >- (1, N) iff 
U> 
G+I (8BE) 
2. 
R(O, c)-p. (I-p) 
p 
RHS(7BE) and RHS(8BE) both have the same general shape as RHS(5BE). In 
particular , note that (5BE) appears twice: it ranks the profitability of (2, R) 
relative to (1, R) in response to both (1, R) and (2, R). This occurs because in a 
world of perfectly segmented product markets the choice between one plant and 
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two depends on 'competitive conditions' abroad, which are influenced by 
whether the foreign rival invests in R&D but not greenfield-FDI. In a related vein 
note that RHS(5BE) > RHS(2BE), which demonstrates that a larger market is 
necessary to generate greenfield-FDI when the foreign rival undertakes R&D 
(because the MNE's probability of acquiring a marginal production cost 
advantage falls). 
Table 1.1 summarises the preceding analysis to give the incumbent's best 
responses in the BE game. 26 
Best is (1, N) iff is (1, R) iff is (2, R) iff 
response to 
(11 N) (IBE) fails and (lBE) holds and (2BE) holds and 
(3BE) fails (2BE) fails (3BE) holds 
(1, R) (4BE) fails and (4BE) holds and (5BE) holds and 
(6BE) fails (5BE) fails (6BE) holds 
(2, R) (7BE) fails and (7BE) holds and (5BE) holds and 
(8BE) fails (5BE) fails (8BE) holds 
Table 1.1. Incumbents' best responses in the BE (blockaded-entry) game. 
Table 1.1 makes the task of deriving equilibrium industrial structures analytically 
appear complicated because of the sheer number of inequality conditions to 
consider, each of which contains at least five parameters. 27 Lemma 5 provides a 
simplification by demonstrating that several of the inequality conditions can in 
general be dropped. 
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Lemma 5. Let (1, R) >. - (1, N) iff p>A (p; t, c, G, I), which we write as p, (p) for 
brevity. Similarly, (2, R) ý-- (1, R) iff p >, q2(p) and 
(2, R) ý-- (1, N) iff p> p3 (p) - (i) if u, 
(p) >A (p) . then p3(p) 
is irrelevant 
to detennining the best response. (ii) Conversely, if ul(p) >, u2(p) , then 
only p3(p) is relevant to determining the best response. 
Proof. Part (i). For pE [0, p, (p)), (1, N) >- (1, R) >- (2, R), so (1, IV) is the best 
response. For P r: (A (A A (PA, (1, R) >- (1, N), (2, R), so (1, R) is the best 
response. For pE (p2 (p), oo), (2, R) >- (1, R) >- (1, N) , so (2, R) is the best 
response. Therefore for any p the best response can be derived without 
reference to p3(p). 
Part (ii). For p EE [0, p2 (p)), (1, N) >- (1, R) >- (2, R), so (1, N) is the best 
response. For pE (p, (p), p, (p)), (1, N), (2, R) >- (1, R), so the best response 
is either (1, N) or (2, R). For p E=- (p, (p), oo), (2, R) >- (1, R) >- (1, IV), so (2, 
R) is the best response. Therefore, (1, R) is never optimally chosen and 
p3(p), which governs the preference relation between (1, N) and (2, R) is 
sufficient to detennine the best response. 28 QED. 
In the next Section we show-that Lemma 5(i) can be invoked under quite general 
restnctions on t, c, G, I, which reduces the set of inequality conditions from eight 
to five. In turn, this makes the analysis of equilibrium behaviour considerably 
more tractable. 
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PE Game with Entry by Firm 3 (S, = R) 
We begin with the penultimate stage of the PE game: finn 3's entry decision. 
Given that 3's expected profits are zero if it chooses 0, we use 3's expected 
profit functions from Section 3.1 to derive the following decision rules. 
In response to {Q, N), (1, N)) R >- 0 iff 
P> II 
(IPE) 
R(O, c)-p 
p 
In response to {Q, N), (1, R)} R >- 0 iff 
> 2.2-1 1. 
P2 
(2PE) 
R(O, c)-p-(I-p)+- R(O, t) 
lu P 
RHS(2PE) is strictly convex on p r= [0,1] with a minimum on pE (0.5,1]. 
(When t ý: 0.5 so R(O, t) = R(O, c) = Rm(O), RHS(2PE) has a minimum at p=1 -) 
In response to {(I, N), (2, R)) R >- 0i ff 
(3PE) 
p 
R(O, c). p. (I-p) 
In response to ((I, R), (1, R)) R >- 0i ff 
(4PE) 
R(O, c) P)2 + R(O, t) _p2. (I_p) 
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In response to ((I, R), (2, R)) R >- 0i ff 
2-1 
>2 
R(O, c) _ P. (I _ P)2 + R(O, t)-p7 -(I-p) 
(5PE) 
Both RHS(4PE) and RHS(5PE) are strictly convex on pE [0,1] with interior 
minima. 
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In response to 1(2, R), (2, R)} R >- 0 iff 
R(O, c) P. 
(I_P)2 
RHS (6PE) is strictly convex on pE [0,1 ] with a minimum at p= 1/3. 
(6PE) 
As in the BE game, the critical p-values defined above can increase as p 
approaches 1. The reason for this is the same as in the BE game: a choice of R 
generally only realises a profit when firin 3 alone innovates successfully, the 
probability of which approaches 0 as p approaches 1. Lemma 6 examines how 
the critical p-value where firm 3 chooses R over 0 changes with the incumbents' 
selected corporate structures. 
Lemma 6. The critical p-value where firm 3 optimally chooses R over 0 
increases with the number of sunk investments (in either geenfield-FDI or 
R&D) undertaken by the incumbents. Specifically, (i) RHS(6PE) > 
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RHS(5PE) > RHS(4PE); (ii) RHS(4PE) ý! RHS(3PE); (iii) RHS(3PE) 
RHS(2PE); and (iv) RHS(2PE) > RHS(IPE). 
Proof. By inspection of RHS(lPE) to RHS(6PE). The two relations in (i) and (iii) 
rely on R(O, t) > 0. (ii) holds with strict inequality iff R(O, c) > R(O, t), i. e. 
iff t<0.5; otherwise R(O, c) = R(O, t) = RM(O) and RHS(4PE) degenerates 
into RHS(3PE). (iv) holds iff 2. R(O, c) > R(O, 1), which is always satisfied 
because R(O, c) ý: R(O, t). 
The number of sunk investments undertaken by the incumbents varies from 0 
under {(I, N), (1, N)) to 4 under {(2, R), (2, R)J. Lemma 6 formalizes the 
intuition from Lemma 4(iv): by undertaking additional sunk investments the 
incumbents can decrease firm 3's expected profits and thereby increase the 
critical p at which entry occurs. Therefore, strategic entry-deterring behaviour by 
the incumbents would imply a larger number of sunk investments (ceteris 
paribus) in the PE equilibrium than in the BE equilibrium. 
We derive the equilibrium industrial structure of the PE game in the next Section. 
By combining the analysis of the incumbents' best responses in the BE game 
with firm 3's decision rules set out above, we are able to identify cases where the 
entry threat is not credible and so the equilibrium industrial structure from the 
BE game prevails (Lemma 4). Whenever firm 3 does optimally enter at the BE 
equilibrium, the incumbents' equilibrium choices may change. Using the 
intuition gained above on entry-deterring and -accommodating strategies, we 
derive the PE game's equilibrium by conjecturing the incumbents' best responses 
to a credible entry threat and then checking the result. 
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1.3.3. Nash Equilibria. 
Equilibrium Industrial Structures in the BE Game (S3 =0) 
Our primary purpose is to investigate the effects of p,, u on equilibrium choices. 
To make this task tractable we place restrictions on the four cost parameters. In 
the Appendix we show that the following two assumptions on the cost 
parameters are sufficient uniquely to determine the equilibrium industrial 
structures of the BE game in (p, p)-space. 30 
(B) R(O, c+t)-R(c, c+t)+R(t, c)-R(O, t) >0 
(C) Gý: I>O 
Assumption (B) on t, c is shown below to be only slightly more restrictive than 
our maintained assumption (A). (In general (B) holds if the gap (c - t) is 
sufficiently large. ) Given our solution method we can distinguish two types of 
variation in the cost parameters. Nondrastic variations in t, c, Gl are consistent 
with both (B) and (C) continuing to hold: the plot of BE equilibria continues to 
take the form shown in Figure 1.4 (although the inter-regional boundaries will 
shift). Drastic variations, on the other hand, alter the form of the plot in Figure 
1.4 (e. g. by causing existing regions to disappear and new ones to emerge). 
Because we are able to show that (B), (C) continue to hold under wide ranges of 
variation for the cost parameters, our discussion below on the comparative-statics 
effects of changes in the cost parameters focusses on nondrastic variations. 
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Given assumptions (B), (C), Figure 1.4 illustrates the equilibrium industrial 
structures of the BE game in (p, p)-space. (A derivation is given in the 
Appendix. ) 
[FIGURE 1.4 IS OVERLEAF] 
Key to Figure 1.4 
Region Equilibrium Industrial Structure under BE 
f(l. , IV), (1, N); 0 
{(l, IV), (1, R); 0 
{(l, R), (1, R); 0) 
IV {(I, R), (1, R); 01; ((1, N), (2, R); 0} 
v ((2, R), (2, R); 0} * 
(Note: * denotes a dominant strategy equilibrium. ) 
We examine the equilibrium properties of the BE and PE games simultaneously 
below (because they have several features in common). Before that we solve the 
PE game for its equilibrium industrial structures given p, p. 
Equilibrium Industrial Structures in the PE Game (S3 E {O, Rj) 
As with the BE game above, we look for a general solution to the PE game in (p, 
p)-space that is robust to changes in the cost parameters. Two conditions on the 
cost parameters are sufficient to generate the plot of equilibrium industrial 
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P 
p 
0.5 
Figure 1.4: Equilibrium industrial structures in the BE game 
Inter-regional boundaries: I/Il boundary is RHS(IBE); II/Ill boundary is 
RHS(4BE); III/IV lower boundary is RHS(2BE); III/IV upper boundary is 
RHS(7BE); III/V boundary is RHS(5BE). 
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structures in the PE game that we present below: first, assumption (C) on Gj is 
maintained; second, we replace assumption (B) on t, c with 
R(O, c+ t) - R(c, c+ t) + R(t, c) - R(O, c) >0 
Because R(O, c) 'a R(O, t) (B)' is (wcakly) tighter than (B). In terms of our 
solution to the PE game assumptions (B)', (C) define nondrastic variations in 
costs. 
The mechanics of deriving best responses and equilibrium behaviour in the PE 
game are set out in the Appendix. The solution method operates as follows. 
Using Lemma 6 we first derive firm 3's optimal choice in each region of Figure 
4. If 3 optimally chooses 0 at the BE equilibrium, then of course that 
equilibrium industrial structure is sustained under potential entry (Lemma 4). If 
3's optimal response to the BE equilibrium is R, then we conjecture the 
incumbents' new best responses and check the result. 
Figure 1.5 illustrates the equilibrium industrial structures of the PE game. 
[FIGURE 1.5 IS OVERLEAF] 
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JU 
p 
Figure 1.5: Equilibrium industrial structures in the PE game 
Inter-regional boundaries: I/II boundary is RHS(IBE); II/Ill boundary is 
RHS(4BE); III/IV lower boundary and IV/V boundary is RHS(2BE); IILqV 
upper boundary and III/V upper boundary is RHS(7BE); III/V lower boundary is 
RHS(2PE); HIM boundary is RHS(4PE); VI/VII boundary is RHS(5BE); 
VI/VIII boundary and VII/VII1 boundary is RHS(5PE); VIII/IX boundary is 
RHS(6PE); IX/X boundary is RHS(A13). 
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0.5 
Key to Figure 1.5 31 
Region Equilibrium Industrial Structure under PE 
I ((I,, N), (1, IV); 01 
{(I, N), (1, R); 0) 
{(I, R), (1, R); 0} 
IV {(1, R), (1, R); 01; {(I, N), (2, R); 0) 
v {(I, R), (1, R); 01; {(1, N), (1, N); R} or {(l, N), (2, R); 0} 
vi ((I, R), (1, R); R} * or ((1, R), (2, R); 0) 
Vil {(2, R), (2, R); 0) * 
Vill ((I, R), (1, R); R}; {(I, R), (1, R); R) or 1(2, R), (2, R); 0) 
Ix {(1, R), (1, R); Rj 
x j(2, R), (2, R); R} * 
(Note: * denotes a dominant strategy equilibrium. ) 
In the key to Figure 1.5 multiple equilibria within a region are separated by 
semicolons. Where PE equilibria are separated by 'or', the relevant equilibrium 
depends on whether entry by firm 3 is accommodated (R) or strategically 
deterred (0) by the incumbents. 
In Section 1.4 we examine the related issues of (i) how the incumbents respond 
to the entry threat (accommodate vs. deter); and (ii) how the entry threat affects 
equilibrium industrial structures relative to the BE case. In the remainder of this 
Section we discuss first the similarities between the BE and PE equilibria 
depicted in Figures 1.4 and 1.5 respectively. Focussing on the BE game for 
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concreteness, we next consider how strategic rivalry between the incumbents 
affects equilibrium behaviour (although our conclusions could be extended to the 
PE game). Finally we analyse the effects on Figures 1.4 and 1.5 of nondrastic 
variations in the cost parameters. 
Comparative statics: the equilibrium effects of varyingp,, u 
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 provide empirical implications for the relationships between 
p, p and equilibrium levels of greenfield-FDI and R&D investment. 32 The derived 
relationships can be quite complex. Consider first the effect of changes in y. In 
the BE game increasing p in low-p industries shifts the equilibrium successively 
from {(I, N), (1, N)} (region I); to {(I, N), (1, R)) (region II); to {(I, R), (1, R)} 
(region III); to ((2, R), (2, R)j (region V). A similar sequence can be observed in 
the PE game if the incumbents accommodate entry. Equilibrium industry 
spen ing on both greenfield-FDI and R&D increases with p (although not 
smoothly). (Note, however, that one-way FDI flows are never observed in the BE 
game: the equilibrium industrial structure jumps from two national (exporting) 
firms to two MNEs (FDI cross-hauling). Furthermore, if entry is deterred in the 
PE game, intra-industry greenfield-FDI flows will fall as p increases from region 
VIII to region IX, before returning to 2-G in region X. ) These general predictions 
appear intuitively reasonable: in bigger markets, firms are more easily able to 
shoulder the sunk costs of greenfield-FDI and R&D. 
In high-p industries the relationships between u and equilibrium sunk 
investments are more complex. Increases in u in the BE game shift the 
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equilibrium industrial structure successively from {(I, N), (1, N)} (region I); to 
{(I, N), (1, R)) (region II); to ((I, R), (1, R)) (region III); to ((I, R), (1, R)l or 
{(I, N), (2, R)) (region IV); to ffl, R), (1, R)) (region III); to {(2, R), (2, R)) 
(region V). If the ((I, R), (1, R)) equilibrium is selected in region IV, then there 
is no difference between low- and high-p industries in terms of the sequence of 
equilibrium industrial structures as p rises. However, if the asymmetric ((I, N), 
(2, R)) equilibrium is selected, then we will observe 're-switching' in terms of 
both greenfield-FDI and R&D behaviour. The positive relationships between u 
and both industry greenfield-FDI and industry R&D would be broken by region 
IV, where the equilibrium switches from both firms investing in R&D to only 
one and from two national (exporting) firms to one MNE and one exporter, 
before switching back again when region III is re-entered at higher values of p. 33 
(Similar 'perverse' relationships can be inferred from the PE game in Figure 1.5 -) 
The effect of changes in p is even less straightforward than that of changes in 14 
For brevity, we shall only highlight the most interesting aspects of the 
relationship between p-values and equilibria. 34 As in the case of varying p, it is 
clear that equilibrium industry spending on greenfield-FDI and R&D need not be 
increasing in p. In very large markets, increasing p in the BE game will take us 
successively through the following equilibrium industrial structures: ((I, IV), (1, 
IV)) (region I); then ffl, N), (1, R)) (region II); then ((I, R), (1, R)) (region III); 
then 1(2, R), (2, R)l (region V); then [(I, R), (1, R)l (region III); then ((I, N), (29 
R)j or ffl, R), (1, R)) (region IV). If the ffl,, N), (2, R)j equilibrium is selected 
in region IV, then equilibrium industry R&D spending will be decreasing in p for 
large markets. Furthermore, in large markets greenfield-FDI cross-hauling only 
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occurs for intermediate p-values: for higher p-values the equilibrium industrial 
structure 're-switches' to one of two national (exporting) finns, before finally 
one-way greenfield-FDI arises in equilibrium when p -= 1. 
(Again, similar 
'perverse' relationships can be inferred from the PE game in Figure 1.5. ) The 
intuition for some of these relationships can be seen by considering why (1, N) is 
a best response to (2, R) for p =- I in the BE game (i. e. how the f(l, N), (2, R)) 
equilibrium arises). Facing a foreign rival's choice of (2, R), an incumbent will 
only undertake the sunk investments associated with (1, R) or (2, R) if it expects 
to acquire a marginal production cost advantage over its rival. The probability of 
this is p. (l - p), which tends to 0 as p approaches 1. Therefore, for p =- 1 (1, N) 
must be the best response to (2, R) in the BE game. 
Proposition 1 summarises the empirical implications of Figures 1.4 and 1.5. 
Proposition 1. (i) Equilibrium industrial structures in the BE and PE games 
depend on both p andu (ii) Equilibrium industry greenfield-FDIflows and 
R&D investment depend on p and p in complex ways. In particular, for 
certain sets of parameter values equilibrium industry spending on 
greenfield-FDI and R&D may be decreasing in p and A 
Proposition I emphasises the complexity of equilibria in the BE and PE games: 
part (i) draws attention to the fact that none of the inter-regional boundaries in 
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 are either horizontal or vertical. Part (ii) of Proposition I 
highlights two striking non-monotonicities. First, equilibrium sunk expenditures 
on greenfield-FDI and R&D may be decreasing in p. This is due to our 
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assumption of Bertrand competition in homogeneous goods. As in Stiglitzs 
(1987) critique of the 'contestability doctrine', Bertrand competitors in a 
homogeneous good will only incur sunk costs if they are likely to generate a 
marginal cost advantage. For example, in our BE game (Figure 1.4) playing (2, 
R) cannot be a best response to (2, R) for p =- 1 because the most likely outcome 
is a market price of 0 in both countries and a loss of G+I for both firms. This 
underlies the switch in equilibrium industrial structure from {(2, R), (2, R); 0) to 
((I, R), (1, R); 0} as we move rightwards from region V to region III in Figure 
1.4. The second non-monotonicity is that equilibrium sunk expenditures may be 
decreasing in p. For example, as we move upwards from region VII to region 
VIII in Figure 1.5 (the PE game) an equilibrium of {(l, R), (1, R); RI replaces 
{(2, R), (2, R); 0): total greenfield-FDI flows fall from 2-G to 0. This contrasts 
with the findings of Shaked and Sutton (1987, Corollary to Proposition 11) and 
Sutton (1998, pp. 58-61) that increases in market size are associated with higher 
spending on fixed costs by incumbents, rather than entry (or 'fragmentation'). A 
key difference between our analysis and that of Shaked and Sutton (1987) is that 
the incumbents and the entrant make their corporate structure choices 
sequentially in our PE game. As we show below (see Section 1.4 and Proposition 
8(i)), the incumbents' equilibrium corporate structure choices are highly sensitive 
to whether entry by finn 3 is to be accommodated (R) or strategically deterred 
(0), and a switch from deterrence to accommodation as p rises can reduce the 
incumbents' equilibrium sunk expenditures. 
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Strategic rivalry between incumbents in the BE game. 
Three types of strategic interaction are noteworthy in the BE game, and we 
devote a Proposition to each. 
Proposition 2. Two-way relationships exist between greenfield-FDI and R&D (ti 
la Petit and Sanna-Randaccio) in the BE game. (i) An incumbent that is 
committed to investing in R&D is 'more likely'to undertake greenfield-FDI 
than one that is committed to not investing in R&D. (ii) An incumbent that 
is committed to maintaining 2 plants is 'more likely' to undertake R&D 
than one that is committed to maintaining only its home plant. 
Proof Part (i) follows directly from Lemma I(i): given that an incumbent 
chooses N over R, I plant strictly dominates 2 plants. However, incumbents 
do occasionally choose (2, R) over (1, R) (e. g. whenever (2, R) arises in 
equilibrium). 
Part (ii). Consider firm I for concreteness. If committed to I plant, firm I 
will undertake R&D iff R, ((I, R), S2; 0) - R, ((I, N), S2; 0) > I. If committed 
to 2 plants, firm I will undertake R&D iff 
R, ((2, R), S2; 0) - R, ((2, N), S2; 0) > I. From Lemma I (i) we have 
Rl((2, N), S2; 0) = R, ((I, N), S2; 0). Therefore, the second inequality 
condition is weaker than the first iff Rj(2, R), S2; 0) > R, ((I, R), 
S2; 0) 
1, 
which holds from Lemma 2(i). QED. 
The aim of Proposition 2 was to reproduce the two-way relationships between 
greenfield-FDI and R&D found by Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (1998,2000). 
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However, it should be noted that the procedure of examining how an exogenous 
change to one of the sunk-investment decisions affects the other sunk-investment 
decision is really an abuse of our modelling structure. Rather than depending on 
each other, the two sunk-investment decisions should together be viewed as 
depending on the qxogenous parameters p, A t, c, G, L 
Proposition 3. Equilibrium industrial structures in the BE game can exhibit 
Prisoner's Dilemma characteristics. 
Proof. In the Prisoner's Dilemma game a dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE) is 
Pareto dominated by another (non-equilibrium) set of strategies. From the 
Appendix we know that 3 symmetric dominant strategy equilibria exist in 
Figure 1.4. Let us focus on the ((2, R), (2, R); 0) DSE in region V. The 
j(2, R), (2, R); 01 DSE is Pareto dominated by an industrial structure of 
{(l, N), (1, N); 0) iff Eir, ((I, N), (1, N); 0) > E7r, ((2, R), (2, R); 0), or G> 
2. p. (l - p). R(O, c) - R(O, c+ t) -L Region V is s. t. [R(O, c) - R(t, c)] -p-(l - 
> G. These two inequalities place bounds on G. They can both be 
satisfied simultaneously iff I> [R(O, c) + RQ, c)j-p-(I - p) - R(O, c+ t). 
This lower bound on I is consistent with G ýt I from assumption (C), which 
underlies Figure 1.4, iff R(O, c+ t) > 2-R(t, c). p. (l -p), which holds for all 
because R(O, c+ t) > R(t, c) and max 2-p-(l -p) = 0.5. QED. 
Proposition 3 shows that it is possible to choose Gj to make the BE game a 
Prisoner's Dilemma in region V of Figure 1.4. The Prisoner's Dilemma 
characteristic of equilibria in the BE game is particularly noteworthy because it 
confirms our conjecture in the Introduction that strategic interfimi rivalry is a 
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crucial element in the determination of equilibrium industrial structures. 
Whenever the BE game is a Prisoner's Dilemma, the two firms would prefer to 
collude in order to achieve the Pareto dominant outcome; however, such 
collusion is rendered infeasible in our one-shot modelling structure by dominant 
free-rider incentives. Therefore, we conclude in line with Horstmann and 
Markusen (1992, p. 116) 'that we cannot ignore the strategic aspects of market 
structure and simply infer market structure by comparing profit levels under 
various strategies'. Of course, the method of 'infer[ring] market structure by 
comparing profit levels' (and ignoring strategic aspects) is fundamental to the 
OLI paradigm, which relegates interfirm rivalry by employing a representative- 
firm framework to determine equilibrium. 
Finally, we compare the equilibrium behaviour of the duopolists in the BE game 
with that of a (global) monopolist. The monopolist is identical to either of the 
incumbents in the BE game; however, because (by definition) the monopolist 
does not face a foreign rival its incentives to innovate and locate production 
abroad are exclusively 'pure'. Therefore we are investigating the effects of the 
cstrategic' incentives to undertake greenfield-FDI and R&D under arise under 
duopolistic rivalry by using the monopoly case as a benchmark. 35 
Lemma 7 prepares the ground for the result in Proposition 4. 
Lemma 7. Under assumption (C) and for sufficiently high p-values, a global 
monopolist will (i) never choose a corporate structure of (2, IV) in 
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equilibrium; and (ii) choose equilibrium corporate structures in the 
sequence (1, N), (1, R), (2, R) as p rises away from 0. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Proposition 4. Under assumption (C) and for sufficiently high p-values (as 
defined by Lemma 7), (i) a necessary-and-sufficient condition for 
greenfield-FDI to be 'more likely' in equilibrium under monopoly than 
under BE duopoly is c 4? xm(t); and (ii) sujficient conditions for R&D to be 
'more likely' in equilibrium under BE duopoly than under monopoly are c 
and c+t4? xu(c). 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Proposition 4 highlights a key difference between the greefield-FDI and R&D 
decisions, which arises when the degree of 'competition' in the industry is 
varied. For c ý: xm(t) and c+t ýt x"(c), greenfield-FDI is 'more likely' under 
monopoly but R&D is 'more likely' under duopoly. The intuition for the 
greenfield-FDI result is as follows. Establishing a plant abroad increases an 
incumbent's net revenues in the BE game only if it also acquires a marginal 
production cost advantage over its foreign rival (via successful R&D). However, 
for the monopolist greenfield-FDI increases net revenue regardless of whether 
R&D is successful (via the elimination of trade costs). Therefore, the likelihood 
of greenfield-FDI in a duopoly is lower than in a monopoly because of the rent- 
dissipating effect of increases in 'competition'. (The greenfield-FDI result will 
not hold if c< xm(t) because in that case an additional incentive for a BE 
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incumbent to undertake geenfield-FDI will be to 'escape competition'; see 
below. ) 
The intuition for the R&D result concerns firms' motives to 'escape competition' 
by investing in R&D. The incentive to perfomi R&D depends on the difference 
between the rents of a successful innovator and an unsuccessful one. A global 
monopolist has a weaker incentive to perform R&D than a duopolist due to 
Arrow's 'replacement effect': because it is already enjoying monopoly rents 
without undertaking R&D, its gain from undertaking R&D (difference in 
expected profit levels) is reduced. (The proof of Proposition 4(ii) places two 
restrictions on t, c for ease. It can be shown that the area in (c, t)-space that 
satisfies c ý! x"(t) and c+tý: x"(c) represents 40% of the area defined by 
assumption (A). ) 
1.3.4. Nondrastic Variations in Costs. 
In this Section we consider the effects of variations in the four cost parameters 
t, c, G, I on the equilibrium industrial structures in the BE and PE games. We 
restrict our attention to nondrastic variations, so assumption (C) on Gj continues 
to hold; as do assumptions (B) and (B)' on t, c in the BE and PE games 
respectively. Our first task is to establish the legitimacy of this focus by showing 
that assumptions (B), (B)', (C) are compatible with substantial ranges of variation 
in the cost parameters. Because assumption (C) is stated explicitly in terms of 
Gj, the reader can readily assess for herself whether the restriction it contains is 
reasonable. However, the opposite is true of assumptions (B) and (B), which t, c 
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only enter via the net revenue function. In Figure 1.6 the solid lines (B) and (B)' 
trace the loci of points in (c, t)-space where the two constraints bind. (A 
derivation is given in the Appendix. For the moment, ignore the dashed lines in 
Figure 1.6. ) The area below lines (B) and (B)' satisfies the two constraints on t, c. 
Note that for I ý: 0.5 constraints (B) and (B)' are the same: this is because for t ý: 
0.5, R(O, t) = R(O, c) = e(O). However, for I<0.5, where RM(O)'2: R(O, c) > R(O, 
t), (B)' is tighter than (B). 
[FIGURE 1.6 IS OVERLEAF] 
Proposition 5 formally describes the restrictiveness of assumptions (B) and (B)'. 
Proposition 5. For all ce (0,1) assumption (B) is satisfied on a non-empty open 
interval of t-values, te (0, t *) with t*<c. Likewisefor assumption (B) ý 
Proof. From inspection of Figure 1.6. 
Proposition 5 is a loose description of Figure 1.6 in the sense that it gives us no 
indication of the size of the interval of permissible I-values (although it does state 
that such an interval always exists). A simple indicator of the t-interval's size is 
that t* > 0.5-c for both (B) and (B)'. Therefore, we can conclude that assumptions 
(B) and (B)' are consistent with large sets of t- and c-values. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 
depict general, rather than special, cases. 
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0.7- 
0.6- 
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0.4- 
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0.2- 
0.1 -- ................... 
0- 
0<c<1 
Figure 1.6: Feasible (c, t)-pairs 
Notes 
c varies between 0 and I on the horizontal axis. (c, t)-pairs above the 45' line are 
ruled out by the maintained assumption (A). The upper (resp. lower) bold line is 
the locus of (c, I)-pairs where constraint (B) (resp. (B)') binds. The admissible (c, 
I)-pairs lie below the bold lines. The pale lines cover (c, t)-pairs where numerical 
analysis showed the sufficient condition from Lemma 8 for LHS(AlO) >0 to be 
violated. 
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Having demonstrated the generality of our solutions, we next consider the effects 
of changes in the sunk costs Gj. There are two distinct effects to consider. First, 
changes in Gj may affect the incumbents' choice between accommodating and 
deterring entry in regions V, VI and VIII of Figure I. S. We consider these effects 
in Section 1.4. Second, changes in Gj will shift the inter-regional boundaries in 
Figures 1.4 and 1.5, thus possibly altering the equilibrium industrial structure 
associated with a given (p, p)-pair. We now consider these effects. 
We show in the Appendix that the shapes of regions V and VII in Figure 5 
depend on whether 
2.1 - [R(O, c) - R(t, c)] - R(O, t) >0 (A8) repeated G 
is satisfied. (The general shapes of all other regions in Figures 1.4 and 1.5 are 
robust to changes in Gj, provided that assumption (C) continues to hold. ) If (A8) 
fails, then (i) the bottom boundary of region V, RHS(2PE), will extend to p=1, 
rather than meeting RHS(2BE) in the interior of Figure 1.5; and (ii) region VII 
ceases to exist. While (A8) holds when G=I, some Gj that satisfy assumption 
(C) imply LHS(AS) ,:: ý 0.36 Intuitively, for GO I LHS(A8) =- - R(O, t), so (A8) 
fails. 
Given that the initial Gj satisfy assumption (C), increasing G or decreasing I will 
always be nondrastic cost variations. We consider the effects of these two 
changes in turn. 37 Because Gj enter the expressions for inter-regional boundaries 
in Figures 1.4 and 1.5 explicitly, the implications of nondrastic variations are 
immediately clear. We consider only the BE game (Figure 1-4) for brevity, 
although our conclusions can be applied directly to the lower parts of Figure 1.5 
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(where entry never occurs) and our techniques can be used throughout Figure 
1.5. Increasing G will shift RHS(2BE) and RHS(5BE) upwards but will leave the 
other three inter-regional boundaries unchanged. This will move region V 
upwards and will squeeze region IV from below. Decreasing I will shift 
RHS(IBE), RHS(4BE) and RHS(7BE) downwards, while leaving the other two 
boundaries unchanged. Therefore, region II will shift downwards and region IV 
will be squeezed from the left. For some 'marginal' (p, p)-pairs, these changes in 
GJ will shift the equilibrium industrial structure. In all the cases just described, 
the induced changes in equilibria are intuitive. 
Gauging the effects of nondrastic variations in t, c on the inter-regional 
boundaries in Figures 1.4 and 1.5 is complicated by the fact that t, c do not enter 
the boundary equations explicitly (but only via the net revenue function). The 
analysis is further complicated because several realisations of the net revenue 
function typically enter the denominator of any given boundary equation. We 
briefly consider some of the more straightforward possibilities in Figure 1.4 by 
focussing on the positions of RHS(2BE), RHS(5BE) and RHS(7BE). A 
nondrastic rise in t will increase the denominators of RHS(2BE) and RHS(5BE), 
thereby shifting those inter-regional boundaries downwards. The rise in t will 
also decrease the denominator of RHS(7BE), shifting that boundary upwards. 
The combined effect of these changes in Figure 1.4 is to increase the sizes of 
regions IV and V, where greenfield-FDI arises in equilibrium. The intuition is 
that an increase in t makes tariff-jumping greenfield-FDI more attractive. A rise 
in c 38 will (weakly) decrease the denominators of RHS(2BE) and RHS(5BE). 39 
This will shift RHS(2BE) and RHS(5BE) upwards. The increase in c will 
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(weakly) increase the denominator of RHS(7BE), pushing the inter-regional 
boundary downwards. The combined effect of these changes in Figure 1.4 is to 
decrease the sizes of regions IV and V. The intuition is that, because undertaking 
greenfield-FDI allows a firm to compete more aggressively in the foreign market, 
the benefit from undertaking greenfield-FDI falls as the foreign incumbent 
becomes a 'softer' rival (i. e. crises). 
1.4. The Effect of the Entry Threat. 
Of course, the crucial distinction between the BE and PE games is the presence 
of an entry threat in the latter (i. e. stage 2 in Figure 1.3). In this Section we 
consider two interrelated aspects of the entry threat. First, when will the 
incumbents select strategies of strategic entry-deterrence over ones of 
accommodation? Second, for given parameter values how do equilibrium 
industrial structures in the PE game compare to those in the BE game? (Clearly 
these two analyses are intimately interrelated because the PE equilibria depend 
on whether the incumbents choose to deter or accommodate entry. ) The second- 
step analysis will give an indication of whether the inclusion of potential entry is 
significant within our modelling structure; and it will also test the intuition we 
provided in the Introduction on the interrelationships between firms' FDI, R&D 
and entry decisions. 
We consider first the incumbents' choice between entry-deterrence and 
accommodation. From Figure 1.5 it is clear that PE equilibria where entry is 
accommodated certainly arise for high p-values (i. e. regions VIII, IX and X). 
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Conversely, for low p-values entry is blockaded (i. e. regions I, II, III and IV). 
For some 'intermediate' p-values (i. e. regions V, VI and VIII) there potentially 
exist either entry-acconunodating or entry-deterring equilibria (which are 
separated by 'or' in the key to Figure 1.5), but assumptions (B)' and (C) are too 
loose to allow us to discriminate between them in general. However, we can 
isolate some of the determinants of whether entry-accommodation or entry- 
deterrence will arise in equilibrium. In the Appendix we derive the following 
necessary-and-sufficient conditions for the entry-deterring PE equilibrium to be 
selected for all p in regions V, VI and VIII. 
Region V {(I, N), (2, R); 0) is selected over {(I,, N), (1, N); RI for all p iff 
2- 1. R(c, c+t)+2. [R(O, c+ t) - R(c, c+ t)) - R(O, C)l -p 
(A9) repeated 
G 
+1 +1 [2-R(O, c)-R(O, t)]- P2 >0 G 
). 
Region VI {(I, R), (2, R); 01 is selected over {(I, R), (1, R); R) for all p iff 
G. 
R(c, c+t)+ 
t-G 
. [R(O, c+t) -2 - R(c, c+t) -R(t, c)] -R(O, c)l -p 
+t 
I 
. [R(c, c+t)-R(O, c+t)+R(O, c)+2. R(t, c)]+2. R(O, c)-R(O, t) p za 
I. 
+ 
t-I 
- [R(O, t) -R(O, c) -R(t, c)] -R(O, c) + R(O, t)l- p3>0 
(AIO) repeated 
Region VIII {(2, R), (2, R); 0) is selected over {(I, R), (1, R); R) as the second 
PE equilibrium for all p iff p> RHS(5BE) or 
68 
4- 
G. 
R(O, c)-(I-p)> 
(G 
+ 1) 
x 12 - R(O, c) - [4 - R(O, c) - R(O, p+ [2 - R(O, c) - R(O, P2 
and 
(A 11)' repeated 
2- 
G. 
[R(O, c) - R(t, c)] -2- R(O, c) + 
t4- 
G. 
R(t, c) +4- R(O, c) - R(O, t)l -p 
- 2- 
1. [R(O, c)+R(t, c)]+2-R(O, c)-R(O, t) p2>0 G 
I. 
(A12)'repeated 
(Note that the case of region VIII is made convoluted because the number of PE 
equilibria is not fixed: there could be a unique entry-accommodating equilibrium 
of ((I, R), (1, R); R), or there might exist both entry-deterring and entry- 
accommodating equilibria. This is not so in regions V and VI, where two PE 
equilibria will always exist. ) 
We begin by examining whether these conditions hold when G=I, which is a 
(simple) polar case under assumption (C). 
Proposition 6. If G=I, then (i) {(1, IV), (2, R); 0) is selected over ((I, N), (1, 
N); R) for all (p, p) in region V of Figure 1.5; and (ii) given sufficiently 
high p, a second equilibrium of ((2, R), (2, R); 0) existsfor all p in region 
VIII of Figure 1.5. 
Proof. Part (i). If G=I, (A9) becomes R(c, c+ t) + (R(O, c+ t) - R(c, c+ t) 
- R(O, c)) -p + (2-R(O, c) - R(O, t)) -p 
2>0. Because 2. R(O, c) > R(O, t), LHS 
is strictly convex in p. Therefore, a sufficient (but unnecessary) condition 
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for LHS >0 on p c= [0,1 ] is that the tangent to LHS at p=0 be ', a 0 at p=1. 
This requires R(O, c+ t)-: 2! R(O, c), which clearly holds. 
Part (ii). Condition (Al 1): if G=I, (Al 1)' becomes 2-R(O, c)-(l - p) > 
2. R(O, c) - [4. R(O, c) - R(O, 1)]p + [2-R(O, c) - R(O, t)]. p2 . Note that LHS = 
RHS = 2. R(O, c) at p=0, and LHS = RHS =0 at p=1. Therefore, because 
LHS is linear in p but RHS is strictly convex in p, we have LHS > RHS on 
E 1). 
Condition (A12)': if G=I, then (A12)' becomes -2. R(t, c) + {4. R(O, c) 
4. R(t, c) - R(O, t)) -p - (4-R(O, c) + 2-R(t, c) - R(O, t)l. p 
2 ý:. 0. This condition 
clearly fails at p=0. Because LHS =0 at p=1, (from Viete's rule on the 
product of roots) the second root of LHS is 2. R(t, c)1{4-R(O, c) + 2. R(t, c) - 
R(O, t)}, which is strictly less than 1. Therefore, p> 2-R(t, c)1[4. R(O, c) 
2-R(t, c) - R(O, 1)) defines 'sufficiently high p'. This p-value is strictly less 
than that where RHS(5BE) intersects RHS(5PE) when G=I, which is p= 
2-R(t, c)1{2-R(O, c) - R(O, t)). QED. 
Part (i) of Proposition 6 establishes that the second equilibrium in region V of 
Figure 1.5 is the entry-deterring ((I, N), (2, R); 0) when G=L Under 
assumption (C), we know that two PE equilibria (one entry-accommodating, the 
other entry-deterring) will always exist in region VIII above RHS(5BE). 
However, below RHS(5BE) only the entry-accommodating equilibrium may 
survive. Part (ii) of Proposition 6 establishes that a second equilibrium of ((2, R), 
(2, R); 0) exists below RHS(5BE) when G=I. 
70 
Investigating whether entry-deterrence or -accommodation arises in equilibrium 
in region VI is complicated by the intractable form of condition (AlO). 
LHS(AIO) is of the form cc + p. p + 7. p 
2+8. 
p 
3, 
where cc, y>0>0,8 and cc +0 
y8>0 for all Gj under assumption (C). 40 Furthermore, LHS(AIO) has two 
stationary points on p>0 (the first a local minimum and the second a local 
maximum), at least the first of which must lie within p (0,1). 
41 Ideally, we 
would like a necessary-and-sufficient condition on tc for LHS(AI 0) >0 on all 
E [0,1]. However, if derived, such a condition would be intractable. 42 Therefore, 
we use the sufficient condition for LHS(AIO) >0 on all p set out in Lemma 8. 
(As we show below, the sufficient condition in Lemma 8 is loose enough to 
provide valuable insightS. 43) 
Lemma 8. A sufficient condition for LHS(AIO) >0 on pe [0,11 is 
31 
a-r-- . j6' > 0, where cc, P, y are defined from (AIO): a =- -. R(c, c+t); 8G 
-I. [R(O, c +t) -2 - R(c, c+t) -R(t, c)] -R(O, c); and P= G 
r-I. [R(c, c+t) -R(O, c +t)+ R(O, c) +2- R(t, c)] +2- R(O, c) - R(O, t). aG 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Despite its seemingly-simple form, the sufficient condition a-r-3 -'6 2 >0 is 8 
difficult to solve analytically for an explicit relationship between t and c. (The 
reason is that cc, p,, y are potentially all quadratic functions of t and c; therefore, 
(x. y and p2 will be fourth-degree polynomials. ) Therefore, we investigate 
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numerically whether the sufficient condition for LHS(AIO) >0 on pE [0,1] 
holds. The adopted procedure is explained in the Appendix. The results of the 
numerical analysis of a-r-3-, 8 2>0 when G=I are shown in Figure 6, where 8 
the areas covered by dashed lines indicate that the sufficient condition does not 
hold. Therefore, where there are no dashed lines, we can be certain that {(l, R), 
(2, R); 0) is selected over {(I, R), (1, R); R) for all (p, p) in region VI of Figure 
1.5 when G=L Of course, because our analysis uses a sufficient condition, we 
cannot conclude that {(l, R), (1, R); R) will be selected in areas of dashed lines. 
However, plots of the cubic LHS(AlO) for given t- and c-values show that 
LHS(AlO) <0 for some (c, I)-pairs sufficiently inside the dashed region of 
Figure 1.6; therefore, although our sufficient condition is unnecessary, it does 
succeed in excluding some inadmissible (c, t)-pairs. 
A simple interpretation of the preceding analysis and of Figure 1.6 is that ((I, R), 
(2, R); 01 is 'more likely' to be selected over {(I, R), (1, R); R} in region VI of 
Figure 1.5, the higher is t. The intuition for this concerns the conventional tariff- 
jumping argument for undertaking greenfield-FDI: when t is very low, it is never 
worth shouldering the sunk cost of establishing an additional plant abroad even if 
this will deter entry. 
The preceding analysis of equilibrium selection in regions V, VI and VIII of 
Figure 1.5 set G=L Proposition 7 covers cases where G>1, which are also 
compatible with assumption (C). 
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Proposition 7. For all Gj under assumption (C), rises in G relative to I make the 
selection of entry-deterring PE equilibria (over entry-accommodating PE 
equilibria) 'less likely'in regions V, VI and VIII of Figure 1.5. Specifically, 
(i) rises in G ceteris paribus weakly increase the size of the p-interval 
where entry-accommodation is selected in equilibrium in regions V, VI and 
VIII of Figure 1.5; and (ii) in the limit as G -). co, entry-deterrence is never 
selected in equilibrium in regions VI and VIII of Figure 1.5, although 
entry-deterrence is always selectedfor some p-values in region V 
Proof. Part (i). The proof focusses on region V of Figure 1.5; the extension to 
regions VI and VIII is straightforward. The proof uses the fact that 
RHS(2PE), RHS(4PE) and RHS(5PE) are all independent of G. From the 
Appendix [(I, N), (2, R); 0) is selected over ((I, N), (1, N); RI in region V 
iff 
G+I 
R(c, c+t)+- . [R(O, c+t)+R(o, c)-R(c, c+t)]. p 
(The necessary-and-sufficient condition (A9) sets RHS(2PE) > p*. ) Clearly 
ap*IaG > 0, which is intuitive because no greenfield-FDI is undertaken 
under J(j, IV), (1, IV); R). In terms of the effect of changes in G on the 
interval of p-values in region V where ((I, N), (1,, N); R) is selected, there 
are two principal cases to consider. 
Case 1: p* < RHS(2PE) or IP > min{RHS(2BE), RHS(7BE)). Marginal 
changes in G will not affect equilibrium selection (deterrence vs. 
accommodation) for any (p, p)-pair in region V. The PE equilibrium will be 
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either ((I, N), (2, R); 01 for allp (if le < RHS(2PE)) or {(I, N), (1, N); R) 
for allp (if IP > min(RHS(2BE), RHS(7BE))). 
Case 2: /0 E (RHS(2PE), min(RHS(2BE), RHS(7BE)I, which is non- 
empty iff region V exists for given p. Marginal increases (resp. decreases) 
in G will increase (resp. decrease) the size of the interval of p-values where 
((I,, N), (1, N); R) is selected, which is p (=- (RHS(2PE), IP). 
(When le = RHS(2PE) (resp. = min(RHS(2BE), RHS(7BE))), increases 
(resp. decreases) in G will alter the pinterval where {(I, IV), (1, N); R) is 
selected, but decreases (resp. increases) in G will not. ) 
Part (ii). Regions VI and VIII. From the Appendix the critical p-value 
where entry-deterrence is selected over entry-accommodation depends 
positively on G but is independent of L (In the case of region VIII the 
critical p-value is defined by two inequality conditions (which must hold 
simultaneously), one of which is independent of L) Therefore, for anyp the 
critical p-value approaches oo as G -* oo. However, the upper boundaries of 
both region VI and region VIII, RHS(5PE) and RHS(6PE), depend on I but 
not G. Therefore, increases in G shift the critical p-value upwards relative 
to the inter-regional boundaries. 
Region V. The upper boundary of region V is min(RHS(2BE), 
RHS(7BE)j. RHS(7BE) depends on I but not G, so the arguments above 
apply. RHS(2BE) depends on G but not I, and as G -4 oo RHS(2BE) 
from part (i) iff R(c, c+ 1) + [R(O, c+ t) - R(c, c+ t) + R(t, c)]-p > 0, which 
holds for all p. Therefore, for p-values in region V where min (RHS(2BE), 
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RHS(7BE)) = RHS(2BE), entry-deterrence is always selected for some p in 
PE equilibrium. QED. 
The intuitive justification for the results in Proposition 7 is that, whereas finn 3 
must undertake R&D but not greenfield-FDI to enter the industry, the 
incumbents' entry-deterring strategies always entail greenfield-FDI. Therefore 
the result stems directly from our modelling structure. (Because firm 3 initially 
owns 2 plants, the cost of additional plants, G, is irrelevant to its entry decision. 
However, the incumbents must invest in greenfield-FDI to deter entry. ) 
We now turn to the second-step analysis of the effects of the entry threat in the 
PE game on equilibrium industrial structures. We use equilibrium industrial 
structures in the BE game as benchmarks. 44 In Figure 1.5 the inter-regional 
boundaries from the BE game (Figure 1.4) are plotted: four of them are also 
inter-regional boundaries in the PE game, and the remainder of RHS(5BE) (apart 
from the lower boundary of region VII) is shown as a dashed line. An interesting 
comparison is between region III in Figure 1.4 and regions III, V, VI, VIII and 
IX in Figure 1.5, which together cover the same set of (p, p)-pairs. In regions 111, 
V, VIII and IX of Figure 1.5 a PE equilibrium where both incumbents choose (1, 
R) exists for sure, as in region III of Figure 1.4; such a PE equilibrium also exists 
in region VI if G is sufficiently close to I (Propositions 6 and 7). In the lower 
regions of Figure 1.5 (111 and V) entry does not occur when both incumbents 
choose (1, R) in PE equilibrium, whereas in the upper regions (VI, VIII and IX) it 
does. 45 
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However, there exist additional PE equilibria in the area where {(I, R), (1, R); 
0) is the BE equilibrium (region III of Figure 1.4). In regions V, VI and VIII of 
Figure 1.5 an entry-deterring PE equilibrium where the incumbents undertake 
more sunk investments than at the corresponding BE equilibrium exists if G is 
sufficiently close to I (Propositions 6 and 7). (In the case of region V the two 
entry-deterring PE equilibria both, of course, entail two sunk investments. ) In 
particular, note that the entry-deterring PE equilibrium of ((I, R), (2, R); 0) in 
region VI is qualitatively different from any of the BE equilibria in Figure 1.4 (in 
terms of the incumbents' behaviour). A final distinction between the 'middle' 
areas of Figures 1.4 and 1.5 is the possibility of an entry-accommodating PE 
equilibrium of j(l, N), (1, N); R) in region V of Figure 1.5, where the 
incumbents undertake fewer sunk investments than at the corresponding BE 
equilibrium. 
We now consider the area above RHS(SBE), where {(2, R), (2, R); 0) is the 
equilibrium industrial structure of the BE game in dominant strategies (region V 
of Figure 1.4). In regions VIII and IX of Figure 1.5 (both of which lie partially 
above RHS(5BE)) entry-accommodating PE equilibria of I(l, R), (1, R); R) exist 
for sure, where the incumbents undertake fewer sunk investments than at the BE 
equilibrium. PE equilibria where both incumbents choose (2, R) exist (i) in 
regions VII and VIII (above RHS(5BE)); and (ii) in region X. In case (i) firm 3 
does not enter the industry in the resulting equilibrium industrial structure of the 
PE game, whereas in case (ii) it does. Therefore, when entry must be 
accommodated, larger markets are necessary in the PE game to induce the 
incumbents to make sunk investments (RHS(A13) > RHS(5BE) for all p); 
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otherwise the incumbents reduce their expenditures on sunk investments (region 
IX of Figure 1.5) relative to the BE case. 
In terms of Fudenberg and Tirole's (1984) taxonomy of investment strategies, the 
incumbents therefore behave as 'top dogs' when deterring entry (in regions VI 
and VIII of Figure 1.5) but as 'puppy dogs' when accommodating it (in regions 
V, VIII and IX of Figure 1.5). The 'top dog' invests in 'strength' (by undertaking 
extra sunk investments) to look tough and ward off rivals, whereas the "puppy 
dog' conspicuously avoids looking 'strong' (by reducing spending on sunk 
investments) to appear inoffensive and avert aggressive reactions from rivals. 46 
Proposition 8 sums up the comparisons between equilibrium industrial structures 
in the BE and PE games. 
Proposition 8. (i) For given parameter values, the incumbents in the PE game 
tend to adopt 'tough' (resp. 'soft) strategies when entry is deterred (resp. 
accommodated) in equilibrium by undertaking more (resp. fewer) sunk 
investments than at the corresponding BE equilibrium. (ii) Yhe entry threat 
in the PE game can induce the incumbents to choose qualitatively different 
configurations of corporate structures in equilibrium to any observed in the 
BE game. 
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1.5. Concluding Comments. 
We have analysed the equilibrium corporate structure choices of rival 
intemational duopolists both without (BE game) and with (PE game) the threat of 
entry. This modelling structure permits investigation of the interrelationships 
between firms' (greenfield-)FDI, (process) R&D and entry decisions. Our 
principal findings are 
(i) Equilibrium industry spending on greenfield-FDI and R&D in the BE game 
depends non-monotonically on p, the probability of R&D success, and A 
market size. (Proposition 1. ) 
(ii) Two-way relationships exist between the incumbents' greenfield-FDI and 
R&D decisions in the BE game, and the resulting equilibrium industrial 
structures can exhibit Prisoner's Dilemma characteristics. (Propositions 2 
and 3. ) 
(iii) Compared to the BE game, additional equilibrium industrial structures arise 
in the PE game. When entry is deterred (resp. accommodated) in PE 
equilibrium, equilibrium spending on sunk investments by the incumbents 
tends to be higher (resp. lower) than in the BE game. (Proposition 8. ) 
(iv) Whether the incumbents in the PE game choose strategies of entry- 
deterrence or -accommodation depends on the sunk costs of greenfield-FDI 
and R&D. The higher is G, the cost of greenfield-FDI, relative to I, the cost 
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of R&D, the 'more likely' is it that entry-accommodation will arise in PE 
equilibrium. (Propositions 6 and 7. ) 
Therefore, our analysis has uncovered significant interrelationships between 
firms' FDI, R&D and entry decisions in the international oligopoly under 
consideration. However, the generality of our results is, of course, limited by the 
assumptions of our modelling structure. We briefly consider four potential 
alterations to our modelling structure. First, what would be the effects of having 
the firms produce differentiated, rather than homogeneous, goods and compete in 
quantities (Cournot), rather than prices (Bertrand)? The immediate effect of these 
extensions (differentiated products, Coumot competition, or both) would be to 
make the determination of equilibrium industrial structures more complex 
because Lemma I could not be invoked to rule out certain corporate structure 
choices in equilibrium. (Bertrand competition in homogeneous products has the 
special property that rivals with equal marginal costs earn zero rents in 
equilibrium. ) Intuitively, one would expect equilibrium industrial structures to 
involve incumbent firms choosing (2, N) when p was low but p large. 
Furthermore, the property of the BE game (Figure 1.4) that (2, R) is not a best 
response to (2, R) for p =- 1 will also be sensitive to the assumption of Bertrand 
competition in homogeneous goods. (An advantage of considering a 
differentiated-products oligopoly would be that product R&D could be modelled. 
However, if for example product R&D shifted the intercept of a linear inverse 
demand function upwards, we would expect similar equilibria to those under 
process R&D. ) 
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Second, what would be the effects of having the incumbents move sequentially, 
rather than simultaneously9 Assuming sequential-moves implies the generation 
of unique equilibrium industrial structures throughout Figures 1.4 and 1.5. For 
example, we have shown (see n. 33) that only the f(l, N), (2, R); 01 equilibrium 
industrial structure would survive in region IV of Figures 1.4 and 1.5 under 
sequential-moves, with the leader selecting (2, R), which yields higher expected 
profits than either (1, N), where the follower chooses (2, R), or (1, R), where the 
follower chooses (1, R). Imposing sequential-moves is therefore a means of 
selecting between alternative candidate equilibria. Another is to assume that 
simultaneously-moving firms co-ordinate on a Pareto dominant equilibrium 
ffocal point'), if one exists. For example, if Gj are such that the second PE 
equilibrium in region V of Figure 1.5 is ((I, IV), (1, N); R), where both 
incumbents earn zero expected profits, the incumbents may co-ordinate on the 
alternative (Pareto dominant) equilibrium of {(l, R), (1, R); 0). 
A third set of modifications to our modelling structure concerns the entry 
process. The assumption that firm 3 owns two (technologically-inefficient) plants 
was justified by interpreting 'entry' as entry by diversification, rather than de 
novo entry. An alternative formulation of (de novo) entry would be for firm 3 
initially to own no plants and to choose in stage 2 of the PE game (Figure 3) (i) 
between 0,1 or 2 plants (and their locations); and (ii) whether to undertake R&D 
(on the same terrns as the incumbents). This formulation would be complicated 
relative to our PE game because of the increased number of strategic choices for 
firm 3 (and hence potential equilibrium industrial structures). (However, there 
would be a strict-dominance result: if choosing one plant only, firm 3 would 
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always prefer to site it in the country with less 'local competition'. ) In addition to 
its technical complexity, experimentation with this formulation of the entry 
process suggested that the entry threat was credible (and hence interesting) far 
less often than in the PE garne we analyse. The reason is that the alternative entry 
process described above implies that firm 3 must undertake additional sunk 
investments (relative to the PE game) in order to enter the industry (e. g. to 
acquire two plants and a marginal production cost of 0 with probability p, firm 3 
would have to sink 2-G + 1, compared to 2-1 in the PE game). Given Bertrand 
competition in homogeneous goods in the market stage, these additional sunk 
costs act as strong deterrents to entry. Because our modelling structure contains 
only one potential entrant (firm 3), it could also be argued that analysis should 
focus on the 'most credible' member of the population of potential entrants, i. e. 
that with the lowest sunk costs of entry. 
Fourth, we consider altering the solution concept from a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies, which defines equilibrium industrial structures in 
the BE and PE games. Our analysis has ignored possible mixed-strategy 
equilibria. There are several justifications for not considering mixed strategies in 
corporate structure choices (stage 1). (i) Pure-strategy equilibria were always 
found to exist (Figures 1.4 and 1.5). (ii) Parameter values where the pure-strategy 
were also dominant-strategy equilibria were isolated in the Appendix (e. g. region 
V of Figure 1.4); in these cases, no mixed-strategy equilibria exist. (iii) The 
conventional rationale for mixed-strategy equilibria is the desire to keep rivals 
guessing. This motive has no immediate relevance within our modelling 
structure. We also assume pure strategies in price setting in the market stage 
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(stage 3 of Figure 1.3). This use of pure strategies is tied to our assumption that 
firms' marginal costs of supplying both markets become common knowledge, 
because we can show that no pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium in prices 
exists when marginal costs are private knowledge (as would be the case if the 
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success/failure of R&D were private information). Therefore, an application of 
mixed strategies could arise in the market stage if our information assumptions 
were altered to make the output of R&D investment private knowledge. 
A final point on solution concepts concerns our focus on non-collusive equilibria. 
We have shown (Proposition 3) that the BE game is a Prisoner's Dilemma for 
certain parameter values. Whenever this occurs, the incumbents would prefer to 
collude to achieve the Pareto dominant outcome, but such collusion is ruled out 
in our one-shot modelling structure by dominant free-rider incentives. However, 
if we allowed for infinitely-repeated product market contact, then collusive 
equilibria might be supported by trigger strategies to punish defection. In turn, 
sunk investments in greenfield-FDI and R&D could strengthen these trigger 
strategies by allow a defector to be punished more severely. Therefore, in a 
dynamic extension of our modelling structure, collusive equilibria could arise 
cndogcnously via non-co-opcrativc play; hence the 'solution concept' becomes 
endogenous. 
Finally, we consider two applications of our modelling structure. Note that our 
BE and PE games can be generally applied to firm expansion across segmented 
product markets, rather than solely across national borders that coincide with 
segmented markets. (In this sense, there is nothing 'special' about MNEs, 
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although their various markets are probably more completely segmented than 
those faced by exclusively national finns. ) The first application is to policy 
games between national governments. For example, rival governments may non- 
co-operatively set tariffs or FD1 policies. If tariffs were determined 
endogenously, the model would be similar to those in 'strategic trade theory', 
although production locations would become endogenous. (Horstmann. and 
Markusen (1992) discuss the jumps in equilibrium industrial structures that can 
arise if I is marginally adjusted, which would characterise these models. ) 
Alternatively, suppose that national governments set their FDI policies 
endogenously, choosing between free-FDI, where inward flows of greenfield- 
FDI are unregulated, and no-FDI, where inward greenfield-FDI is banned. 
(Governments have no power over outward FDI flows. ) Equilibrium policies 
would depend on the government's objective function, and there will be a 
conflict between the interests of domestic consumers (who will favour free-FDI 
and intense competition) and domestic firms (who would prefer the protection 
afforded by no-FDI). Our modelling structure provides a framework within 
which to investigate these issues. 
The second application, which is the subject of chapter 2, is to the distinction 
between greenfield-FDI, the form of FDI modelled in the BE and PE games, and 
acquisition-FDI, whereby a firm establishes production facilities abroad by 
purchasing a local rival. Given that acquisition-FDI is a dominant component of 
empirical FDI flows but has received little theoretical attention, models where 
differentforms of FDI arise endogenously would fill a significant gap. They will 
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allow us inter alia to develop a more rounded picture of the welfare effects of 
intemational flows of FDI. 
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1.6 Endnotes. 
1 In part, these models sought to account for the observed international cross- 
hauling of trade and FDI flows between pairs of countries within the same 
industry. (This stylized empirical fact is often interpreted as being inconsistent 
with an explanation of international economic specialisation based on differing 
'comparative advantages' across countries. ) For Rowthorn, this is an explicit aim 
and therefore he assumes that both firms produce a homogeneous product, 
whereas Horstmann and Markusen allow for product differentiation. 
20 plants represents a decision not to enter the industry; I plant represents a 
decision to locate a single plant at home, perhaps serving the foreign market by 
exporting (which incurs a trade cost); 2 plants represents a decision to undertake 
greenfield-FDI and maintain plants in both countries. These production location 
decisions are irreversible and become common knowledge in stage two. 
3 Two points of clarification are in order. First, throughout this chapter FDI in 
general is identified with greenfield-FDI in particular: there is no role for 
acquisition-M. (In this, we follow a widespread convention in game-theoretic 
analyses of the MNE. ) In chapter 2 we nest the modelling structure developed 
below within a more general framework that allows for acquisition-FDI. That 
step will allow us systematically to explore the distinction between greenfield- 
and acquisition-FDI. Second, in the context of an established international 
oligopoly 'entry' has two distinct meanings. Within a given industry entry into a 
foreign country via intra-industry FDI is encapsulated in our FDI decision. By 
contrast, our entry decision refers to additional firms entering the industry at a 
global level. Neither Rowthorn nor Horstmann/Markusen analyse 'entry' in the 
latter (sequential) sense: both assume a given initial population of two firms with 
no possibility of subsequent entry by extra firms (see Rowthorn, 1989, pp. 3-4). 
(Horstmann and Markusen (1992, p. 119) do, however, explicitly acknowledge 
the possibility that certain sets of parameter values may induce entry by 
additional finns, but they decline to analyse it. ) 
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See especially Motta (1992, pp. 1564-5). 
5 Because FDI reduces the MNE's marginal cost relative to exporting, the 
domestic firm's profits at a Cournot equilibrium following entry must fall when 
the MNE chooses FDI over exporting. Therefore it is impossible for the domestic 
firm optimally to choose 'enter' against an investing MNE but 'stay out' against 
an exporting one. However, the converse is possible, and it creates an incentive 
for cntry-deterring (or 'pre-emptive') FDI: see Smith (1987, p. 95, sec. 5.3). Of 
course, such strategic FDI is a specific example of the entry-deterring 
investments analysed in a general model by Dixit (1980). 
6 'Certain entry' means choosing entry is the domestic firm's dominant strategy 
so the MNE must accommodate it. We are comparing the difference between two 
levels of monopoly profits with that between two levels of Coumot-duopoly 
profits. Setting p (market size) to I in Motta's model for simplicity and ignoring 
the sunk cost parameters, - (X 
MH - ME ý (S 4). (2 - s) is the MNE's gain from 
FDI if entry is ruled out and = MHH - MEH (4-s / 9). (1 - s) is the MNE's gain 
from FDI if entry is certain. Clearly cc >0 for all s>0, where s is the per-unit 
trade cost. Furthermore for GE (P , cc), where G is the MNE's sunk cost of 
greenfield-FDI, the presence of a stage-two domestic entrant with a dominant 
strategy will affect the MNE's optimal stage-one choice. See also Smith (1987, 
pp. 94-5, secs. 5.1 and 5.2). 
7 Linkages between a firm's profits and its rival's behaviour do not imply 
interdependences between the firms' equilibrium strategies: this is the essence of 
the distinction between Nash equilibria and dominant strategy equilibria. Naylor 
and Santoni (1999, Lemma 1) provide sufficient conditions for a location game 
in an international duopoly to be exclusively dominance-solvable. If national 
product markets are perfectly segmented and fixed costs are incurred only for 
greenfield-FDI, then a firm's export vs. FDI choice will be independent of its 
rival's behaviour. (The firm will optimally undertake greenfield-FDI if 7rFD1 - TCX 
> G, where 7rFDI/X is variable profits from abroad when the foreign market is 
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served by FDI/exporting and G is the sunk cost of greenfield-FDI. Clearly, this 
condition is independent of the foreign firm's export vs. FDI decision: the key 
assumptions are (i) that only greenfield-FDI incurs a fixed cost, so the foreign 
firm will always serve its home market; and (ii) that national product markets are 
perfectly segmented, so a firm's global profits are additively separable in profits 
earned at home and abroad. ) In contrast to Naylor/Santoni, best responses in the 
Rowthom and Horstmann/Markusen models are conditional on the rival's 
behaviour: the presence of plant-specific fixed costs in both models (and of firm- 
specific fixed costs in Horstmann/Markusen) implies that a0 plant (inactivity) 
strategy must be included for both firms to avoid loss-making in equilibrium. 
Adding the 0 plant strategy considerably complicates the analysis, and inter alia 
it implies that the gain in variable profits from choosing greenfield-FDI over 
exporting depends on whether the foreign firm is active. (See n. 6 above. ) 
In our models equilibrium strategies are also interdependent: the analysis of 
location decisions is identical to Naylor/Santoni; however, by investing in R&D 
a firm can reduce its marginal cost at home, thus altering its rival's incentive to 
undertake greenfield-FDI. 
8 This example is based on Horstmann and Markusen (1992, p. 117)"s Figure 1. 
9 Recall that, by producing abroad, an MNE 'jumps' the trade cost, which enters 
a national firm's marginal cost of serving the foreign market. 
10 The problem with investigating equilibria via numerical simulations is that 
they give no indication of how equilibrium configurations respond to small 
changes in exogenous parameters in the neighbourhood of the numerical 
solution; and, more generally, they give no indication of the global 'pattern' of 
equilibria: there is always a chance that a given simulation may yield highly 
unrepresentative (fluky) results. (Petit and Sanna-Randaccio perhaps suffer from 
this latter problem when they admit (2000, p. 356, n. 17): 'Only scenarios 
leading to a single subgame perfect equilibrium were reported in the paper. 
However for other parameter values multiple equilibria may be obtained. ' But 
how likely are we to obtain multiple, rather than unique, equilibria? ) 
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11 Fudenberg and Tirole modified Dixit's conclusion that an entry threat would 
generally prompt 'overinvestment' by the incumbent relative to the monopoly 
benchmark (see Dixit (1980, p. 106): 'the role of an irrevocable commitment of 
investment in entry-deterrence is to alter the initial conditions of the post-entry 
game to the advantage of the established firm'). However, they confirmed Dixit's 
implicit conclusion that credible entry threats do affect incumbents' equilibrium 
strategies. 
12 An analogy from linear algebra may help to make this point. Consider a 
system of three linear simultaneous equations in three unknowns. By ignoring 
one of the equations, the remaining two could be solved to express two of the 
unknowns as functions of the third. However, this procedure would only generate 
the 'equilibrium' values for the two unknowns if the equilibrium level of the 
third unknown happened to be inserted into their reduced forms, which would 
require a fluke. 
13 This focus on entry by diversification, rather than de novo entry, allows us 
initially to avoid analysing the entrant's location decision. We assume that the 
entrant possesses pre-existing plants for another (but 'similar') industry in both 
countries and that these plants can be used to produce for our industry (albeit 
highly inefficiently at first). The assumption of entry by diversification can be 
justified in two ways. First, Geroski (1995, p. 424)'s fifth 'stylized fact about 
entry' states that 'De novo entry is more common but less successful than entry 
by diversification' (italics added). Therefore, it could be argued that entry by 
diversification is likely to exert the more significant effect on industrial structure 
in the long run because a disproportionate number of de novo entrants later exit. 
Second, it should be recalled that our analysis is concerned with the strategic 
behaviour of MNEs in concentrated, oligopolistic industries. In part, these 
oligopolies are sustained by high plant-specific fixed costs (and hence scale 
economies) relative to 'market size'. In such industries entry by diversification 
would seem more likely to occur than de novo entry because binding financial 
constraints would prevent potential de novo entrants from establishing plants 
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before receiving revenue flows. We discuss possible modifications to the entry 
decision in Section 1.5. 
14 If the Rowthorn model, which also assumes homogeneous products, were 
solved using Bertrand competition in stage two, FDI could not occur in 
equilibrium. Because marginal production costs are constant and equal across 
firms, an MNE would always make a loss abroad following FDI: price would be 
driven down to marginal production cost and the MNE's loss would equal the 
fixed cost of FDL 
15 In part these modifications are considered as a response to Sutton (1990)'s 
concern that, because a large range of phenomena can be rationalised by 
tweaking the assumptions of a given game-theoretic model, game-theoretic 
models run the risk of 'explaining nothing'. 
16 'The difference between incumbent finns and entrants is that incumbent firms 
own plant and equipment specific to this industry and thereby are committed to 
continue operations in this industry, whereas this is not the case for a potential 
entrant. It is thus not just simple economies of scale which may cause a barrier to 
entry, but rather economies of scale in combination with irreversible capital 
commitments. ' (von Weizs! icker, 1980, p. 401). 
17 Note that if firm 3 enters the industry, its marginal cost is restricted to (0, c) 
because firm 3 has two plants by assumption. 
18 Net revenue is sometimes called 'variable profit'. 
19 Firm i's net revenue if it sets a price of xi and serves the entire market is p. (l - 
xi)-(xi - cj) is strictly concave in xi with a maximum at xi = XM(ci). Therefore, for 
xi < 21(cj), increases in xi will increase i's net revenue; and if i is constrained to 
set xi below x"(c), it will optimally set xi as close to xm(ci) as possible. See Vives 
(1999, p. 123 and p. 368, n. 8 on the 'open set problem'). 
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20 More precisely, being able to rank the various realisations of R(-) 
('rankability') is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for deriving best 
responses to the rival's corporate structure choices. As is demonstrated below, a 
sufficient condition is rankability of linear combinations of the realisations of 
R(. ), which is more demanding. 
21 Because the two firms originate from different countries, it is impossible for 
both firms to regard a given country as 'foreign' (i. e. there must always be a 
local firm). Therefore, the realisations R(t, t), R(t, c+t), R(c+t, t) and R(c+t, C+t) 
are ignored. 
22 Firm i will export tofs home market iff cj E [c, +t, 1), and finnj will export to 
i's home market iff cj E (0, ci - t]. For t>0 these two intervals do not overlap. 
23 Note that our information assumptions at each stage of the game are quite 
exact. Finn 3's stage-two entry decision can be conditional on the incumbents' 
corporate structure choices. In stage three the marginal costs of each firm in both 
countries become common knowledge. This assumption underpins the 
subsequent Bertrand equilibrium. Although our model does not incorporate 
interfirm technological spillovers, these interfirrn information flows could be 
interpreted as a weak form of spillover. 
24 That R(O, c+ t) > R(t, c) is intuitively obvious because the firm's price ceiling 
is lower but its marginal cost is higher in its export market relative to its 
domestic market. The formal proof comprises two steps. First, from Figure 1.1 
R(O, c) > R(t, c). Second, from Figure 1.2 R(O, c+ t) ý: R(O, c) where the 
inequality is strict iff c< xm(O) = 0.5. Because the inequality in step one is strict, 
combining steps one and two gives R(O, c+ t) > R(t, c). 
25 Both RHS(4BE) and RHS(6BE) can be written in general as 
p crit = kl(a P_p_p2 ); a, fl, k > 0, a. p_, 8. P2 >0 on p C= (0,11 . 
(We discuss 
the fl-coefficient in RHS(4BE) in more detail below. ) It can be shown that 
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crit dp dp=Oatp=al2-, 8>0.5 and that sgn(dpcr'tldp)#sgn(a-2., B. p). 
The sign property implies that 1IT" is strictly convex in p. 
26 Given that we label an inequality condition as 'holding' (P > d') or 'failing' 
(, u < g') on the basis of strict inequalities, the case where a condition 'binds' (P 
= IF) has been glossed over. When an inequality condition exactly binds there 
will be no unique best response (i. e. a tie), so that multiple equilibria can easily 
arise. For simplicity we do not explicitly consider these cases because they do 
not affect our main conclusions. Furthermore, if actual market size is thought of 
as a continuous random variable (across potential 'states of nature'), then such 
ties would not occur with measurable probability. 
27 Of course, a widely-used alternative to analytical solutions is numerical 
simulation. If we assigned numerical values to the six structural parameters, the 
inequality conditions could easily be tested and equilibrium choices derived. 
Unfortunately the price of this approach is generality of conclusions. 
28 Central to the results in Lemma 5 is the fact that pl(p), p2(p), pj(p) are not 
independent: pj(p) must always lie between pi(p), p2(p). For example, if p3(p) > 
, U2(P) 
in part (i), then there exists a set of p-values where 
(2, R) ý-- (1, R) ý-- (1, N) >. - (2, R) , which is a contradiction. 
29 Both RHS(4PE) and RHS(5PE) can be written in general as 
crit 
_, q. P2 + r. P3 -(0,1] P =k1(a-p-fl-p'+y-p'); a,, 8, r, k>O, a-p >0 onp (= 
gra can be shown to have the property 
r crit sgn(dp 
Idp) 
# sgn(a-2-, 8-p+3-y-p'). Because a-2., B-p +3., Y-p' =a 
and - R(O, t) at p=0 and 1 respectively, and because a-2-, 8 -p+3-r- p' is 
quadratic in p, dg'*Idp has only one change of sign (from - to +) on pE [0,1]. 
30 Put another way, (B) and (C) are sufficient conditions for the plot of BE 
equilibria to take a fixed fonn in (p, p)-space. 
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31 The underlying symmetries (across both incumbent firms and countries) in the 
PE game imply that (i) dominant strategy equilibria must be symmetric; and (ii) 
in asymmetric Nash equilibria the equilibrium corporate structure of a given 
incumbent is indeterminate. 
32 Of course, the problem remains of how to identify our parameters, especially 
p, in empirical work. Furthermore, our models have no repeated-game structure, 
so any empirical implications are better thought of as applying to cross-sectional 
analyses than time-series ones. (We cannot simply assume repeated games with 
the same per-period equilibria as in Figures 1.4 and 1.5, because the greenfield- 
FDI and R&D decisions have dynamic implications: they are sunk, rather than 
fixed, costs. ) 
33 There appears no obvious way of selecting between the two equilibria in 
region IV. One method would be to focus exclusively on symmetric equilibria, 
but that is ad hoc. A more sophisticated criterion is Pareto dominance: the 
selected equilibrium (focal point) is (weakly) preferred by both firms to the other 
candidate equilibrium. Unfortunately, as is clear from the expected profit 
functions, the two firms have different preferences between the two equilibria. 
The (1, N)-firm will clearly prefer the {(I, R), (1, R)} equilibrium because at the 
IV), (2, R)) equilibrium its profit is zero. However, the (2, R)-firm will prefer 
the ((I, N), (2, R)} equilibrium. To see this, compare its profits at the two 
equilibria and note that the (2, R)-firrn will prefer the asymmetric equilibrium iff 
R(O, c) - R(t, c) + R(c, c+t) + [R(O, c+ t) - R(c, c+t) + R(t, c) - R(O, t)]. p > G. 
From assumption (B) [-] > 0, so a sufficient condition for the inequality to hold 
for high p is R(O, c) - R(t, c) + R(c, c+t) > G; i. e. that it holds at p=0. This is a 
restriction on u. The lowest p-value in region IV can be found by noting that 
when (2BE) binds at p=1, R(O, c) - R(t, c) = G; which implies that R(O, c) - R(t, 
c) + R(c, c+t) >G must hold throughout region IV. An implication of this result 
is that if the incumbents moved sequentially (rather than simultaneously) in the 
BE game, then the ((I, N), (2, R)) equilibrium would be selected in region IV 
(with the leader choosing (2, R)). 
92 
34 For example, there are in fact six distinct sequences of equilibrium industrial 
structures in the BE game asp varies between 0 and 1, depending on the given P- 
value. We list them here for reference; we begin with the lowest range of p- 
values and work upwards. (i) j(1, IV), (1, IV)} (region I). (ii) {(I, IV), (1, N)j 
(region I); then ((I, IV), (1, R)} (region 11). (iii) {(I, IV), (1, IV)} (region 1); then 
ffl,, N), (1, R)) (region II); then ((I, R), (1, R)} (region III); then {(I, IV), (1, R)} 
(region II). The existence of this sequence relies on (4BE) having an interior 
minimum, which need not always be the case. (iv) ffl, N), (1, IV)} (region 1); 
then ((I, IV), (1, R)} (region 11); then ((I, R), (1, R)} (region III). (v) ffl, IV), (1, 
IV)) (region I); then {(I, IV), (1, R)j (region 11); then {(I, R), (1, R)) (region III); 
then [(I, R), (1, R)j or ((I, IV), (2, R)j (region IV). (vi) {(I, IV), (1, Iffl (region 
1); then ((I, IV), (1, R)j (region II); then {(I, R), (1, R)j (region III); then ((2, R), 
(2, R)j (region V); then ((I, R), (1, R)} (region III); then {(I, R), (1, R)} or {(I, 
N), (2, R)) (region IV). 
35 A simpler 'monopoly case', not considered in this paper, would be where the 
two incumbents in the BE game colluded. The monopoly thus created would not 
undertake greenfield-FDI because the BE game's incumbents together own 
plants in both countries. For more discussion of the effects of allowing collusion 
between the incumbents, see chapter 2 (the 'Acquisition Subgame'). 
36 Proof. When G=I (A8) 'becomes 2. R(O, c) - 2. R(t, c) - R(O, t) > 0. When t= 
0, LHS = 0. Now consider progressive rises in t from 0 to c. aLHS/at >0 requires 
-2-(cIR(t, c)lat) > aR(O, t)lat. For t:! ý 0.5, R(O, t) = p-(1 - t)-t and R(t, c) = p. (l - 
c). (c - t) for 
? (t) ý: c and R"(t) for xm(t) :! ý c. Given either functional form for 
R(t, c), aLHSlat > 0. (Note that aLHSlat >0 when R(t, c) =, a. (l - c). (c - t) iff t> 
c-0.5, which is implied by? (t) ý: c for t>0. ) For t ý: 0.5, R(O, t) = Rm(O), so 
aR(O, t)lat =0 and therefore aLHSlat > 0. 
93 
37 The effects of decreases in G or increases in I will be the opposites of what we 
catalogue, provided that the changes are not 'too big' (i. e. drastic: assumption 
(C) must continue to hold). 
38 Note from Figure 1.6 that all rises in c are nondrastic. 
39 For c>0.5 a[R(O, c) - R(t, c)]Iac =- aR(t, c)lac: 5 0. The derivative equals 0 if 
c is very high (c > x-"(t)). For c<0.5 R(O, c) = p-(l - c)-c and R(t, c) = p-(I - 
c). (c - t), and a[R(O, c) - R(t, c)]Iac < 0. The derivative cannot be evaluated at c 
= 0.5 because the net revenue function is kinked. 
40 The sign restrictions on cc, 5 are straightforward. Those on Py follow from 
(M), which is proved in the Appendix: R(c, c+ t) - R(O, c+ 1) + R(O, c) >0 for 
all t, c under assumption (A). 7>0 follows directly from (M). To show P<0, 
rewrite P as -I. [R(c, c+t)-R(O, c+t)]+R(O, c)ý -I. [R(c, c+t)+R(t, c)] 
ýG 
G 
and note that min(. ) = LHS(A6) when G=L 
41 Because dLHS(AIO)/dp =P+ 2-yp +3 . 8P2 , there is a possibility that 
LHS(AIO) is decreasing in p for all p ý: 0 (iff I-P-8 ý: ý). However, this 
possibility is ruled out because LHS(AIO) at p=I is strictly greater than 
LHS(AI 0) at p=0. To see this, note that P+y+8>0 iff R(O, t) - R(c, c+ t) > 0. 
At t=0, LHS 0. Now consider progressive rises in t towards t=c. For t:! ý 0.5, 
we have R(O, = p-(I - t)-t and R(c, c+ t) = p-(I -c- t)-t or 
e(c). Given either 
functional form for R(c, c+ t), we get a[ R(O, t) - R(c, c+ t)]Iat > 0. For t ý: 0.5, 
we have R(O, t) = RM(O) and R(c, c+ t) = Rm(c), so the condition becomes Rm(O) 
- Rm(c) > 0, which clearly holds. 
Therefore, because R(O, t) - R(c, c+ 1) > 0, LHS(AIO) must be strictly increasing 
on some of pE [0,1]. This implies that the smaller root of dLHS(AlO)/dp =0 
must lie on pE (0,1). 
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42 The derivation procedure would be: first, solve for the smaller root of 
dLHS(AIO)/dp =0 using the quadratic formula; second, substitute this p-value 
into condition (AlO); third, solve (AlO), whose parameters depend implicitly on 
t, c, for an explicit inequality relation between t and c. 
43 Other sufficient conditions that were experimented with (e. g. that the tangent 
to LHS(Al 0) at p=0 be Z!: 0 at p= 1) proved far too restrictive (unnecessary) to 
be useful. 
44 Comparison with the blockaded-entry case is only one (but perhaps the 
simplest) method of evaluating the effects of an entry threat. For example, 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) compare closed- and open-loop equilibria; in the 
former the entrant moves after the incumbents (and observes their choices), 
whereas in the latter all players move simultaneously (or cannot observe 
preceding moves). 
45 Perhaps confusingly, a widespread simplification of Bain's classifications of 
incumbents' strategies given an entry threat (Tirole, 1988, p. 306) suggests that, 
if both incumbents choose (1, R), entry is 'blockaded' in regions III and V of the 
PE game (Figure 1.5), whereas it is 'accommodated' in regions VI, VIII and IX. 
We shall follow Bain's classifications by referring to 'accommodation' and 
'deterrence' in Figure 1.5, but for consistency (and to avoid undue confusion) we 
shall reserve the label of 'blockaded entry' for describing Figure 1.4. 
46 Fudenberg and Tirole's (1984) analysis of investment behaviour in anticipation 
of entry is really only tangentially applicable here. Fudenberg/Tirole examined a 
duopolist's incentives to invest in shifting its best-response function under a 
variety of assumptions about the nature of competition (strategic complements 
vs. substitutes) and the effects of investment (which way the best-response 
function shifts). However, in their model only one firm could vary its level of 
investment and the investment decision variable was continuous; whereas our 
analysis has both fin-ns undertaking discrete investment projects. Nevertheless, 
the investment incentives in our model accord with Fudenberg/Tirole's 
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conclusions when investment makes the investor 'tough' and competition is in 
strategic complements. 
47 Sketch of proof. Let xH (resp. xL) be the equilibrium price of a local producer 
whose R&D investment fails (resp. succeeds) and so has a high (resp. low) 
marginal cost. (Because marginal costs are private knowledge, firms' equilibrium 
pricing strategies can only be conditional on their own marginal costs. ) Set xH > 
X L. For all XL > 0, it is a best response by a successful innovator to undercut xL 
marginally and earn p. (I - xL ): the firm wins the whole market regardless of its 
rival's type. However, if xL=0, it is a successful innovator's best response to 
undercut xH marginally (and abandon competition with the low-cost type) to earn 
(I - p)-p-(I - 
xH). Therefore, a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium in pure 
(pricing) strategies does not exist. 
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1.7 Appendix. 
1.7.1. Equilibrium industrial structures in the BE game (S3 =0). 
The solution we derive to the BE game has the following properties: 
(i). Lemma 5(i) holds for all S2. This requires 
RHS(2BE) > RHS(IBE) or 
R(O, c+ t) - R(c, c+ t) + R(t, c) -I- [R(O, c) - R(t, c)] >0 (Al) G 
RHS(5BE) > RHS(4BE) or 
(I-P)- R(O, c+t)-R(c, c+t)+R(t, c)- 
I 
-[R(O, c)-R(t, c)] (A2) GI 
+p. R(O, t)>O 
RHS(5BE) > RHS(7BE) or 
R(O, c)+R(t, c)- 
I 
-[R(O, c)-R(t, c)]>O (M) G 
These three conditions together imply that (3BE), (6BE) and (8BE) are irrelevant 
to determining the incumbents' best responses (and therefore equilibrium 
behaviour). Furthermore, there will exist for all pa set of p-values where (1, R) 
is the best response to any S2. 
Therefore the five conditions (IBE), (2BE), (4BE), (5BE) and (7BE) are 
sufficient to determine the BE equilibrium. 
(H). RHS(5BE) ý> RHS(2BE) > RHS(4BE) > RHS(IBE). This requires 
RHS(5BE) > RIIS(2BE), which holds for all p r= (0,1]; see the discussion in the 
main text. 
RHS(2BE) > RIIS(4BE) or 
(I - p) . [R(O, c + t) + R(t, c) - R(c, c+ t)] +p- R(O, t) 
-I. [R(o, c) - R(t, Ol >0 
(M) 
G 
RHS(4BE) > RHS(lBE) or 
[R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)-R(c, c+t)-R(O, t)]-p >0 (A5) 
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(iii). RHS(7BE) > RHS(2BE) at p=I and RHS(7BE) < RHS(IBE) for p =-ý 0. 
The first inequality clearly holds because lim RHS(7BE)=oo whereas 
p -> I 
RHS(2BE) takes a finite value at p=1. The second inequality holds iff 
R(O, c)-R(O, c+t)+R(c, c+t) >0 (A6) 
which ensures that the nonzero p-value where RHS(7BE) = RHS(lBE) is strictly 
positive. 
(iv). A single-crossing result. RHS(7BE) intersects each of RHS(j]BE), jr= {1,2, 
41, exactly once on pE (0,1). This follows directly from (iii) and the fact that 
the three equations RHS(7BE) = RHS(j*BE) all have unique solutions in p forp # 
0. 
We now show that assumptions (B), (C) are sufficient to ensure that conditions 
(Al) to (A6) all hold. First, (A2) can be rewritten as 
(1-p)-LHS(Al)+p. R(O, t)>0, so (Al) implies (A2) and (A2) can be dropped. 
Second, forp #0 (A5) becomes assumption (B). Third, note that 
dLHS(A4) 
= -LHS(B) <0 dp 
so it is necessary that (M) hold at p=1: 
R O, t -I- [R(O, c) - R(t, c)] >0 (A4)' G 
We are left with (Al), (M), (M), (A4)' and (B). (Al) and (A3) can be 
eliminated as follows. First, LHS(Al) = LHS(A4)' + LHS(B), so (A4)' and (B) 
together imply (Al). Second, under assumption (C) 
I<1; 
an d because 
I 
GG 
enters (M) and (A4)' with a negative coefficient, it is sufficient that (M) and 
(A4)' hold when G=L In this case, (M) holds trivially, and (A4)' becomes 
R(O, t) - R(O, c) + R(t, c) >0 (A4)tf 
Both (M)" and (A6) hold for all t, c under assumption (A). A longhand proof 
would exhaustively examine whether (M)" and (A6) hold for every set of t, c that 
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uniquely detennines the functional forra of R(-), i. e. undercutting vs. monopoly- 
pricing, and is consistent with our maintained assumption (A). Here we present 
two shorter proofs. 
(i). (M)" holds for all t, c under (A). 
Proo At c=t LHS(A4)" = 0. Now consider progressive increases in c above t. )f. 
The effect of these increases on LHS(A4)" is given by 
aLHS(A4)" aR(t, c) aR(O, c) 
ac ac ac 
For c -= t 
RQ, c) = p. (1 - c). (c - t) (an undercutting equilibrium), so aR(t, c)lac > 
0; and R(O, c) = p. (1 - c)-c or Rm(O) (depending on c), so aR(O, c)lac ý: O. Given 
either expression for R(O, c), aLHS(A4)"/ac > 0. When cO t we get R(t, c) = 
RM(t), so aR(t, c)lac = 0; and therefore R(O, c) = Rm(O), so aR(O, c)lac = 0. 
Therefore LHS(A4)" >0 and MHS(M)'Vac =0 for c0t. 
(ii). (A6) holds for all t, c under (A). 
Proof. At t=0 LHS(A6) = 0. Now consider progressive increases in t towards c. 
The effect of these increases on LHS(A6) is given by 
aLHS(A6) aR(c, c+t) aR(O, c+t) 
at at at 
For t =- 0 R(c, c+ t) = p(I -c- t)-t (an undercutting equilibrium), so aR(c, c+ 
t)lat > 0; and R(O, c+ t) = p-(I -c- t). (c + t) or Rm(O) (depending on c), so aR(O, 
c+ t)lat ý: 0. Given either of these expressions for R(O, c+ t), aLHS(A6)lat > 0. 
When t00 we get R(c, c+ t) = Rm(c), so aR(c, c+ t)lat = 0; and therefore R(O, 
c+ t) = Rm(O), so aR(O, c+ t)lat = 0. Therefore LHS(A6) >0 and aLHS(A6)lat 
0 for tO 0. 
We have reduced the set of constraints (Al) to (A6) to (B) with the aid of (C). 
Therefore (B) and (C) are sufficient to fix the plot of BE equilibria in a general 
forrn in (p, p)-space. This enables us to draw reasonably general conclusions 
about the equilibrium properties of the BE game. 
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Under assumptions (B) and (C), the relative positions of the five conditions 
(IBE), (2BE), (4BE), (5BE) and (7BE) are fixed in (p, p)-space. The plot in 
Figure ALI shows that they divide the (p, p)-space into nine distinct regions, 
each with a different configuration of best responses (and possibly different 
equilibria). The equilibrium industrial structure in each region can be inferred 
from its set of best responses. Figure 1.4 in the main text tidies Figure Al. 1 up 
by grouping together regions of identical equilibria. 
[FIGURE Al. I IS OVERLEAF] 
Key to Figure ALI 
Region Best response to 
(I N) (1, R) (2, R) 
Nash equilibria 
(Equilibrium industrial structures) 
I GI IV) (11 N) (11 N) ff" N), GA; 01* 
11 (1, N) (1, N) (1, R) ffl, IV), (1, N); 0) 
111 (1, R) (1, N) (1, N) ffl, N), (1, R); 0) 
IV (1, R) (1, N) (1, R) ffl, N), (1, R); 0) 
v (1, R) (1, R) (1, N) ((l, R), (1, R); 0) 
vi (1, R) (1, R) (1, R) ((l, R), (1, R); 0) * 
VII (2, R) (1, R) (1, R) {(I, R), (1, R); 0) 
VIII (2, R) (1, R) (1, N) ((I, R), (1, R); 0); {(I, N), (2, R); 0} 
Ix (2, R) (2, R) (2, R) {(2, R), (2, R); 01* 
(Note: * denotes a (Iommant strategy equilibrium. ) 
Two significant aspects of the plot in Figure ALI are not constrained: the 
value where RHS(4BE) takes its minimum; and the p-value where RHS(7BE) 
intersects RHS (2BE). These p-values are significant because both are identifiable 
in Figure 1.4. We make two observations. First, the minimum p-value on 
RHS(4BE) is greater than 0.5; it will be strictly less than 1 if LHS(B) > R(O, t) 
which is more demanding than assumption (B). (Therefore RHS(4BE) may be 
strictly decreasing for all pE (0,1). ) Second, the minimum p-value on 
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p 
11 
p 
Figure AIA: Equilibrium industrial structures in the BE game 
Inter-regional boundaries. I/11 boundary is RHS(7BE); i/ill boundary is 
RHS(lBE); IVIV boundary is RHS(1BE); III/IV boundary is RHS(7BE); III/V 
boundary is RHS(4BE); IVNI boundary is RHS(4BE); VNI boundary is 
RHS(7BE); VNIII boundary is RHS(2BE); VINII boundary is RHS(2BE); 
VIUVIII boundary is RHS(7BE); VII/IX boundary is RHS(5BE)- 
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RHS(4BE) will be greater than the p-value where RHS(7BE) and RHS(2BE) 
intersectiff 
I. [R(O, c)-R(t, c)] > 
R(O, c+t) + R(t, c) -R(c, c+t) -2- R(O, t) 
G. [R(O, c)+R(t, c)] 2. [R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)-R(c, c+t)-R(O, t)I 
This condition will certainly hold when (B) almost binds, so the RHS is negative. 
Alternatively, when t =- 0 we have LHS : -= 
0 and RHS -= 0.5, so the condition 
is 
violated. 
1.7.2. Equilibrium industrial structures in the PE game (S3 r= (0, R} ). 
Our solution to the PE gaine proceeds in two steps. 
Step 1. Lemma 6 ranks RHS(IPE) to RHS(6PE). In step one we position 
RHS(IPE) to RHS(6PE) on Figure Al. l. The following conditions characterise 
our solution: 
(i). RHS(IPE) > RHS(lBE) for all pE [0,1]. This inequality is a direct 
implication of assumption (B)'. 
We can show that RHS(IPE) > RHS(IBE) implies that the precise position of 
RHS(I PE) relative to the inter-regional boundaries in the BE game (Figure Al. 1) 
is irrelevant to solving the PE game; and that therefore condition (IPE) can be 
discarded. First, note that for p< RHS(IPE) (i. e. when (1PE) is violated) firm 3 
will always optimally choose 0 (Lemma 6). Therefore, when P< RHS(IPE) the 
PE equilibria are identical to those in the BE game. Second, when UE 
I (RHS(IPE), RHS(2PE)) firm 3 will optimally choose R iff both incumbents 
choose (1, N) (but 0 otherwise). From Lemma 4(i), therefore, a necessary 
condition for the incumbents' best responses to differ between the BE and PE 
games whenjU E (RHS(IPE), RHS(2PE)) is that (1,, N) be a best response to (1, 
IV) in the BE game when p c= (RHS(IPE), RHS(2PE)). (Otherwise the best 
responses in the BE game will not be disrupted by the entry threat. ) However, 
note from Figure Al A that (1, N) is a best response to (1, N) in the BE game only 
below RHS(IBE) (i. e. regions I and 11). Therefore, because RHS(IPE) > 
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RHS(IBE) the entry threat in the PE game cannot change the incumbents' best 
responses onU E (RHS(IPE), RHS(2PE)) relative to the BE game. Consequently 
condition (IPE) can be discarded because for p< RHS(2PE) equilibria in the 
PE game will be identical to those in the BE game. 
Having discarded (lPE) we now show how assumptions (B)' and (C) position 
RHS(2PE) to RHS(6PE) on Figure Al. 1 to produce Figure Al. 2. 
[FIGURE A1.2 IS OVERLEAF] 
(ii). RHS(2PE) > RHS(4BE) for all p c= [0,1]. In general RHS(2PE) 
RHS(4BE) iff 
2-[R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)-R(c, c+t)-R(O, c)]- (I -p)+ p-R(O, t) >0 
Because the LHS of this condition is linear in p, it is sufficient that the inequality 
hold at p=0,1 (the end-points). At p=0 the condition is identical to assumption 
(B)'. At p=1 it becomes R(O, t) > 0, which clearly holds. 
(iii). RHS(2BE) > RHS(6PE) for low p. In general RHS(2BE) > RHS(6PE) iff 
R(O, c). (I-p) 2>I. [R(O, c)-R(t, c)] G 
Because (I _ P)2 is strictly decreasing on pE [0,1], it is sufficient that the 
inequality hold at p=0; i. e. 
R O, c)- 
I 
. [R(O, c)-R(t, c)]>O (A7) G 
Because the coefficient on G is negative and G ::! ý 
I under assumption (C), it is 
sufficient that the inequality hold when G=L In this case, the above inequality 
holds trivially. 
Taken together, (ii) and (iii) imply that all of RHS(2PE) to RHS(6PE) lie 
between RHS(4BE) and RHS(2BE) for lowp-values. 
103 
14 
p 
0.5 
Figure A1.2: Equilibrium industrial structures in the PE game 
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(iv). RHS(5BE) > RHS(4PE) for all pc [0,1). In general RHS(5BE) 
RHS(4PE) iff 
R(O, c)- G . 
[R(O, c)-R(t, c)]- 2. R(O, c)-R(O, t)- G. 
[R(O, c)-R(t, c)]I. p 
+[R(O, c) - R(O, t)] - p' >0 
where the LHS is quadratic in p and of the form a -, B -p+y. P2; a>0 from 
(A7), y ý: 0, a-P+y=0. If y=0 the LHS is linear in p and strictly positive on p 
E [0,1) (because both end-points ý: 0). If y>0 then the LHS is strictly convex in 
p and it is sufficient for RHS(5BE) > RHS(4PE) on pE [0,1) that its second root 
be strictly greater than 1. From Vi6te's rule on the product of roots, this requires 
a>7, which reduces to (A4)' (already proven). 
RHS(6PE) > RHS(5BE) for high p. For p r= (0,1) RHS(6PE) > RHS(5BE) 
iff 
I- 
[R(O, c) - R(t, c)] > R(O, c) - (I - p) G 
where the LHS is strictly positive for t>0. Therefore by choosing p sufficiently 
close to I the condition can always be met. 
An implication of (iv) and (v) is that RHS(5BE) lies between RHS(4PE) and 
RHS(6PE) for high p. But where does RHS(5BE) lie in relation to RHS(5PE) E 
(RHS(4PE), RHS(6PE)) whenp =- 1? 
(vi). Assumptions (B)' and (C) are consistent with both RHS(SPE) > RHS(5BE) 
and RHS(5BE) > RHS(5PE) for high p. To see this, note that in general 
RHS(5PE) > RHS(5BE) iff 
-2-IR(O, c)- G. 
[R(O, c)-R(t, c)]l 
I 
- 2---[R(O, c)-R(t, c)l-4. R(O, c)+R(O, t) p-[2. R(O, c)-R(O, t)l-p >O 
1G1. 
where the LHS is of the form a -, 8 -p-r- p2; cc -c-, 0 from (A7), y>0 (so LHS 
strictly concave in p), a-P-y=0. Therefore it is sufficient for RHS(5PE) 
RHS(5BE) (resp. RHS(5BE) > RHS(5PE)) at high p that the second root of the 
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LHS be strictly less (resp. greater) than 1. From Viete's rule on the product of 
roots the second root <I iff y> -a, or 
2.1 -[R(O, c)-R(t, c)]-R(O, t) >0 (AS) G 
We show in the main text that assumption (C) is consistent with both LHS(A8) > 
0 and LHS(A8) < 0. Whether or not (M) is satisfied affects equilibrium 
industrial structures in the PE game for a (small) set of high p- and P-values. We 
analyse both possibilities in Section 1.3.4 of the main text. 
We finish step one by considering the positions of RHS(2PE) and RHS(3PE) 
(which from Lemma 6 are the lowest of RHS(2PE) to RHS(6PE) in (p, p)-space) 
in relation to the inter-regional boundaries in Figure Al. 1. 
(vii). RHS(3PE) > RHS(7BE) for all p. This requires R(t, c) >0 and so clearly 
holds. 
(viii). RHS(2PE) > RHS(2BE) for highp iff 
I 
2-- . [R(O, c)-R(t, c)]-R(O, t) >0 (A8) G 
which, as we noted in (vi) above, can both hold and fail under assumption (C). In 
this case whether or not (A8) holds has a minor effect on equilibrium industrial 
structures in the PE game, which we describe in Section 1.3.4 of the main text. 
(ix). The p-value where RHS(7BE) intersects RHS(2PE) is strictly less than the 
p-value where RHS(7BE) intersects RHS(2BE). Comparing RHS(2BE), 
RHS(7BE) and RHS(2PE), this requires 
I 
R(O, c)+R(t, c)-- . [R(O, c)-R(t, c)] G2- R(t, c) 
R(O, c) + R(t, c) 2-R(t, c)+R(O, t) 
it is sufficient for this inequality to hold when the LHS is minimized, which 
under (C) occurs when G=L Setting G=I and simplifying, the inequality above 
becomes 
R(t, c)+R(O, t)-R(O, c) >0 (A4)pf 
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which we have already shown to hold. The significance of this result is that it 
sets a lower bound on the position of RHS(2BE). It implies that a triangle in (p, 
p)-space above RHS(2PE) whose sides are RHS(2BE), RHS(7BE) and 
RHS(2PE) always exists (see Figure A1.2), where (as we show in step two) 
equilibrium industrial structures differ between the BE and PE games. 
Step 2. In step two we derive the equilibrium industrial structure in each region 
of Figure A2. The following definition provides a useful shorthand. 
Definition Al. Given thatj E {BE, PE), an incumbent finn's best response set in 
JSBR SBR [(l, R)], SjBR[(2, R)]) where SjB'[S] denotes the j game is j [(I, N)J, j 
the incumbent's best response to S for all SE ((I, N), (1, R), (2, R)j . (By 
symmetry both incumbents must have the same best response set. ) 
From (i) in step one we know that below RHS(2PE) the PE equilibria are 
identical to those in the BE game. The area above RHS'(2PE) is divided five 
ways by RHS(3PE) to RHS(6PE). Therefore from the viewpoint of firm 3's best 
responses there are five distinct regions to consider in Figure A1.2: 
(RHS(2PE), RHS(3PE). Firm 3 optimally chooses R in response to {(l, 
(1, IV)) and {(I, N), (1, R% but 0 otherwise. Therefore from Lemma 4(i) 
BR BR r -= '5BE[(I,, N)] (2, R) forp > RHS(2BE) 
SP4, 
E 
1(12N)l 
SpBER[Q, R)] SBBER[(I, R)] (1, R) 
(12 N) for p< RHS(7BE) SpBER[(2, R)] = SBBER[(22 R)] = 
f(l, 
R) for p> RHS(7BE) 
BR BR 
ý 
[(2, R)]= SB SP'E IIE[(2, R)] because firm 3 will never enter if at least one 
t 
incumbent chooses (2, R). SpBER [(I, R)] = SB"ER[(I, R)] and SpBER [(I, N)] = SBR [(I, N)] BE 
for p> RHS(2BE) because neither I(l, R), (1, R)) nor ((I, N), (2, R)j provokes 
entry. 
RHS(2BE) and RHS(7BE) divide the area between RHS(2PE) and RHS(3PE) 
into four parts. Foru > RHS(2BE), RHS(7BE) an incumbent's best response set 
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under PE is {(2, R), (1, R), (1, R)), so the PE equilibrium is ffl, R), (1, R); 01 
(as under BE). Foru E (RHS(2BE), RHS(7BE)) an incumbent's best response 
set under PE is ((2, R), (1, R), (1, N)), so the PE equilibrium is ffl, R), (1, R); 
0) or ((I, N), (2, R); 0) (as under BE). Foru < RHS(2BE) SBR [(I, N)] = (1, R) 13E 
which could be disrupted by potential entry. From Lemma Al below, an 
incumbent's best response set under PE foru r= (RHS(7BE), RHS(2BE)) is {(I, 
R) or (2, R), (1, R), (1, R% which yields a PE equilibrium of {(I, R), (1, R); 0) 
(as in the BE game, but possibly no longer a dominant-strategy equilibrium). For 
,u< 
RHS(2BE), RHS(7BE) an incumbent's best response set under PE is ((I, N) 
or (2, R), (1, R), (1, Iffl, which always yields two PE equilibria: {(I, R), (1, R); 
01 for sure and either {(I, IV), (1, N); R} (if (1, N) >- (2, R) in response to (1, N)) 
or ffl, N), (2, R); 01 (if (2, R) >- (1, N) in response to (1, IV)), where the identity 
of the second equilibrium depends (inter alia) on 
I. 
G 
In the final case above, when p< RHS(2BE), RHS(7BE), the identity of the 
second equilibrium depends on an incumbent's preference between (1, N) and (2, 
R) in response to (1, N). In general, given that ((I, IV), (1, N)j provokes entry but 
{(I, N), (2, R)} does not, (2, R) >- (1, N) in response to (1, IV) iff 
G+I 
R(c, c+t)+ . [R(O, c+t)+R(O, c)-R(c, c+t)]-p 
which holds for all p> RHS(2PE) iff 
2.1 R(c, c+t)+2- [R(O, c + t) - R(c, c+t)] - R(O, c)l. P G 
(A9) 
+ +1 [2. R(O, c)-R(O, t)]. p'>o 
We examine the properties of (A9) in the main text. 
Lemma Al. If firm 3 optimally chooses R in response to both {(l, N), (1, N)} 
and {(I, N), (1, R)), then an incumbent has (1, R) >- (resp. (1, N) in response 
to (1, N) asu > (resp. <) RHS(7BE). 
Proof. By comparing expected pro-fit functions from the main text. 
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This result is not a coincidence. Given that firm 3 will certainly choose R, the 
foreign rival's choice of (1, N) makes it irrelevant to the incumbent's decision 
(because firm 3 is always a 'tougher competitor' than the foreign rival). 
Therefore, it is as if the incumbent is responding to a choice of 0 by firm 3 and 
(2, R) by its foreign rival. 
(RHS(3PE), RHS(4PE)). Firm 3 optimally chooses R in response to 
any corporate structure pair where at least one incumbent chooses (1, N), but 0 
otherwise. Therefore from Lemma 4(i) 
S BR BR 
PIE 
SBE[(I, R)] = (1, R) 
SpBER[(2, R)] SBBER[(2, R)] = (1, R) 
Under BE an incumbent's best response to (1, N) would be (1, R) below 
RHS(2BE) and (2, R) above it. However, in the PE game for U> RHS(3PE) 
entry by firm 3 must be accommodated if an incumbent's rival chooses (1, N). 
Lemma A2 below shows that for pE (RHS(3PE), RHS(4PE)) 
SpBER[(I, N)] = (1, R) . 
Therefore, ffl, R), (1, R); 01 is the equilibrium industrial 
structure (in dominant strategies) in the PE game. 
Lemma A2. If firm 3 optimally chooses R in response to both ((I, N), (1, R)} 
and ((I, IV), (2, R)), then an incumbent has (2, R) >- (resp. -< ) (1, R) in response 
to (1,, N) as p> (resp. <) RHS(5BE). 
Proof. By comparing expected profit functions from the main text. 
For reasons analogous to those for Lemma Al, this result is not a coincidence. 
Together Lemma Al and Lemma A2 imply that SBR [(I, N)j = (1, R) for uE PE 
(RHS(7BE), RHS(5BE)) and that Sp"ER[(I, N)] = (2, R) for p> RHS(5BE). 
(iii). pE (RHS(4PE), RHS(5PE)). Finn 3 optimally chooses R unless the 
incumbents select ((I, R), (2, R)) or {(2, R), (2, R)J. We have 
SBR (1, R) for p< RHS(5BE) 
PE [Q, N)l = (2, R) for p> RHS(SBE) 
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from Lemma Al and Lemma A2, and 
S BR p'E [Q, R)] = (2, R) for p> RHS(5BE) 
SpBER[(2, R)] = 
(1, R) for < RHS(5BE) 1(2, 
R) for > RHS(5BE) 
from Lemma 4(i). 
For p> RHS(5BE) the equilibrium industrial structure of the PE game (in 
dominant strategies) is {(2, R), (2, R); 0). For p< RHS(5BE) 
SB'E'[(l, R)]=(l, R), which would induce entry. Using Lemma A3 below, an 
incumbent's best response set under PE for p< RHS(5BE) is ffl, R), (1, R) or (2, 
R), (1, R)J, which yields a PE equilibrium of either ffl, R), (11 R); R) in 
dominant strategies (if (1, R) >-- (2, R) in response to (1, R)) or {(I, R), (2, R); 0) 
(if (2, R)>-(l, R) in response to (1, R)). Therefore, to tie the PE equilibrium 
down, we need to derive an incumbent's preference relation between (1, R) and 
(2, R) in response to (1, R). In general, given that ffl, R), (1, R)} provokes entry 
but {(I, R), (2, R)j does not, (2, R) ý-- (1, R) in response to (1, R) iff 
AU> 
G 
R(c, c+t)+ 
I. 
[R(O, c +t) -2- R(c, c+t) - R(t, c)] -p p 
+- [R(c, c+ t) -R(O, c+t) + R(O, c) + 2. R(t, c)] - P2 
+- [R(O, t) - R(O, c) - R(t, c)] - p' p 
which holds for all p> RHS(4PE) iff 
I. R(c, c+t)+ [R(O, c+ t) -2- R(c, c+ t) - R(t, c)] - R(O, c)l -p G 
+ [R(c, c+ t) - R(O, c+ t) + R(O, c) +2- R(t, c)] +2- R(O, c) - R(O, t)l -p 
[R(O, t)-R(O, c)-R(t, c)]-R(O, c)+R(O, t) -P 3>0 
(AlO) 
We examine the properties of (Al 0) in the main text. 
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Lemma A3. If firm 3 optimally chooses R in response to both {(I, N), (1, R)) 
and ffl, R), (1, R)}, then an incumbent has (1, R) >- (1, N) in response to (1, R) 
for all p r= [0,1) when p> RHS(4PE). 
Proof. Comparing expected profit functions in the main text, we find that in 
general (1, R) >-- (1, N) in response to (1, R) (given that both choices provoke 
entry) iff 
> 
[R(O, c)+R(t, c)]-p-- . [2 - R(O, c) +2- R(t, c) - R(O, t)] - p' 
[R(O, c) + R(t, c) - R(O, t)] - 
This holds for all p> RHS(4PE) iff 
R(t, c) - (1 -> 
which trivially holds on pE [0,1). QED. 
(iv). p r= (RHS(5PE), RHS(6PE)). Fin-n 3 optimally chooses R unless both 
incumbents choose (2, R). We have 
SBR[ (1, R) for p< RHS(5BE) 
PE ("A'A = 
1(2, 
R) forp > RHS(5BE) 
from Lemma Al and Lemma A2, and 
Z BR SpLE [(2, R)] = (2, R) forp > RHS(5BE) 
from Lemma 4(i). 
Because 3 optimally chooses R in response to any industrial structure involving 
(1, R), SpBR[(I, R)] cannot automatically be related to SB, ER[(l, R)]. We show in 
Lemma A4 below that SpER [(I, R)] = (1, R) for all p r: (RHS(5PE), RHS(6PE)). 
Therefore for ji > RHS(5BE) an incumbent's best response set under PE is [(2, 
R), (1, R), (2, R)J, which yields PE equilibria of ((I, R), (1, R); RI and {(2, R), 
(2, R); 0). For p< RHS(5BE) SpBE[(2, R)] must be derived. The immediate 
difficulty is that under assumption (C) on Gj it is impossible to derive any 
pairwise preference rankings between (1, IV), (1, R) and (2, R) that are valid for 
all (RHS(5PE), RHS(6PE)) (which would enable us to discount one 
III 
corporate structure as a best response, as in Lemma Al to Lemma A3). 
Therefore, for u< RHS(5BE) S, ER[(2, R)]E{(I, N), (I, R), (2, R)) and an 
incumbent's best response set under PE is ((1, R), (1, R), Sp'ER[(2, R)]). If 
Sp"ER[(2, R)] = (1, N) or (1, R), then there is a unique equilibrium industrial 
structure of f(l, R), (1, R); R), possibly in dominant strategies. If SpER[(2, R)] = 
(2, R), then there is an additional equilibrium industrial structure of {(2, R), (2, 
R); 01. Therefore, given our focus on equilibria, the crucial determinant is 
whether (2, R) is an incumbent's best response to (2, R) under PE. In general, 
given that only {(2, R), (2, R)) deters entry, we have (2, R) >- (1, N) in response 
to (2, R) iff 
G+I (All) 
2. 
R(O, c)-p-(l-p) 
p 
and (2, R) >- (1, R) in response to (2, R) iff 
P> 1.2. 
GI. 
P3 
(A12) 
[R(O, c)-R(t, c)]. p+ R(t, c)-p'-- [R(O, c)+R(t, c)] 
lu P lu 
Conditions (Al 1) and (A12) hold for all p> RHS(5PE) iff 
4- 
G. 
R(O, c). (I-p)> 
(G 
+1 
(Al 1)' 
x 12 - R(O, c) -[4 - R(O, c) - R(O, t)] -p +[2 - R(O, c) - R(O, t)] - P2 
1 
and 
2. 
G- 
[R(O, c) - R(t, c)] - 2. R(O, c) + 
t4. 
G. 
R(t, c) + 4. R(O, c) - R(O, t)l -p 
(A12)p 
- 2- 
1. [R(O, c)+R(t, c)]+2-R(O, c)-R(O, t) p2>0 
tG I- 
We examine the properties of (Al 1)' and (Al 2), in the main text. 
Lemma A4. SpBER[(I, R)] = (1, R) for allU E (RHS(5PE), RHS(6PE)). 
Proof. (i). Given that both choices provoke entry, (1, R) >- (1, N) in response to 
(1, R) iff 
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I 
P> II [R(O, c) + R(t, c)] -p- [2 - R(O, c) +2- R(t, c) - R(O, t)] - p' 
1 
[R(O, c) + R(t, c) - R(O, t)] - 
(using expected profit functions from the main text). Forp #0 this holds for allu 
RHS(5PE) iff 
2. R(t, c) . (I _ P)2> R(O, t)-p-(p 
which clearly holds for all pE (0,1), where LHS >0> RHS. 
(ii). Given that both choices provoke entry, (1, R) >- (2, R) in response to (1, R) iff 
G 
P< I [R(O, c) - R(t, c)] -p- (I - p)' 
(using expected profit functions from the main text). For p#0,1 this holds for 
all p< RHS(6PE) iff 
R(O, c) -I . [R(O, c) -R(t, c)] >0 (A7) repeated G 
which was shown above to hold under assumption (C). QED. 
a> RHS(6PE). Finn 3 optimally chooses R regardless of what the 
incumbents choose. We have 
SBR (1, R) forp < RHS(5BE) 
I PE 
(1, N)] 
(2, R) for p> RHS(5BE) 
from Lemma Al and Lemma A2. We show in Lemma A5 below that 
S B: R [(l, R)] # (1, N) and that 
BR 
PE J3PE [(2, R)l # (1, N) . Indeed, in response to both (1, 
R) and (2, R) an incumbent has (2, R) >- (resp. -< ) (1, R) as 
p> (resp. G (A13) 
[R(O, c)-R(t, c)]. P. 
(I 
_ P)2 
where RHS(A13) > RHS(5BE), RHS(6PE). (Note that RHS(A13) >RHS(6PE) 
relies on condition (A7), which holds under assumption (Q. ) It is significant that 
(A13) governs an incumbent's preference between (1, R) and (2, R) in response 
to both (1, R) and (2, R). The reason is analogous to that for the 'double 
appearance' of condition (5BE) when we examined the incumbents' best 
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responses under BE in the main text. Given that national product markets are 
perfectly segmented, the choice of an R&D-undertaking incumbent between I 
plant and 2 depends on 'competitive conditions' abroad, which are influenced by 
the foreign incumbent's investment in R&D but not by its investment in 
greenfield-FDI. 
From the viewpoint of the incumbents' best response sets, the area where U> 
RHS(6PE) is split three ways. For p< RHS(5BE) the equilibrium industrial 
structure under PE (in dominant strategies) is ((I, R), (1, R); R). For P r= 
(RHS(5BE), RHS(A13)) the PE equilibrium remains {(I, R), (1, R); R) (but not 
in dominant strategies). For u> RHS(A13) the PE equilibrium (in dominant 
strategies) is {(2, R), (2, R); R). 
Lemma A5. (i) In response to (1, R) an incumbent has (1, R) >- (1, N) for all P> 
RHS(6PE)and PE (0,1) in the PE game. (ii) In response to (2, R) an incumbent 
has (1, R) ý- (1, N) for allu > RHS(6PE)and pE (0,1) in the PE game. 
Proof. (i) follows directly from Lemma A4(i). 
(ii). Given that both choices provoke entry, (1, R) >- (1, N) in response to (2, R) iff 
[R(O, c) + R(t, c)] - P. 
(I 
_ P)2 
p 
which trivially holds for all p> RHS(6PE), p#0,1 because R(t, c) > 0. QED. 
Figure 5 in the main text summarises the results of step two. Figure 5 tidies 
Figure A2 up by grouping together regions of identical equilibria. 
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1.7.3. Monopoly case. 
Monopolist's expectedprofits 
Eirm (1, N) Rm (c) + Rm (c + t) 
E; rm (1, R) p- [Rm (0) + Rm (t)] + (I - p) . [Rm (c) + Rm (c + 
E; rm (2, AT) 2- Rm (c) -G 
E; rm (2, R) 2-p- Rm (0) +2- (1 - p) . Rm (c) -G-I 
Note that, relative to the duopoly case, the monopoly case is complicated because 
Lemma l(i) cannot be invoked to rule out (2, IV). (Indeed, intuitively one would 
expect (2, N) to be the monopolist's equilibrium choice for sufficiently high P- 
values whenp is low. ) 
Proof cfLemma 7 
Part (i). Comparing expected profit functions, we get (1, R) >- (2, N) iff 
Rm(c+t)-Rm(c)+[Rm(O)+Rm(t)-Rm(c)-Rm(c+t)]-p >I-G 
Under assumption (C), RHS :! ý 0. LHS is linear in p; at p=0 LHS < 0, and at p= 
I LHS > 0. LHS >0 is sufficient for the inequality condition to hold, and this 
occurs when 
Rm(c)-Rm(c+t) 
- Pi Rm (0) + Rm (t) - Rm (c) - Rm (c + t) - 
QED. 
Part (ii). Ignoring (2, N) and comparing expected profit functions, we get 
(1, R) >- (1, N) iff 
(A14) 
JU 
- [Rm (0) + Rm (t) - Rm (c) - Rm (c + t)] -p 
(2, R) >- (1, R) iff 
P> IIG (A15) [Rm (c) - Rm (c ++ [Rm (0) - Rm Rm (C) + Rm (c +p 
115 
From Lemma 5(i) in the main text, if RHS(AIS) > RHS(A14) then (A14) and 
(A15) are sufficient to determine the monopoly equilibrium. Furthermore, the 
monopolist will optimally choose (1, N), (1, R) and (2, R) in sequence as u rises 
away from 0. Under assumption (C), a sufficient condition for RHS(A15) > 
RHS(A14) is denom(A14) > denom(A15), or 
Rm c -Rm c+t P> 2-[Rm(t)-Rm(c+t)] 
It is straightforward to show that P2 E (0,0.5) for c>t. Furthermore, P2 > P, iff 
Rm (0) - Rm (t) - Rm (c) + Rm (c + t) > 0, which must hold. (Proof. for t=0, LHS = 
0; and aLHSlat = aRm(c + t)lat - aRm(t)lat >0 given that aRm(t)lat < aRm(c + 
t)lat < 0. ) Therefore in both parts of Lemma 7 'sufficiently high p' can be 
interpreted asp > P2; and the results in the Lemma apply to all pE (N) 1). QED. 
Proof ofProposition 4 
Part (i). From Lemma 7(ii) geenfield-FDI occurs in monopoly equilibrium iff 
(A 15) holds. For sufficiently high p, geenfield-FDI occurs in BE equilibrium iff 
(2BE) from the main text holds. Greenfield-FDI is 'more likely' in monopoly 
equilibrium iff RHS(2BE) > RHS(A15), or iff 
Rm (c) - Rm (c + t) + [Rm (0) - Rm (t) - Rm (c) + Rm (c + t)] -p> [R(O, c) - R(t, c)] -p 
At p=0 this condition certainly holds. Because both LHS and RHS are linear in 
the condition will hold on pE [0,1) iff 
Rm 0 -R(O, c)ýtRm(t)-R(t, c) 
(i. e. LHS RHS at p= 1). If R(t, c) = Rm(t), then RHS =0 while LHS ý: 0. At t= 
0, LHS RHS. Therefore, it is sufficient for the condition to hold for all t, c 
under assumption (A) that MHSlat: 5 0 when R(t, c) p-(1 - c). (c - t), which in 
turn requires c ý: xm(t); a contradiction because R(t, c) P-(1 - c). (c - t) implies c 
:! ý P(t). Therefore, a necessary-and-sufficient condition for greenfield-FDI to be 
0 more likely' in monopoly than BE equilibrium on PE [0,1) is c -2: P(t). QED. 
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Part (ii). From Lemma 7(ii) R&D occurs in monopoly equilibrium iff (A14) 
holds. R&D occurs in BE equilibrium iff (IBE) from the main text holds. R&D 
is 'more likely' in BE equilibrium iff RHS(Al 4) > RHS(1 BE), or (for p# 0) iff 
R(O, c+t)+ R(t, c)-R(c, c+t) > Rm(O) + Rm(t) -Rm(c) -Rm(c+t) 
Imposing c ý: P(t), which implies that R(t, c) = RM(t), and c+tý: xM(c), which 
implies that R(c, c+ t) = Rm(c) and thus also that R(O, c+ t) = Rm(O), is sufficient 
to ensure that the condition holds because Rm(c + t) > 0. QED. 
1.7.4. Plotting constraints (B) and (B)' in (c, t)-space. 
An immediate problem is the fact that t, c do not enter assumptions (B) and (B)' 
explicitly. Moreover, each of the five nonzero realisations of R(-) takes one of 
two possible functional forms, depending on whether the Bertrand equilibrium 
involves undercutting or monopoly-pricing. Therefore 
R(O, t) 
fp- (I - t) -t for t:: ý 0.5 
tRm (0) fort ý: 0.5 
R(O, c) 
p -(l-c)-c for c:! ý 0.5 IRm 
(0) for c ý: 0.5 
R(O, c+t) 
p. (I-c-t)-(c+t) forc+t:: ý0.5 
Rm (0) for c+tý! 0.5 
R(t, c) 
(1 - C) - (c t) for c: ý xm (t) 
[R m (t) for c xm (t) 
R(c, c+t) = 
p. (I-c-t)-t forc+t: 5xm(c) 
Rm (c) for c+tý: xm (c) 
Figure A1.3 divides (c, t)-space below the 45" line (recall that assumption (A) is 
maintained throughout) up into 9 distinct regions. In each region the functional 
form of R(-) is fixed, so constraints (B) and (B)' can be written explicitly in terms 
of t'C. 
[FIGURE A1.3 IS OVERLEAF] 
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t 
0.5 
0 
Figure A1.3: Feasible set of c- and t-values 
Inter-regional boundaries: I/11 boundary is c+t= xm(O) = 0.5; II/Ill, IVN and 
VIVVIII boundaries are c+t= xm(c); IVNII, VNIII and VL/1X boundaries are c 
= XM(t). 
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C 
0.5 
Key to Figure A1.3 
Region Form of R(. ) (N. B. U= 'undercutting', M= 'monopoly-pricing' 
R(O, t) R(O, c) R(O, c+ t) R(t, c) R(c, c+ t) 
I U U U U U 
ii U U M U U 
III U U M U M 
IV U M M U U 
V U M M U M 
vi M M M U M 
Vil U M M M U 
Vill U M M M M 
ix M M M M M 
Using the specific functional forms of R(. ), we can derive the sets of t- and c- 
values where assumptions (B) and (B)' hold for each region of Figure A1.3. 
Region Assumption (B) holds iff Assumption (B)' holds iff 
I t <1-41-2. c+2 C2 
t <C. (I -C) 
3-2-c- ý(-6 c- 7) --(2 -c- 1) 2 I t< 
4 
-( -c)- t< 
2 
2-c-, f(-6 c- -4). (c - 1) c. (2-c) 
2 
t< 
4. (1 - c) 
IV Holds throughout Holds throughout 
v 2-c- ý(-6- -c- 
-4)(c 
- 1) I t< . (5-c-1) t< 2 4 
vi 1 
t<- . (5-c-1) 
1 
t<- . (5-c-I) 4 4 
VII Holds throughout Holds throughout 
VIII Holds throughout Holds throughout 
Ix Holds throughout Holds throughout 
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Given that (c, t) are such that constraints (B) and (B)' bind (i. e. on the bold lines 
in Figure 6 in the main text), the extreme c-values in each region are calculated 
(using Maple) as: 
Constraint (B) 
Region I: min c=0; max c=0.275 
Region II: min c=0.275; max c=0.392 
Regions III/V: min c-- 0.392; max c=0.6 
Region VI: min c=0.6; max c=1 
Constraint (B)' 
Region 1: min c=0; max c=0.293 
Region II: min c=0.293; max c=0.423 
Region III: min c=0.423; max c=0.5 
Regions VNI: min c=0.5; max c=1 
1.7.5. Proof of Lemma 8 (and description of numerical analysis technique). 
ProqfqfLemma 8 
Define p,, =- -3rJ>0 as the p-value where LHS(AlO) has a point of 
inflection. For p< (resp. >) PINF, LHS(AI 0) is strictly convex (resp. concave) in 
p. The proof now proceeds in two steps. 
Step (i). Note that if LHS(AIO) >0 at P[NF, then LHS(AIO) >0 on all [PINF5,4 
This follows because a+P+r+ 45 >0 and because a chord between two points 
on a concave function always lies beneath the function. Therefore a sufficient 
condition for LHS(AIO) >0 on PE [0,11 is LHS(AIO) >0 on pE [0) PINFI 
(whenPfNF:: 5 1, this condition is also necessary). 
Step (ii). To test LHS(AIO) >0 on p r= [0, PINFI, we replace LHS(AIO) with a 
quadratic in p. LHS(AI 0) =a+(, 8 +y-p+8- p2) . 
'p, and we replace () with 
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'6+ 
2. 
r-P, where 8+ 
2. 
r-P is the chord between p=0 and p= PINF on 
33 
2 
, 
8+r-p+(5-p'. Compared to (, 6+r-p+g-p')-P, 
( 
8+ 
3. r-P -p 
has two 
noteworthy features. First, j8 +2 -r-P)-P:: ý(, 
8+r P+j. P2 )-P for allp e LO, 3 
pINF], so a++2 *r. p p>O is a sufficient conditon for LHS(AIO) >0 onp 3 
2 
E [0, pINF]. Second, the global minimum of 
( 
'6+ 3. r. p). p must 
lie on [0, pINF] 
2 
because for p> PINF and p<0( 8+ 3. r-P). p>0 whereas 
for some p in [0, 
2 
PINFI Jfl+ 3. 
r-P). p<0. Therefore a sufficient condition for LHS(AIO) >0 on 
2222 
PE [0, prNF] is a+, 8-p+-. r*p >0 for allp. a+, 8 p+- .r*p has a global 33 
3- 
'82 minimum (because 7> 0) at p>0 where its value is a- 4-r 8-r 
3 
Therefore a -r-- . '82 >0 provides our sufficient condition. QED. 8 
Description ofnumerical analysis technique behind Figure 6 
We set t ?,. c, %E {0.05,0.1,0.15,..., 0.95), and substituted this t-value into the 
sufficient condition for LHS(AIO) >0 on p EE [0,1] from Lemma 8. The 
sufficient condition could therefore be written in terms of c alone. Taking 
account of how the functional forms of cc, P and y vary between regions in Figure 
Al. 3, we then calculated, for each %, the set of c-values where the sufficient 
condition from Lemma 8 was satisfied. The numerical results are given in the 
table overleaf (and are plotted in Figure 1.6 in the main text). 
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Interval of c-values where the sufficient condition for LHS(AlO) >0 on 
p ra [0,1] from Lemma 8 is satisfied. 
0.05 None 
0.1 None 
0.15 [0,0.48] 
0.2 [0,0.56] 
0.25 [0,0.67] 
0.3 1 [0,0.69] 
0.35 1 0 [0,0.711 
0.4 1 [0,0.74] 
0.45 [0,0.76] 
0.5 [0,0.79] 
0.55 [0,0.83] 
0.6 
1 
[0,0.86] 
-0.65 [0,0.89] 
0.7 [0,0.921 
0.75 [0,0.95] 
0.8 [0,0.961 
0.85 [0,0.98] 
0.9 [0,0.99] 
0.95 [0,0.99] 
Table AIA: Numerical analysis of the sufficient condition in Lemma 8. 
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Chapter 2 
Greenfield Investment versus Acquisition: 
Alternative Modes of Foreign Expansion 
2.1. Introduction. 
In reality foreign direct investment (FDI) is a heterogeneous flow of funds, 
composed of both geenfield-FDI ('greenfield investment'), which represents a 
net addition to the host country's capital stock, and acquisition-FDI, which 
represents a change in the ownership of pre-existing production facilities in the 
host country. ' The current chapter is primarily concerned with two questions, 
which are provoked by this observation. First, what determines the fonn of FDI 
that arises in equilibrium? Second, what are the comparative welfare properties 
of equilibria associated with the alternative forms of FDI? (The positive analysis 
of Section 2.3 tackles the first question, and the normative analysis of Section 2.4 
addresses the second. ) 
To explore these questions, we model the equilibrium industrial structures of a 
concentrated global industry that spans two (perfectly segmented) national 
product markets (i. e. an "international oligopoly'). Finns' FDI decisions (i. e. 
123 
whether to produce abroad and what fonn of FDI to choose) and process R&D 
decisions are made endogenously. A key contribution of this chapter is its 
incorporation of acquisition-FDI into a model of equilibrium industrial structures 
in an international oligopoly: precursor models in this tradition (e. g. Horstmann 
and Markusen, 1992; Rowthom, 1992; Petit and Sanna-Randaccio, 2000; chapter 
I above) identified FDI in general with greenfield-FDI in particular. This 
contribution is potentially significant because, empirically, acquisition-FDI is the 
dominant form of FDI: UNCTAD (2000, pp. 14-18) reports that '[o]ver the past 
decade, most of the growth in international production has been via cross-border 
M&As [mergers and acquisitions]... rather than greenfield investment: the value 
of completed cross-border M&As rose from less than $100 billion in 1987 to 
$720 billion in 1999... [when t1he ratio of the value of cross-border M&As to 
world FDIflows reached over 80 per cent' (italics added). 
A number of contributions have analysed equilibrium acquisition-FDI (e. g. 
Barros and Cabral, 1994; Falvey, 1998; Hom and Persson, 2001a, 2001b). All 
employ a decision rule for equilibrium selection pioneered by Salant, Switzer and 
Reynolds (1983): for a given cross-border acquisition to arise in equilibrium, the 
equilibrium profits of the resulting multinational enterprise (MNE) must exceed 
the combined profits of the predator and target firms in product market 
equilibrium if the proposed cross-border acquisition does not occur. 2 The 
equilibrium in the absence of acquisition provides a 'threat point', and therefore 
the decision rule selects acquisition iff an acquisition price exists that will make 
both the predator and the target firms better off (see Section 2.2). However, none 
of the analyses of equilibrium acquisition-FDI include greenfield-FDI as an 
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alternative to acquisition-FDI: a firm's only alternative means of serving the 
foreign product market is to export from its domestic production base. This 
omission has two consequences. First, existing models of equilibrium 
acquisition-FDI cannot provide comparisons between greenfield- and 
acquisition-FDI: such comparisons require the development of a modelling 
structure where the form of FDI is endogenously selected. 3 The current paper 
attempts to fill this gap. Second, the exclusion of greenfield-FDI as an alternative 
to acquisition-FDI implies that firms' profits at the threat point (i. e. their 
'disagreement profits' if no acquisition occurs) may be incorrectly represented. 
In turn, this will of course affect the validity of predictions concerning the 
emergence of acquisition-FDI in equilibrium (via the decision rule outlined 
above). (It should be noted that the exclusion of geenfield-FDI does not imply 
that disagreement profits will be 'too low'. If rival firms non-co-operatively 
choose between exporting and greenfield-FDI as means of serving the foreign 
product market when acquisition-FDI is ruled out, then greenfield-FDI can arise 
in (Prisoner's Dilemma) equilibria where both firms would prefer exporting: see 
Proposition 3 of chapter 1. ) 
The modelling structure we develop in Section 2.2 captures the choice between 
greenfield- and acquisition-FDI fonnally-, it also includes endogenous process 
R&D decisions. It is instructive to consider why these two innovations might be 
expected to produce interesting results. First, the greenfield/acquisition 
distinction is significant because FDI is likely to have different welfare effects 
depending on its form: insofar as foreign market entry via acquisition-FDI, rather 
than greenfield-FDI, results in a more concentrated market structure, acquisition- 
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FDI will be associated with lower consumer welfare (i. e. higher prices) than 
greenfield-FDI. 4 However, despite the fact that acquisition-FDI leaves the 
number of firms in the host country unchanged (i. e. it merely produces a change 
in ownership), it is wrong to conclude that host-country consumer welfare is the 
same under entering fin-n strategies of acquisition-FDI and no-FDI. Assume that 
the host country initially contains one indigenous firm, and a foreign finn is 
contemplating serving its product market via exporting, greenfield-FDI or 
acquisition-FDI; both firms have identical production costs, and the product is 
5 homogeneous. Greenfield entry will produce a symmetric duopoly in the host 
country, and entry via acquisition will produce a monopoly. However, in the 
absence of entry via either form of FDI, the indigenous firm may be constrained 
from monopolistic behaviour by the foreign firm's exporting option; most 
obviously, if the foreign firm chooses to export and Bertrand competition 
prevails, then the indigenous firm cannot (in equilibrium) set a price higher than 
the common marginal cost plus the trade cost, which might be beneath its 
monopoly price. 6 Therefore, in consumer welfare terms, the best entry strategy is 
greenfield-FDI and the worst acquisition-FDI, with exporting lying between the 
two. The key point is that equilibrium outcomes if the foreign firm does not 
undertake FDI (but chooses instead to export to the host country) are not 
necessarily identical to those under entry via acquisition: the possibility of facing 
imports places a constraint on the indigenous firm's behaviour under the no-FDI 
(exporting) strategy, which is removed by acquisition. 
Second, process R&D investments are deterrnined endogenously within our 
modelling structure because the relationships between R&D and the two forms of 
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FDI may be different, although it is unclear a priori whether acquiring firms or 
greenfield investors will have a greater propensity to undertake R&D. 
Investigating these relationships will allow us to test a hypothesis that frequently 
motivates public policy: an oft-cited benefit of inward investment in the form of 
acquisition-FDI is its ability to foster 'technological development', both via the 
ability of firms in a more concentrated market to bear the sunk costs of R&D and 
via the injection of superior technologies into the moribund target firm (a 'failing 
7 firm' defence). However, a simple theoretical example shows the issue is far 
from closed. Assume a Bertrand duopoly in a homogeneous-good market, where 
both firms initially have marginal costs of c>0 and both have access to the same 
process innovation. The innovation is drastic and, at a sunk cost of 1, will reduce 
the innovator's marginal cost to 0.8 The duopolists play a two-stage (non-co- 
operative) game, first choosing whether to invest in R&D and then competing in 
prices. There are two distinct pure-strategy equilibria. If Rm(O) -I<0,9 there is a 
dominant strategy equilibrium where neither firm does R&D. However, if Rm(O) 
-I>0, there are two asymmetric Nash equilibria where one firm only does 
R&D. 10 If the two firms combine to form a monopoly, R&D will be undertaken 
iff Rm(O) -I> Rm(c). It is clear that the 'incentive' to undertake R&D is greater 
for either duopolist than for the monopolist, in the sense that the critical level of I 
where R&D is abandoned is greater in the duopoly. 1 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 the tools 
necessary for our analysis are developed. We set out the extensive fonn of the 
game that fonns the core of our analysis, and we provide several idiosyncratic 
definitions. We assume that the world comprises two identical countries and that 
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consumers are immobile internationally so that national product markets are 
perfectly segmented. There initially exist four plants to produce the 
homogeneous product, two in each country. There are three firms, two of which 
(the 'incumbents') own one plant each in different countries; the third firm (the 
gpotential entrant') owns one plant in each country. The potential entrant's plants 
are initially (drastically) productively inefficient relative to the incumbents' 
(their marginal production cost exceeds the monopoly price of an incumbent). By 
undertaking process R&D the potential entrant can lower her marginal 
production cost and sell strictly positive output in product market equilibrium. 
Therefore, 'entry' in our model occurs via R&D investment rather than via sunk 
investments in new plants (although process R&D investments do, of course, 
alter the productivity of existing plants), as in (e. g. ) Gilbert and Newbery. (1982). 
I have argued in chapter I that this characterisation of the entry decision is 
consistent with entry by diversification. 
The game has four stages. In stage one, one of the incumbents may purchase the 
rival incumbent, thereby generating an international flow of acquisition-FDI. If 
an acquisition occurs, we then enter the Acquisition (A) subgame: in stage two 
the integrated incumbent (which owns a plant in each country) chooses how 
much to invest in process R&D. If no acquisition occurs in stage one, we enter 
the Greenfield (G) subgame, which is fonnally identical to the potential entry 
(PE) game set out in chapter 1: in Stage two the incumbents non-co-operatively 
choose (i) whether to undertake (tariff-jumping) greenfield-FDI and (ii) how 
much to invest in process R&D. Stages three and four are identical in both the A 
and the G subgames. In stage three the potential entrant decides whether to enter 
128 
the industry by undertaking process R&D. In stage four market equilibrium in 
both countries is established via Bertrand competition (marginal costs are 
common knowledge). 
Two features of our modelling structure generate significant interest. First, the 
inclusion of endogenous R&D investment decisions implies that consumer 
welfare need not necessarily be lower in more concentrated market equilibria 
because the (logical) possibility exists that equilibrium R&D investment may 
increase with concentration. Second, the inclusion of a third firm's entry decision 
(stage three) implies that the stage-one choice between the two subgames is not a 
(trivial) comparison of monopoly and duopoly profits. It also allows us to 
compare 'entry decisions' in the two subgames. 
In Section 2.3 we derive equilibrium industrial structures, conditional on the 
game's exogenous parameters. The A and G subgames are solved backwards to 
isolate subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In both subgames 
firms behave non-co-operatively. The stage-one choice of which subgame to play 
is detennined by a co-operative decision rule: the A subgame is selected iff the 
integrated monopolist's profits are strictly greater than the combined profits of 
the incumbents in the G subgame. 12 Therefore, the G-equilibriurn represents a 
threat point if take-over negotiations break down. A sufficient condition for co- 
operative equilibria to be stable is that players can make binding commitments to 
each other. In the context of a cross-border acquisition it is reasonable to assume 
that binding commitments can be made because after a take-over control over the 
target firm is ceded to the acquirer. (Furthermore, it should be noted that the use 
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of co-operativc decision rules for mergers is widespread in the theoretical 
literature. ) The key findings arc that acquisition-FDI certainly arises in medium- 
sized markets and that grmficid-FI)l arises in large markets if the sunk costs of 
grccnricld-FDI and R&D are not 'too large'. 
In Scction 2.4 wc compare the welfare propaties of the A- and G-equilibria. We 
focus on global social welfare (GSNNr), which comprises consumer surplus across 
countries and the sum of prorits across firms, because the symmetry across 
countrics in our niodcl implics that, if market cquilibria differ in the two 
countries, any assignmcnt of cquilibriurn roles would be arbitrary. We find that 
consumcrs gcncrally (but not always) prefer the G-equilibrium to the A- 
equilibrium because 'compctition' is more intense. However, global profits 
(across both incunibmts and the potential entrant) are higher in the A- 
cquilibrium. (Note, howcvcr, that this does not imply that the equilibrium 
industrial structure %%ill always involve acquisition-FDI because rent-dissipating 
cntryis'morcltkcly'inA-equilt um. ) Therefore, the welfare comparison of G- 
and A-cquilibria gcncrally invol%-cs a Williamson (1968) trade-off between 
profits and consumer surplus. Despite this general result, we do find (limited) 
circumstances %vlicrc dic A-equilibrium is socially Parcto dominant because 
acquisition-FDI incrcascs consumcr wclfarc: in small mark-cts acquisition-FDI 
can bc associatcd with cquilibrium R&D that would not occur at the G- 
cquilibrium, thus lowcring markct priccs; in spitc of monopolization. In this 
spccial casc the advocacy of acquisition-FDI in public policy is unambiguously 
justificd. 
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Finally, Section 2.5 offers some concluding comments. We consider some of the 
limitations of our analysis and some potential extensions. 
2.2. The Modelling Structure. 
2.2.1. Sequence of Moves and Corporate Structure Choices. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the extensive fonn of our four-stage game. (As we show 
below, Figure 2.1 incorporates the simplification of firms' strategic choices given 
in Lemma 1. ) The stage-one choice between the two subgames is determined by 
the co-operative greenfield/acquisition decision rule (GADR), which is set out 
formally in Section 2.2.3. In stages two and three the incumbents and the 
potential entrant, respectively, choose their 'corporate structures'. In stage four 
market equilibrium is established in both countries via Bertrand competition. 
Finns will be seen to have 'symmetric information' (Rasmusen, 2001, p. 49) and 
thus maximize their expected profits. 
firm's corporate structure choice represents its strategic ('long-terrn') 
decisions vis-a-vis the location of production and the level of technology. The 
incumbents initially own one plant each, located in different countries, both of 
which can produce the homogeneous good at a constant marginal cost of cE (0, 
they can serve the local product market at their marginal production cost but 
must pay a per-unit premium of I (the trade cost) if selling abroad via exporting 
rather than FDI. The potential entrant initially owns two plants, one in each 
country, whose marginal production costs are strictly greater than P(c), the 
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monopoly price associated with c (see Section 2.2.2). Firms can establish 
additional plants in either country at a sunk cost of G. Therefore, there are plant- 
level economies of scale, and (i) neither the potential entrant nor the acquirer will 
optimally establish additional plants (note that via take-over the acquirer gains 
the rival incumbent's 'home' plant); (ii) each incumbent will optimally establish 
at most one additional plant abroad in the G subgame. 
[FIGURE 2.1 IS OVERLEAF] 
Technological progress occurs via process R&D investments in steps, and each 
step incurs a sunk cost of L The technological laggard (the potential entrant) can 
purchase the industry's best-practice technology (i. e. a marginal production cost 
of c) in one step. For finns on the technological frontier (i. e. the incumbents 
initially, and the potential entrant after sinking an investment of I to catch up) I 
purchases a process R&D investment with a risky outcome. With probability pE 
(0,1) R&D investment 'succeeds' and the firm's marginal production cost falls 
to 0; however, with probability (I - p) R&D investment 'fails' and the firm's 
marginal production cost remains at c. The probability of success p is identical 
and independent across firms. 
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Greenfield/ Acquisition Decision Rule (GADR) 
Acquisition 
I Acquirer I 
R&D (R) /\ No R&D (N) 
Potential Potential 
Entrant Entrant 
In (R) Out (0) In (R) Out (0) 
\ 
ou 0 
Bertrand competition in both countries 
A subgame 
Figure 2.1: Game Tree 
No Acquisition 
The two G-incumbents 
simultaneously and irreversibly 
choose (i) between I and 2 
(greenfield-FDD plants; and 
(ii) whether to invest in R&D 
(R) or not (N). 
I Potential Entrant I 
In (R) Z 'ý Out (0) 
LBertrand 
competition in both countries 
_I 
G subgame 
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Several aspects of the order of moves in Figure 2.1 require justification. First, 
Bertrand competition is modelled as the final stage after firms have taken 
production location and R&D investment decisions because decisions involving 
sunk investments entail more commitment than pricing decisions, which can be 
altered rapidly and at relatively little cost. It is thus natural (and conventional) to 
treat pricing policies as contingent on prior sunk investment decisions. Second, 
we assume that the incumbents (whether or not an acquisition occurs) make sunk 
investments before the potential entrant to capture the frequently-cited first- 
mover advantage of incumbency (e. g. Dixit, 1980): historical presence in the 
industry affords the incumbents earlier knowledge of, and ability to exploit, 
profitable investment opportunities created by the opening up of national markets 
to cross-border trade and investment flows. Third, the incumbents' merger 
decision (leading potentially to a flow of acquisition-FDI) occurs before their 
process R&D and greenfield-FDI decisions. We make this assumption to add 
significant interest to our investigation of the second motivating question set out 
in the Introduction ('What are the comparative welfare properties of equilibria 
associated with the alternative forms of FDIT). By making R&D investments 
conditional on whether a merger has occurred, we are able to explore additional 
possible welfare consequences of merger to the 'pricing effects' that have 
traditionally dominated the literature. Moreover, Petit and Sanna-Randaccio 
(2000, p. 341) cite several recent empirical studies which find that 'to an ever 
greater degree, firms are concemed with how their intemational strategy will 
influence their innovative activity'. This implies that firms' FDI decisions 
precede their R&D decisions (contrary to the 'traditional' view of, e. g., Caves, 
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1971) perhaps - as Petit and Sanna-Randaccio suggest - because the FDI 
decision involves a longer term commitment than the R&D decision. 
Given these characteristics of the firms' strategic choices,, we can limit the 
strategy spaces of the acquirer and the potential entrant in the A subgame to [N, 
R) and (0, E, R) respectively. (The latter is also the potential entrant's strategy 
space in the G subgame. ) N and 0 both represent decisions not to invest in any 
process R&D, although they are taken from different marginal production costs 
(c for the acquirer and > P(c) for the potential entrant). A choice of 0 by the 
potential entrant is equivalent to a decision not to enter the industry. A choice of 
E by the potential entrant costs I and reduces its marginal production cost to c. A 
choice of R (investment in 'new' R&D from a social viewpoint, rather than just 
rcatching up') produces a marginal production cost of either 0 ('success') or c 
Cfailure'), and it costs the acquirer I but the potential entrant 2-L We show in 
Lemma I below that the potential entrant's strategy space can be simplified to 
{O, R) because E is strictly dominated by 0. Therefore, a choice of R by the 
potential entrant represents a decision to enter the industry. 
13 
The incumbents' stage-two strategy space in the G subgame is {(I, IV), (1, R), (2, 
N), (2, R)J. (The G subgame is identical to the potential-entry (PE) game in 
chapter 1, where the purpose was to examine the effects of an entry threat on 
equilibrium industrial structures. ) The first component of a corporate structure 
pair indicates how many plants the incumbent will maintain (a choice of 2 costs 
G); the second component indicates whether (R) or not (N) the incumbent invests 
in process R&D at a sunk cost of L Note that loss-making in equilibrium is ruled 
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out by the inclusion of the (1, N) strategy, which incurs no sunk costs, and so an 
texit' (or 'inactivity') strategy may legitmately be ignored. Lemma I shows that 
(2, N) may be dropped from the incumbents' strategy spaces because it is strictly 
dominated by (1, N). 
Lemma 1. (Chapter 1) (i) In the A and G subgames the potential entrant will 
never optimally choose a corporate structure of E because it is strictly 
dominated by one of 0. (ii) In the G subgame an incumbent will never 
optimally choose a corporate structure of (2, N) because it is strictly 
dominated by one of (1,, N). 
Proof. (i) If the potential entrant chooses E it sinks I to move onto the 
technological frontier and can produce at both its plants with a marginal 
cost of c. However, because both countries contain rivals' pre-existing 
plants with marginal costs of c, the potential entrant's expected global net 
revenues in Bertrand equilibrium remain 0. Therefore, choosing E over 0 
will reduce the entrant's expected profits by I, so 0 strictly dominates E. 
(H) Because the two countries' product markets are perfectly segmented, 
choosing (2, N) rather than (1, N) has no effect on an incumbent's revenues 
from its home market: it continues to sell at home with a marginal cost of c. 
Its marginal cost abroad falls from c+t to c, and it sinks G into greenfield- 
FDI. However, the incumbent's expected net revenues abroad in Bertrand 
equilibrium remain 0 because its foreign rival has a plant abroad with a 
marginal cost of c at most. Therefore, choosing (2, N) over (1, N) will 
reduce an incumbent's expected profits by G, so (1, N) strictly dominates 
(2, N). QED. 
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The assumptions on corporate structure choices outlined above imply that an 
active firm's marginal cost of serving either national product market can take 
four values: 
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0 if the firrWs R&D succeeds and it produces locally 
marginal cost 
t if the firrWs R&D succeeds and it produces abroad 
c if the firm's R&D fails and it produces locally 
c+t if the firm's R&D fails and it produces abroad 
Throughout our analysis we maintain the following assumption (which seems 
intuitively reasonable) on t, c: 
(A) << 
2.2.2. Market Size and Net Revenue. 's 
There are two countries in the world. Demand conditions in both are identical, 
and the product is homogeneous. Market demand in either country is 
Qj =P. ('-Xj) 
Qj and xj are demand and price in country i respectively, j c= {1,21. National 
product markets are assumed to be perfectly segmented, so consumers in country 
are constrained to make purchases only on their home market; thus, x-j (the 
market price abroad) does not influence Qj. U measures the 'size' of either 
(1) 
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national product market, and it can be interpreted as an index of the number of 
homogeneous consumers in each country, all of whom have a reservation price 
of 1. 
Net revenue equals revenue minus variable costs. 16 If either national product 
market is monopolised by firm i with a constant marginal cost of ci, the 
monopoly price will be 
1 
xu (ci) =-. (1 + ci) 
The monopolist's net revenue is 
ju 
4 
If a national product market is served by a duopoly, then firm i's net revenue 
function is R(ci, cj), where ci is firm fs marginal cost and cy is its rival's marginal 
cost. (The symmetry across countries - i. e. identical market demand functions - 
implies that R"(q) and R(ci , qj) apply to both countries. ) The exact functional 
form of R(ci , qj) depends on the assumed form of duopolistic competition. At 
Bertrand equilibrium and if marginal costs are common knowledge 
0 for Ci E [Cp 
R (c,, cj) p- (I - cj) - (c, - c) for C, EE [(XM )-l (Cj), Cj (2) 
Rm(ci) for ciE(O, (xm)-I(cj)] 
The results in (2) are standard. (Note that (x")-'(cj) gives the marginal cost that is 
associated with a monopoly price of cj. ) If ci > cj then firm i's rival optimally sets 
a price below ci and captures the entire market. If ci = cj the Bertrand equilibrium 
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price equals the common level of marginal costs. A conventional assumption is 
that the market is divided equally between the two firms. If ci < cj there are two 
possibilities. If the gap between ci and cj is 'small' (xm(ci) > cj) firm i optimally 
sets a price below cj, but the gap between the two firms' marginal costs is not 
large enough to allow firm i to charge its monopoly price. Therefore, i sets a 
price of cj - c, earns net revenue per unit of cy - ci and serves the entire market 
with lk(l - cj) units. 17 This 'undercutting equilibrium' is shown in the second 
line of (2). However, if the gap between ci and cj is 'large' (x"(cj) < cj) firm i 
optimally sets its monopoly price, which is still less than qj. This 'monopoly- 
pricing equilibrium' is shown in the bottom line of (2). If it is assumed that both 
firms initially have marginal costs of cj, then the distinction between 'small' and 
'large' levels of (cj - ci) can be linked directly to the size of finn i's process 
innovation (i. e. nondrastic or drastic). Furthermore, net revenues at a Bertrand 
equilibrium with more than two firms can be straightforwardly described using 
(2) if cj is reinterpreted as the minimum of firm i's rivals' marginal costs (i. e. qj =- 
min(ci, CZ, ---, Ci- 19 Ci+ 19 ... 5 CND- 
The R(ci, cj) function is not well-behaved: it is continuous but not smooth (with 
kinks as we move between lines in (2)). R(-) is decreasing in ci and increasing in 
c. The weak monotonicity of R(-) implies that realisations for given cj can be j 
ranked using the restrictions in assumption (A) as 
R(O, 0) = R(t, 0) = R(c, 0) = R(c + t, 0) =0 
R3'(O) 2t R(O, t) >0 and R(t, t) = R(c, t) = R(c + t, t) =0 (3) 
R"l(0)2ýR(O, c) >R(t, c) >O andR(c, c)=R(c+t, c)=0 
Ru(0)2: R(O, c+t) >R(t, c+t) >R(c, c+t) >O andR(c+t, c+t)=0 
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Likewise, it is possible to rank R(ci, cj) for given ci and different values of cj. 
However, with only loose restrictions on t, c as in (A), it is impossible to rank 
R(-) definitively for different values of ci and cj. This is a disadvantage created by 
the badly-behaved functional form of R(. ). We return to this problem when 
deriving equilibrium solutions in Section 2.3 below. 
To provide a feel for the implications of Bertrand competition and assumption 
(A) taken together, we make three final observations on the characteristics of 
market equilibria. First, if two firms produce locally to serve a product market 
(and entry does not occur in stage three), then either will only make strictly 
positive net revenue if it innovates successfully but its rival doesn't. Second, in 
the asymmetric industrial structure where one firra produces locally but its rival 
produces abroad (and serves the market by exporting) the local firm will make 
strictly positive net revenue unless its own R&D fails but its rival's succeeds; 
conversely, the exporting firm will only make strictly positive net revenue if its 
own R&D succeeds but the local fir'n's fails. Third, cross-hauling of 
international trade flows will never occur in equilibrium, although greenfield- 
FDI cross-hauling (in the G subgame) may occur. (To see this, note that a 
necessary condition for trade cross-hauling is that neither firm undertake 
greenfield-FDI. Given that, firm i will export tofs home market iff cj (: - [c, +t, 
and firinj will export to i's home market iff Cj E (0, cr-t], where ci is i's marginal 
production cost. For t>0 these two intervals do not overlap. ) 
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2.2.3. Equilibrium Concepts. 
Definitions 1 and 2 fonnally characterise the pure-strategy (subgame perfect) 
Nash equilibria of the A and G subgames. Definition 3 then sets out the 
greenfield/acquisition decision rule (GADR) that selects between the A- and G- 
equilibria to determine the equilibrium industrial structure of the overall game. 
We label the incumbents in the G subgame firms I and 2, the potential entrant in 
stage three firm 3, and the acquirer (integrated firm) in the A subgarne firm A. 
Derinition 1. (S,,; S, I is the equilibrium of the A subgame iff 
BR SA= arg max EirA(SA; S3' (SA)) and S3 3 (SA) 
SA 
where 
S BR 
3' 
(SA) =- arg max E7r3 (SA; S3) 
S3 
for all SA E(N, R} andS3 E{O, R) 
S BR 
3, 
(SA) gives the potential entrant's best response to any choice of SAby the 
acquirer. Because the acquirer is the first-mover (and its corporate structure 
choice is observed by the potential entrant at the start of stage three), 
S3" is 
endogenous when SA is determined: the acquirer must take account of the 
knock-on effects of its own corporate structure choice on the potential entrant's 
behaviour. From this formulation of the A sub9ame's equilibrium it is clear that 
the acquirer can potentially use its corporate structure choice to influence the 
potential entrant's behaviour to its own advantage. 
141 
Deflnition 2 . 
18 f 
*, *; *} is the equilibrium of the G subgame iff SI S2 S3 
BR * BR * BR ** ' (S2 ); S2 =' (SI ); and S3 = S3 (SI 2 
S2 S, = Sý S2 
where the S13R(-) functions 
BR BR Sj (S2) =- arg max Eyr, (S S2; S3' (SS, » 
S, 
SBR (S arg max Ex2 (S, S ; SBR(S, S » 
S2 
12 
SBR (S 
I 'S 2) 3= arg max Eir3 (S,, S2; S3) 
S3 
for all S, S2r= ((I, N), (1, R), (2, R)j and S3 E(O, R) 
give the firrns' best responses to their rivals' corporate structure choices. 
Because the potential entrant is the second-mover in the G subgame, it takes the 
incumbents' corporate structures as given when deriving its best response; 
therefore, S, " depends on S,, S2. However, firms I and 2 must take account of 
the knock-on effects of their own corporate structure choices on the potential 
entrant's behaviour; therefore, 
SBR is endogenized within SIBR, SBR . By analogy 32 
with Definition 1, this formulation of the G subgame's equilibrium makes it clear 
that the incumbents can potentially use their corporate structure choices to 
influence the potential entrant's behaviour to their own advantage. 
Deflnition 3. {SA; S3 } (resp. {S, S2 ; S3 1) is the equilibrium industrial structure 
of the game in Figure Ii 
ErA (SA; S3 )> (resp. E; rl (SI , 
S2 ; S3 + ET2 (sl $ S2 ; S3 (4) 
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We refer to (4) as the greenfieldlacquisition decision rule (GADR). The GADR is 
used to select between the A- and G-equilibria, and we will say that the selected 
equilibrium (i. e. the equilibrium industrial structure of the overall game) 
dominates the rival candidate equilibrium. 
The GADR is formally identical to the decision rule conventionally used in co- 
operative merger games (e. g. Salant, Switzer and Reynolds, 1983). The GADR 
selects the A-equilibrium iff an acquisition would be (strictly) profitable. To 
show this, assume for concreteness that the acquirer is firm 1. We can place 
lower and upper bounds on the take-over price that 1 will pay for 2. The lower 
bound, BL, is such that 2 is indifferent between accepting the take-over offer and 
playing the G subgame (i. e. rejecting it); therefore, BL = Ez2(s, SA). 
Likewise, the upper bound, BU, is such that 1 is indifferent between playing the 
two subgarnes (because 2 captures the entire surplus); therefore, 
*****U 
E; rA (SA; 
S3 )-Bu =E; r, (S, S2 ; 
S3 ). The GADR requires B> BL, so that there 
exists a non-empty interval of take-over prices such that both firms are better off 
after the take-over. Note that the GADR requires take-overs to be strictly 
profitable. Following Gowrisankaran (1999), this is a simple method of 
incorporating an infinitesimal sunk cost of administering the take-over. 
One potential drawback of the GADR is that it does not determine the 
equilibrium take-over price. Therefore in the normative analysis of Section 2.4 
we focus on global social welfare (GSW), rather (e. g. ) than trying to compare 
national welfare levels between acquisition-FDI source and host countries. The 
equilibrium take-over price would depend crucially on the specification of the 
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bargaining mechanism that the take-over terms are negotiated through, which we 
do not model. (For example, if 1 makes 2a take-it-or-leave-it offer, we would 
expect a price of Oust above) BL; conversely, if 2 makes Ia take-it-or-leave-it 
offer, we would expect a price of Oust below) Bu. A common practice - e. g. Hart 
and Moore (1990) - is to assume that the acquirer and the target share the surplus 
equally. Our GADR encompasses all these cases. ) 
Finally, we briefly illustrate how endogenous process R&D interacts with the 
GADR. Assume N ex ante identical firms compete A la. Bertrand to serve a single 
market for a homogeneous product. Each firm possesses a process innovation 
that 'succeeds' with probability p and 'fails' with probability (I - p); 'success' 
and 'failure' are associated with marginal production costs of 0 and c 
respectively. In this setting (which has similarities to our modelling structure) the 
expected profit of any firm is P. (I _ P)N-1 - R(O, c) ; if two firms merge, then the 
expected profits of any firm in the new equilibrium are p. (I _ P)N-2 - R(O, c). It is 
straightforward to show that for p r= [0,0.5] the merger is unprofitable and for p 
c= (0.5,1] the merger is profitable irrespective of N. This contrasts sharply with 
outcomes in the same set-up without endogenous process R&D (i. e. where all 
firms' marginal production costs are fixed at c), where only a merger from 
duopoly to monopoly is strictly profitable (although for different reasons than 
- those behind Salant, Switzer and Reynolds' (1983) similar finding). 
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2.3. Positive Analysis. 
2.3.1. Equilibria in the A subgame. 
Table 2.1 gives the payoff matrix in the A subgame. Because both the acquirer 
and the potential entrant own 2 plants, the trade cost t is irrelevant in the A 
subgame: international trade flows never occur in equilibrium. If the potential 
entrant chooses 0, then the acquirer monopolises both product markets. If the 
potential entrant chooses R, then either firm must possess a marginal production 
cost advantage over its rival to earn R(O, c) in both countries, which occurs with 
probabilityp. (l -p) when both firms undertake R&D. 
Acquirer 
-> N R 
Potential 
entrant 
0 E; rA=2. Rm(c) E; rA= 2. p- Rm (0) + 2. Q- p) - Rm (c) -I 
E; r3 =0 E; r3 =0 
R E; rA= 0 E; rA=2-p-(l-p)-R(O, c)-I 
E; r3=2-p. R(O, c)-2-I E; r3= 2-p- (I - p) - R(O, c) -2-I 
Table 2.1: Payoti-Matnx in the A subgame 
We consider the potential entrant's optimal decision first, which may be 
conditional on the acquirer's prior choice. If the acquirer chooses N, then the 
potential entrant has R >- (resp. -< )0 as 
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p> (resp. <)11 
R(O, c) -p 
RHS(5) defines a critical p-value: because p enters R(-) multiplicatively, 
(11, u)-R(O, c) is independent of p. In (p, p)-space RHS(5) is a rectangular 
hyperbola, because a fall in p must be counterbalanced by a rise in A which 
increases the payoff to successful R&D. 
If the acquirer chooses R, then the potential entrant has R >- (resp. -< )0 as 
p> (resp. <) 
I 
(6) 
R(O, c). p. (l-p) 
RHS(6) is a U-shaped parabola in (p, p)-space, which is symmetric around p= 
0.5 with asymptotes at p=0 and p=1. To earn strictly positive net revenue (and 
thereby finance the sunk costs of entry), the potential entrant requires a marginal 
production cost advantage over the acquirer (i. e. successful R&D is insufficient). 
This occurs with probability p-(I - p), which approaches 0 as p approaches 1; 
therefore, for p =- 1a very large market is required to Make E7E3 >0 because the 
payoff to a marginal production cost advantage must rise to counterbalance a fall 
in its probability. 
For p (=- (0,11 RHS(6) > RHS (5), so there are three distinct situations to be faced 
by the acquirer when making her stage-two (see Figure 1) decision. For p 
RHS(5) entry is blockaded: regardless of the acquirer's choice, the potential 
entrant chooses 0. In this case the acquirer has R >- (resp. -< )N as 
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,u> 
(resp. <)21 
. [Rm (0) - Rm (c)] -p p 
For, u E=- (RHS(5), RHS(6)) the potential entrant's optimal decision is conditional 
on the acquirer's choice: by choosing R, the acquirer can deter entry; however, 
entry will occur if the acquirer chooses N. Therefore, the acquirer has 
(resp. -< )N as 
p> (resp. 
I 
-. Rm(c)+- . [Rm (0) - Rm (c)] -p pp 
Finally, for p> RHS(6) the potential entrant chooses R regardless of the 
acquirer's prior choice, so the acquirer must accommodate entry. Therefore, the 
acquirer has R >- (resp. -< )N as 
p> (resp. <) 
I 
2. 
R(O, c). p. (I-p) 
p 
By comparing RHS(8) and RHS(9) to RHS(7), we derive the following result. 
Lemma 2. Relative to the benchmark of blockaded entry, (i) the acquirer is 
tmore likely' to invest in R&D when entry can be deterred; and (ii) if entry must 
be accommodated, the acquirer is 'less likely' to invest in R&D for large p, but 
f more likely' for small p. 
proof. Part (i) requires RHS(7) > RHS(8), so that an interval of p-values exists 
where the acquirer undertakes R&D to deter entry that would not be 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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undertaken if entry were blockaded. RHS(7) > RHS(8) is clear from 
straightforward inspection. 
Part (ii) (the 'less likely' result) requires RHS(7) < RHS(9) for large p, so 
that an interval of p-values exists where the acquirer undertakes R&D 
when entry is blockaded that would not be undertaken if entry had to be 
acconunodated. RHS(9) > RHS(7) iff R'(O)-Rm(c)>R(O, c). (I-p), 
which clearly holds for p=1. A necessary-and-sufficient condition for 
RHS(9) > RHS(7) on pE (0,11 is Rm (0) - R' (c) - R(O, c) > 0. This 
condition does not hold: for c ý: 0.5 R(O, c) = Rm(O), so LHS = -Rm(c); for c 
< 0.5 R(O, c) =, u. (l - c)-c and LHS >0 iff c> 2/3, which is a contradiction. 
Therefore, for p =- 0 RHS(7) > RHS(9) (the 'more likely' result). QED. 
The result in Lemma 2 allows us to characterise the acquirer's optimal behaviour 
in terms of Fudenberg and Tirole's (1984) taxonomy of an incumbent's 
investment strategies in anticipation of entry. When entry can be deterred, the 
acquirer behaves as a 'top dog' (part (i)). However, when entry must be 
accommodated, the acquirer behaves as a 'puppy dog' for large p but as a 'top 
dog' for small p (part (ii)). The 'top dog' invests in 'strength' (by undertaking 
extra sunk investments) to look tough and ward off rivals, whereas the 'puppy 
dog' conspicuously avoids looking 'strong' (by reducing spending on sunk 
investments) to appear inoffensive and avert aggressive reactions from rivals. 19 
In part (ii) we compare the optimal R&D behaviour of a monopolist to that of a 
duopolist, and the result reflects variations in the strength of Arrow's 
6 replacement effect': insofar as undertaking R&D gives the acquirer a chance to 
cescape competition' in the duopoly (i. e. when accommodating entry), the 
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acquirer will have a stronger incentive to undertake R&D as a duopolist than as a 
monopolist. When p is small, so there is little chance that the potential entrant's 
R&D will succeed, the 'replacement effect' in duopoly is strong, and thus the 
acquirer is 'more likely' to undertake R&D when entry must be accommodated 
than under blockaded entry. However, when p is large, the 'replacement effect' 
in duopoly is weak: the potential entrant's R&D is likely to succeed, so that 
R&D success will not allow the acquirer to 'escape competition'. Therefore, for 
large p the acquirer is 'more likely' to undertake R&D under blockaded, rather 
than accommodated, entry. 
The equilibria of the A subgame are plotted in (p,, u)-space in Figure 2.2. For p< 
RHS(5) the acquirer optimally chooses R iff (7) holds. It is straightforward to 
show that RHS(5) > RHS(7); therefore , for p< RHS(7) < RHS(5) the A- 
equilibrium is (N; 0), and forp E (RHS(7), RHS(5)) the A-equilibrium is (R; 
01.20 The {N; 0) and {R; 0} A-equilibria are represented in regions I and II of 
Figure 2.2 respectively. For pE (RHS(5), RHS(6)) the acquirer optimally 
chooses R iff (8) holds. In Lemma 2(i) we showed that RHS(7) > RHS(8); 
therefore, because RHS(5) > RHS(7) (see n. 20 above), the A-equilibrium on p F_ 
(RHS(5), RHS(6)) is (R; 0}, which is represented in region 11 of Figure 2. For p 
> RHS(6) the acquirer optimally chooses R iff (9) holds. Clearly RHS(9) 
RHS(6), so the A-equilibrium forp > RHS(6) (i. e. region III of Figure 2.2) is (R; 
R}. 
[FIGURE 2.2 IS OVERLEAF] 
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Ii 
; (7) 
p 
0 
Figure 2.2: A-equilibria 
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Key to Figure 2.2 
Region A-equilibrium 
(N; 01 
{R; 0) 
iii {R; R} 
An interesting feature of Figure 2.2 is the lack of an A-equilibrium of (N, R). 
The key reason for this is the sequential-moves structure of the A subgame. If the 
acquirer and the potential entrant chose their corporate structures simultaneously, 
then (R; 0) would arise in A-equilibrium (which we label case (x for ease) iff U,, 
>I>L,,,, where Ua =2-[Rm(O)-Rm(c)]. p and La =R(O, c). p. (l-p); and 
{N; R) would arise in A-equilibrium (case P) iff Up >I> Lp, where 
=R(O, c)-p and LP=2. R(O, c) -p- (I - p). U and L define (respectively) 
upper and lower bounds on I for the existence of the A-equilibrium. Clearly, Lp > 
L,,, and U.. > Up for p#0 (see n. 20), so that in the simultaneous-moves version 
of the A subgame whenever {N; RI is an A-equilibrium, so is {R; 0). 21 (The 
reason for this is that the potential entrant's sunk cost of R is twice as large as the 
acquirer's. This in turn decreases L,, relative to Lp, because L defines the I-value 
where the non-innovating firm is indifferent between its two strategies, and 
increases U relative to Up, because U defines the I-value where the innovating 
firm is indifferent between its two strategies. If the potential entrant could 'catch 
up' at zero sunk cost, so that R cost I for both finns, then we would have L,, = Lp 
:; 6 0.22 U>U.. reflects the potential entrant's stronger and Up > U.. for p 
incentive to choose R via Arrow's 'replacement effect'. ) 
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In the sequential-moves version of the A subgame that we have analysed, the 
acquirer - as first-mover - chooses between A-equilibria of (R; 0) and (N; R). 
The acquirer prefers (R; 0) iff I<Ua+2. Rm (c), which must hold whenever 
(N; R) arises as an A-equilibrium in the simultaneous-moves version because U,, 
> Up. (Therefore, the acquirer's R&D investment is pre-emptive in this case. ) 
The acquirer's preference for {R; 0) over (N; R) whenever {N; R) arises under 
simultaneous-moves reflects the 'efficiency effect' (see Tirole, 1988, p. 393): the 
acquirer's gain from selecting {R; 0) over {N; R) (i. e. monopoly vs. duopoly 
profits) is greater than the potential entrant's gain from becoming a duopolist in 
{N; R). 23 
Finally, note that although the entry threat in the A subgame does alter the 
acquirer's 'incentives' to invest in R&D (see Lemma 2), it does not alter the 
acquirer's equilibrium behaviour relative to the benchmark of blockaded entry. 
In the absence of a potential entrant, the acquirer would optimally choose R 
(resp. IV) iff p> (resp. <) RHS(7); this also describes the acquirer's equilibrium 
behaviour in the presence of an entry threat (see Figure 2.2). 
2.3.2. Equilibria in the G subgame. 
The G subgame is solved and extensively discussed in chapter 1; here, we 
present the solution and catalogue its properties that are relevant for our purpose. 
Table 2.2 gives the G subgame's payoff matrix. Rather than discussing the 
derivation of expected profits in each industrial structure, we highlight several 
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general features and then present a specimen derivation. First, note that we adopt 
the convention throughout, where a firra eams strictly positive net revenue in 
both countries in Bertrand equilibrium, of writing domestic net revenue as the 
first tenn in square brackets and foreign net revenue as the second. Expected 
profits can be viewed as a weighted average of realized profits across all possible 
'states of nature', where each state is associated with a distinct configuration of 
R&D outcomes across firms and the weight applied equals the probability of that 
state's occurrence. (Recall from Section 2.2.1 that the probability of R&D 
success p is identical and independent across firms; at the end of Section 2.2.2 
we provide a brief discussion of how firms' realized net revenues are influenced 
by their R&D outcomes and location choices. ) 
[TABLE 2.2 IS OVERLEAF] 
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(The incumbents are firms 1 and 2, and the potential entrant is fin-ri 3. If 3 
chooses 0, E; r3 =0 (not reported for brevity). ) 
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For illustrative purposes, consider the firms' expected profits when firms 1 and 2 
choose corporate structures of (1, R) and (2, R) respectively. If the potential 
entrant chooses 0, then the incumbents' expected profits are 
Er, =p- (I - p) - [R(O, c) + R(t, c)] -I 
Eir2 =p- (I - p) - [R(O, c+ t) + R(O, c)] + P2 -R(O, t) + 
(1 _ P)2 -R(c, c+t)-G-I 
Because firm 2 has a local plant in country 1, firm 1 must possess a marginal 
production cost advantage if it is to earn strictly positive net revenue. This occurs 
with probability p-(I - p) when l's R&D investment succeeds but 2's fails. On 
the other hand, firm 2 can earn strictly positive net revenue at home when the 
firms' marginal production costs are the same because the trade cost insulates its 
domestic plant from foreign competition. 
If the potential entrant chooses R, then the finus' expected profits are 
Eir, =p- (I - p) 2 . [R(O, c)+R(t, c)]-l 
E; r2=2. p . 
(I _ P)2 - R(O, c) + P2 -(I-p)-R(O, t)-G-I 
E; r3=2- p. (I _ P)2 - R(O, c) +P2 -(l-p)-R(O, t)-2-I 
Finn 1 faces two local rivals and must possess marginal production cost 
advantages over both with probability p. (I _ P)2 to earn R(O, c) at home and R(t, 
c) abroad. If firm 2 alone innovates successfully, it earns R(O, c) in both 
countries; additionally, because firm 2 faces only one local rival (the potential 
entrant, firm 3), if both incumbents' R&D investments succeed but the potential 
entrant's fails, then firm 2 earns R(O, t) at home. If the potential entrant alone 
innovates successfully, then it earns R(O, c) in both countries; if only firm 2's 
R&D fails, then the potential entrant earns R(O, t) in country 2. (Note that, when 
the potential entrant chooses R, the incumbents' expected net revenues have a 
factor of p-(1 - p): because the potential entrant owns a plant in each country, a 
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necessary condition for an incumbent to earn strictly positive net revenue is that 
its own Pý&D succeeds but the potential entrant's fails. Furthermore, entry 
reduces the incumbents' expected profits. ) 
Because of the complexity of the G subgame we place restrictions on the four 
cost parameters 1, c, Gj when deriving its solution. We show in chapter I that the 
following two assumptions are sufficient to fix the form of a plot of G-equilibria 
in (p, p)-space. 24 
(B) R(O, c+t)-R(c, c+t)+R(t, c)-R(O, c) >0 
(C) Gý: I>O 
Assumption (B) on t, c is only slightly more restrictive than our maintained 
assumption A). 25 (In general (B) holds if the gap (c - t) is sufficiently large. ) By 
invoking (B) and (C), both of which hold under wide ranges of variation in the 
cost parameters, we can draw general conclusions about equilibrium behaviour in 
the G subgame. (We term variations in t, c, GI that are consistent with both (B) 
and (C) continuing to hold nondrastic variations; drastic variations violate (B) or 
(C) or both. ) Given assumptions (B), (C), Figure 2.3 illustrates the equilibria of 
the G subgame in (p, u)-space. The inter-regional boundaries in Figure 2.3 are 
defined below the key. 
[FIGURE 2.3 IS OVERLEAF] 
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Figure 2.3: G-equilibria 
inter-regional boundaries: I/II boundary is RHS(10); II/III boundary is 
RHS(1 1); III/IV lower boundary and IV/V boundary is RHS(12); III/IV upper 
boundary and III/V upper boundary is RHS(13); IIIN lower boundary is 
RHS(14); HIM boundary is RHS(15); VINII boundary is RHS(16); VINIII 
boundary and VIINIII boundary is RHS(I 7); VIII/IX boundary is RHS(1 8); 
DUX boundary is RHS(19). 
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Key to Figure 2.3 
Region Equilibrium Industrial Structure under PE 
1 (1, N); 0) 
(1, R); 0} 
{(I, R), (1, R); 01 
IV {(1, R), (1, R); 0); {(I, N), (2, R); 01 
V {(1, R), (1, R); 0); {(I, N), (1, N); R) or ((1, N), (2, R); 0) 
vi {(I, R), (1, R); R) * or {(I, R), (2, R); 0) 
vii {(2, R), (2, R); 0) * 
Vill {(I, R), (1, R); R I; {(I, R), (1, R); R) or {(2, R), (2, R); 01 
Ix {(1, R), (1, R); R) 
x {(2, R), (2, R); R I* 
(Note: * denotes a dominant strategy equilibrium. ) 
inter-regional boundaries in Figure 2.3 
I/Il boundary: 
P= 11 (10) [R(O, c+ t) + R(t, c) - R(c, c+ t)] -p 
II/Ill boundary: 
p 
[R(O, c+t) + R(t, c) - R(c, c+t)]. p -(I - p) +- - R(O, t) -p p 
III/IV lower boundary and IV/V boundary: 
G 
[R(O, c)-R(t, c)]. p 
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III/IV upper boundary and III/V upper boundary: 
p=1. 
I 
[R(O, c) + R(t, c)] -p- p) p 
III/V lower boundary: 
2.2-1 1 
P2 
(14) 
R(O, c) -p- (I - p) +-- R(O, t) - 
pp 
IIINI boundary: 
P= I.. 
P. (1 
11 (15) 
R(O, c) P)2 + R(O, t) p2. (l_p) 
VINII boundary: 
P= IG [R(O, c) - R(t, c)] -p 
VI/VIII boundary and VII/VIII boundary: 
2.2-1 1. 
p2. (I_P) R(O, c)-p. (I-p)'+- R(O, t) 
pp 
VIII/IX boundary: 
IX/X boundary: 
p= 
R(O, c) p. (I-p)' 
G 
I 
--[R(O, c)-R(t, c)]. P. 
(I _ P)2 
JU 
(19) 
in the key to Figure 2.3 multiple equilibria within a region are separated by 
semicolons. Where G-equilibria are separated by 'or', the relevant equilibrium 
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depends on whether entry by firm 3 is accommodated (R) or strategically 
deterred (0) by the incumbents. We highlight three properties of Figure 2.3 that 
are relevant for our purposes. 
Gl. (chapter 1, section 1.3.4) The shapes of regions V and VII in Figure 2.3 
depend on whether 
I 
2-- . [R(O, c) - R(t, c)] - R(O, t) >0 (20) G 
is satisfied. (The general shapes of all other regions in Figure 2.3 are robust to 
changes in the cost parameters, provided that assumptions (B) and (C) continue 
to hold. ) If (20) fails, then (i) the bottom boundary of region V, RHS(14), will 
extend to p=1, rather than meeting RHS(12) in the interior of Figure 2.3; and 
(ii) region VII ceases to exist. While (20) holds when G=I, some Gj that satisfy 
assumption (C) Imply LHS(20) < 0.26 Intuitively, for G01 LHS(20) =-ý -R(O, t), 
so (20) fails. 
G2 and G3 concern equilibrium selection (entry-deterrence vs. -accommodation) 
in regions V, VI and VIII of Figure 2.3. G2 and G3 use the following necessary- 
and-sufficient conditions for the entry-deterring G-equilibrium to be selected for 
all u in the relevant region. 
Region V {(l, N), (2, R); 0) is selected over {(I, N), (1, N); R) for all p iff 
2- 
1. 
R(c, c+ t) + 2. [R(O, c + t) - R(c, c+ t)] - R(O, c)l -p G 
(21) 
+I+I [2. R(O, c)-R(O, t)]. P2 ý,. 0 G 
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Region VI. {(l, R), (2, R); 01 is selected over {(l, R), (1, R); R) for allp iff 
G 
R(c, c+t)+ 
tG 
. [R(O, c+ t) -2- R(c, c+ t) - R(t, c)] - R(O, c)l -p 
- [R(c, c+ t) - R(O, c +t) + R(O, c) +2- R(t, c)] +2- R(O, c) - R(O, t)l -p2 (22) zi - 
+ 
t-I 
- [R(O, t) - R(O, c) -R(t, c)] - R(O, c) + R(O, t)l -p3>0 
Region VIII {(2, R), (2, R); 0) is selected over {(I, R), (1, R); R) as the second 
G-equilibrium for all p iff p> RHS(I 6) or 
4- 
G. 
R(O, c) - (I - p) >G+ 1) (23) 
x 12 - R(O, c) - [4 - R(O, c) - R(O, p+ [2. R(O, c) - R(O, t)] - P2 
1 
and 
2. 
G -[R(O, 
c) -R(t, c)]- 2. R(O, c) + 
14- 
G. 
R(t, c) + 4. R(O, c) - R(O, t)i -p 
(24) 
12 
- 2---[R(O, c)+R(t, c)]+2. R(O, c)-R(O, t) p >O 
tG1. 
G2. (chapter 1, Proposition 6 and Lemma 8) If G=I, then (i) ((I, IV), (2, R); 01 
is selected over [(I, N), (1, N); R) for all (p, p) in region V of Figure 2.3; (ii) 
given sufficiently high p, a second equilibrium of ((2, R), (2, R); 01 exists for all 
in region VIII of Figure 2.3; and (iii) given t sufficiently greater than 0, f(l, R), 
(2, R); 0) is (certainly) selected over ffl, R), (1, R); R) for all (p, p) in region VI 
of Figure 2.3. 
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Note in part (iii) of G2 that the requirement for t sufficiently greater than 0 is 
consistent with our earlier requirement in assumption (B) that the gap (c - t) be 
sufficiently large. Finally, G3 reports on the effects of setting G>L 
G3. (chapter 1, Proposition 7) (i) Rises in G ceteris paribus weakly increase the 
size of the p-interval for any p where entry-accommodation is selected in 
equilibrium in regions V, VI and VIII of Figure 2.3. (ii) In the limit as G -> oo, 
entry-deterrence is never selected in equilibrium in region VI, although entry- 
deterrence is always selected for some (p,, u)-pairs in regions V and VIII. 
The intuitive justification for the results in G2 and G3 concerning the influence 
of G relative to I on equilibrium selection is that, whereas the potential entrant 
must undertake R&D but not greenfield-FDI to enter the industry, the 
incumbents' entry-deterring strategies always entail greenfield-FDI. Therefore 
the result stems directly from our modelling structure. (Because the potential 
entrant initially owns 2 plants, the cost of additional plants, G, is irrelevant to its 
entry decision. However, the incumbents must invest in greenfield-FDI to deter 
entry. ) 
2.3.3. Equilibrium industrial structures: A-equilibrium vs. G-equilibrium. 
In this Section we compare the A- and G-equilibria for given parameter values to 
derive (overall) equilibrium industrial structures and the equilibrium mode of 
FDL This task comprises two steps. (The mechanics are presented in the 
Appendix. ) First, we locate the inter-regional boundaries in the A subgame 
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(Figure 2.2) relative to those in the G subgame (Figure 2.3), so that both the A- 
and G-equilibria are fixed for given parameter values. Second, we determine the 
equilibrium industrial structure by using the GADR to select between the A- and 
G-equilibria. A complication arises when there are multiple G-equilibria (A- 
equilibria are always unique: see Figure 2.2). In this case the selected subgame 
may depend on which G-equilibriurn is selected within the G subgame. Of 
course, if the A-equilibrium dominates all the G-equilibria, then we can 
unambiguously conclude that the A subgame will be played in equilibrium (and 
vice versa). Figure 2.4 illustrates the model's equilibrium industrial structures in 
(p, p)-space. 
[FIGURE 2.4 IS OVERLEAF] 
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Figure 2.4: Equilibrium Industrial Structures (the G/A choice) 
Bold inter-regional boundaries are labelled in the Figure. Dashed lines are inter- 
regional bounaries from the G subgame (included for comparison). 
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Key to Figure 2.4 
Region Equilibrium Industrial Structure 
I N), (1, N); 0) (resp. (N-, 0)) iff t ý!: (resp. <) xm (c) -c 
JR; 01 (Region II exists iff (Al) fails. ) 
{R; 0) 
IV ffl, R), (1, R); 0) (Region IV exists iff t<0.5. ) 
v G-equilibrium is j(1, R), (1, R); R) 
Small P: {(I, R), (1, R); R} (resp. {R; R 1) for small (resp. large) t 
Large p: {R; R) 
G-equilibrium is j(1, R), (2, R); 01 
((I, R), (2, R); 0) (resp. (R; R)) for small (resp. large) G 
vi G-equilibrium is ((1, R)q (19 R); R} 
Small p: ((I, R), (1, R); R) (resp. ffl, R), (1, R); R) for small I; (R; 
R) for large 1) for small (resp. large) t 
Large p: [R; R) (resp. ((I, R), (1, R); R} for small 1, {R; R) for large 
1) for small (resp. large) t 
Vil G-equilibrium is 1(2, R), (2, R); 0) 
Small p (within region VII): ((2, R), (2, R); 0} (resp. {R; Rj) for 
small (resp. large) t 
Large p: 1(2, R), (2, R); 01 (resp. {(2, R), (2, R); 01 for small G, I, 
{R; R) for large G, 1) for small (resp. large) t 
VIII Small p (< 0.5): {(2, R), (2, R); R) (resp. {R; Rj) for small (resp. 
large) t, G, I 
Large p (ý: 0.5): {R; R) 
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Figure 2.4 provides implications for the relationships between p, u and 
equilibrium industrial structures; however, the derived relationships can be quite 
complex. Consider first the effects of changes in p in small-p industries. If t is 
small, increasing p shifts the equilibrium industrial structure successively from 
IN; 0) (region 1); to {R; 0} (regions Il and III); to {(I, R), (1, R); 01 (region 
IV); to {(I, R), (2, R); 0} for small G or {(I, R), (1, R); R) for large G (region 
V); to f(l, R), (1, R); R} (region VI); to {(2, R), (2, R); R} for small G, I or {R; 
R) for large G, I (region VIII). For large t the sequence of equilibrium industrial 
structures is {(l, N), (1, N); 01 (region 1); {R; 01 (regions Il and III); f(l, R), (2, 
R); 01 for small G or (R; RI for large G (region V); ffl, R), (1, R); R} for small 
I or {R; RI for large I (region VI); {(2, R), (2, R); R) for small G, I or {R; RI for 
large G, I (region VIII) (note that region IV does not exist for large t). These 
sequences are surnmarised for ease of reference in Table 2.3. 
[TABLE 2.3 IS OVERLEAF] 
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Table 2.3: Summary of determinants of equilibrium industrial structures in 
Figure 2.4 
Region* Smallp Largep 
Small t Large t Small t Large t 
I (N; 0} {(I,, N), (1, IV); 01 (N; 0) {(l, N), (1, M; 0) 
III (R; 01 
IV ((I, R), (1, R); 0) N/A {(l, R), (1, R); O) N/A 
V Small G: 
{(l, R), (2, R); 01 Small G: {(l, R), (2, R); 0) 
Large G: Large G: (R, R 
{(I, R), (1, R); R) 
Vil Small G, I- 
N/A {(2, R), (2, R); 01 1(2, R), (2, R); 01 
Large G, L. 
{R; R) 
Vi Small I- Small I- 
{(I, R), (1, R); R) ((I, R), (1, R); R) {R; R) {(I, R), (1, R); R) 
Large 1. Large P. 
{R; R) {R; R) 
' VIII Small G, I. {(2, R), (2, R); R) {R; R} 
Large G, I. {R; R) 
Regions appear in Figure 2.4. Movements down a column reflect increases in 
P. ) 
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The choice between {(I, N), (1, N); 0) and {N; 0) in region I depends on t in an 
intuitively-appealing way: large t affords the incumbents in the G subgame 
sufficient protection to monopoly-price, implying no (strict) profitability gains 
from acquisition-FDI; but if t is small, acquisition-FDI increases aggregate 
profits by eliminating the 'import competition' faced by each G-incumbent. In 
regions II and III the generation of acquisition-FDI in equilibrium is unsurprising 
because the acquirer is a global monopolist in A-equilibrium (no entry occurs). 
(The difference between regions II and III concerns the discarded G-equilibrium, 
which is ((I, N), (1, N); 0) in 11 and {(I, IV), (1, R); 0), {(I, R), (1, R); 01, f(l, 
N), (2, R); 0) or ((I, N), (1, IV); R) in III; section 2.4 explores the significance of 
this difference in welfare terms. ) In region IV the equilibrium industrial structure 
is the G-equilibrium of {(I, R), (1, R); 01 because both the A- and G-equilibria 
are duopolistic. Entry is 'more likely' to occur in the A subgame than in the G 
subgame if the entry-deterring G-equilibrium is played (if not, entry could occur 
in a G-equilibrium of {(I, N), (1,, N); RI in region III where the A-equilibrium is 
{R; 0}), which makes intuitive sense because the entrant faces a monopoly in 
the A subgame but a duopoly in the G subgame. Therefore, for intennediate 
values (regions IV, V and VII) entry is deterred in G-equilibrium but 
accommodated in A-equilibrium and acquisition-FDI does not generate a 'more 
concentrated' industrial structure (in terms of firm numbers), which implies that 
the profitability gains from acquisition-FDI are limited (and perhaps non- 
existent). 
In regions V, VI and VIII the equilibrium industrial structures are identical in the 
small- and large-t cases (for small p) if G, I are small. Increasing G, I causes 
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substitution in equilibrium away from industrial structures that involve 
greenfield-FDI and (relatively) large numbers of R&D investments. Therefore, in 
region V increasing G replaces (one-way) greenfield-FDI in equilibrium with 
equilibrium industrial structures involving either no FDI (small t) or acquisition- 
FDI (large t). In similar fashion, increasing I shifts the equilibrium industrial 
structure for large t in region VI from ((I, R), (1, R); R) to (R; R), which halves 
the incumbents' combined spending on R&D. (In region VIII the equilibrium 
industrial structure is independent of t, and large G, I cause the substitution of 
{R; R) for {(2, R), (2, R); RI. ) For large G, I increasing t generates 'tariff- 
jumping' acquisition-FDI in equilibrium in regions V and VI (recall that for 
small G, I equilibrium industrial structures are independent of t): {R; R) 
displaces {(l, R), (1, R); R) in both V and VI. We examine tariff-jumping 
acquisition-FDI in more detail below and contrast it with (the more familiar) 
tariff-jumping greenfield-FDI. 
Finally, we can draw some tentative generalisations on the effects of changes in 
p on equilibrium FDI flows and industrial structures in small-p industries. In 
small markets (region I) the industry is served either by two national firms (for 
large t) or by a monopolistic MNE (for small t), created by acquisition-FDI; 
R&D is never undertaken. In medium-sized markets (regions Il and 111) the 
equilibrium industrial structure is a monopolistic MNE, created by acquisition- 
FDI, which invests in R&D. In large markets (regions V, VI and VIII) the 
equilibrium industrial structure is the G-equilibrium. for small G, 1; both G- 
incumbents undertake R&D and greenfield-FDI flows may be one-way (region 
V), non-existent (region VI) or cross-hauled (region VIII). For large G, I in large 
169 
markets the equilibrium industrial structure is two MNEs (the G-incumbents 
integrate via tariff-jumping acquisition-FDI and entry occurs), both undertaking 
R&D, when t is large; when t is small the equilibrium industrial structure is ((I, 
R), (1, R); R} (regions V and VI) or {R; R) (region VIII). Greenfield-FDI never 
occurs in large markets for large G, L 
We now turn to consider the effects of changes in p in large-p industries. If t is 
small, increasing p shifts the equilibrium industrial structure successively from 
IN; 0) (region I); to {R; 0) (regions Il and IH); to {(I, R), (1, R); 0) (region 
IV); to f(l, R), (2, R); 0) for small G or (R; R) for large G (region V); to [(2, 
R), (2, R); 01 (region VII); to JR; R) (regions VI and VIII). For large t the 
sequence of equilibrium industrial structures is {(1, IV), (1, N); 0} (region 1); {R; 
0) (regions II and III); ffl, R), (2, R); 0) for small G or {R; R} for large G 
(region V); ((2, R), (2, R); 0} for small G, I or (R; R) for large G, I (region VII); 
f (1, R), (1, R); RI for small I or {R; R} for large I (region VI); JR; R) (region 
VIII) (note that region IV does not exist for large t). See table 3 for a summary of 
these sequences. 
Equilibrium selection in regions I to IV is identical in the large- and small-p 
cases. In region VIII acquisition-FDI always arises in equilibrium for large p 
regardless of t, G, I (the irrelevance of G, I stems from the fact that the acquirer's 
expected net revenues are greater than the G-incumbents' for P>0.5 in region 
VIII). In regions V and VII the equilibrium industrial structures are identical in 
the small- and large-t cases if G, I are small, with one-way greenfield-FDI in V 
and greenfield-FDI cross-hauling in VII. Increasing G, I again causes substitution 
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in equilibrium away from industrial structures involving greenfield-FDI and 
(relatively) large numbers of R&D investments: acquisition-FDI arises in region 
V and (for large t) in region VII, displacing greenfield-FDI flows and halving the 
incumbents' combined R&D spending. In region VI acquisition-FDI arises in 
equilibrium for small t, but it is replaced by I(l, R), (1, R); R} for large t if I is 
small. (If I is large, then (R; R} is the equilibrium industrial structure for all t in 
region VI. ) This implies that for small I increasing t in region VI will cause ((1, 
R), (1, R); R) to replace (R; R), which appears to contradict the explanation of 
equilibrium acquisition-FDI in terms of 'tariff-jumping' motives. 
In models of equilibrium greenfield-FDI with segmented national product 
markets increasing t unambiguously increases a firm's 'incentive' to undertake 
greenfield-FDI abroad (see chapter 1 for elaboration of this point). Because 
national product markets are perfectly segmented, undertaking greenfield-FDI 
only affects a firm's profits from abroad (ceteris paribus). Foreign profits are (by 
definition) independent of t if greenfield-FDI is undertaken and decreasing in t if 
the foreign market is served by exporting from a domestic plant; therefore, the 
difference greenfield-FDI profits and exporting profits is increasing in t, creating 
the conventional tariff-jumping motive for greenfield-FDI. 
In our modelling of acquisition-FDI the decision rule for acquisition-FDI (the 
GADR) compares the G-incumbents' combined profits to the acquirer's profits 
(which are independent of t because the potential entrant has two plants so 
international trade does not occur in the A subgame), which is a qualitatively 
different comparison to that for greenfield-FDI. Under ((I, R), (1, R); RI the 
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derivative of the G-incumbents' expected profits with respect to t is 
[P* 
dt +('-P). dt , where 
[-] is a convex combination 
of dR(O, t)ldt and dR(t, c)ldt. For small p the derivative approximately equals 
dR Q, c) < 0, so increases in t reduce the G-incumbents' profits dt 
under {(I, R), (1, R); R) and strengthen the incentive to undertake (tariff- 
jumping) acquisition-M. This effect was observed for small P and large G, I in 
regions V and VI. However, for large p the derivative approximately equals 
2-p 2. (, _P). 
dR(O, t) ýýO, so increases in t increase the G-incumbents' profits dt 
under ((I, R), (1, R); R} and weaken the incentive for acquisition-FD1. This latter 
effect occurs for large p and small I in region VI. 27 Aside from regions V and VI, 
changes in t also cause switches between acquisition-FDI and G-equilibria 
involving no greenfield-FDI in region 1, where the relationship is again perverse: 
decreases in t generate acquisition-FDI (because dR(c, c+t)ldt ýý 0). 
In general, changes in p affect equilibrium FDI flows and industrial structures for 
large p as follows. In small (region I) and medium-sized (regions II and III) 
markets the equilibrium industrial structures are identical to those for small p. In 
large markets (regions V, VI, VII and VIII) the equilibrium industrial structure is 
two MNEs, one created by acquisition-FDI, for large G, L For small G, I the 
equilibrium industrial structure is either {R; R) in 'very large' markets (regions 
VI and VIII) or the G-equilibrium (regions V and VII), where entry never occurs, 
both G-incumbents undertake R&D, and greenfield-FDI flows are either one-way 
or cross-hauled. 
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By comparing the small- and large-p cases, we can gain some intuition on the 
effects of changes in p on equilibrium industrial structures. In small (region I) 
and medium-sized (regions II and III) markets the equilibrium industrial 
structures are independent of p. In large markets (regions V, VI, VII and VIII) 
increases in p make acquisition-FDI 'more likely'. This is clear in region VIII, 
and also for small t in region VI and region V (if G large). Note, moreover, that 
there are no t, G, I where deceasing p switches the equilibrium industrial 
structure to include acquisition-FDI where previously the G-equilibrium was 
selected. To provide intuition on this (weak) positive relationship between p and 
acquisition-FDI flows, compare the incumbents' net revenues between the G and 
A subgames in region VIII. The probability that the acquirer eams net revenue of 
R(O, c) in each country is p-(I - p); the equivalent probability for the G- 
incumbents is 2. p. (l _ P)2: the G subgame offers two chances to win both 
markets, but each is less likely than the acquirer's single chance. Clearly, p-(1 - 
p) > 2-p-(1 _ P)2 iff p>0.5, which is merely a straightforward comparative 
mathematical property of the probabilities of winning the markets, so 
acquisition-FDI certainly arises in equilibrium in region VIII for p>0.5 because 
acquisition also reduces the incumbents' sunk costs. 
Proposition I summarises the comparative-statics effects on the equilibrium 
industrial structure of variations in p, A t, G, I that were discussed above. 
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Proposition 1. (i) A (weak) positive association exists between p and equilibrium 
intra-industry acquisition-M. (ii) The association between p and 
equilibrium acquisition-FDI can be positive, negative, U-shaped or hump- 
shaped. (iff) The association between t and equilibrium acquisition-FDI is 
positive (conventional ) for small p but negative (ýperverse ) for large p. 
(iv) There are negative associations in equilibrium between G, I and 
(respectively) intra-industry greenfield-FDI flows and industry R&D 
spending. Increases in G can cause the substitution in equilibrium of 
acquisition-FDIfor greenfield-FDI 
The equilibrium properties of the model described in Proposition I are clear from 
Figure 2.4 and Table 2.3 (and the preceding discussion). Two comments are in 
order. First, Proposition I refers to associations between structural variables and 
acquisition-FDI, rather than acquisition-FDI flows. Recall that the size and 
direction of acquisition-FDI flOws are not -explicitly determined in our model; 
therefore, Proposition I is best interpreted as highlighting associations between 
structural variables and the occurrence of acquisition. Second, although some of 
the associations in Proposition I (e. g. in part (ii)) can take several forms, this 
does not imply that they are indeterminate. For example, the form of the 
association between acquisition-FDI and p is detennined by p, t, G, I as follows: 
(a) positive for {large p, large t; all G, I) and for {small p, large t, large G, I}; (b) 
negative for (small p, small t, small G, I); (c) U-shaped for (small p, small t, 
large G, I) and for {large p, small t, all G, I); and (d) hump-shaped for (small p, 
large t, small G, I). 
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Figure 2.4 and Table 2.3 also allow us to substantiate a claim made in the 
Introduction: that by excluding strategies of greenfield-FDI from the 
determination of the threat point, previous models of equilibrium acquisition-FDI 
may 'misleadingly' predict the occurrence of acquisition-FDI in equilibrium. 
(Note that these models are 'misleading' in terms of their application to reality, 
where firms can undertake greenfield-FDI; they are correct in terms of their own 
assumptions on firms' strategy spaces. ) Observe in region V of Figure 2.4 that if 
is large then (R; R) is selected over {(I, R), (1, R); R). However, for 
sufficiently small G {(I, R), (2, R); 0) is selected over {R; R). Therefore, if 
greenfield-FDI strategies were excluded, then (R; R) would arise in equilibrium 
for large p in region V. However, if greenfield-FDI strategies are admitted, then 
(for sufficiently small G) {(1, R), (2, R); 01 is chosen over {(I, R), (1, R); R) in 
the G subgame and over {R; R) in the 'overall' garne. Greenfield-FDI is used by 
one G-incumbent to deter entry and bolster the G-incumbents' profits, thereby 
rendering acquisition-FDI unprofitable. Therefore, in order to explain 
acquisition-FDI in equilibrium, greenfield-FDI strategies must also be included 
in the model. 
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2.4. Normative Analysis 
In this Section we perform some illustrative welfare comparisons between the A- 
and G-equilibria. Our welfare concept is global social welfare, which is 
composed of total expected consumer surplus across both countries and total 
expected profits across the three firms. To keep the analysis tractable and brief, 
we concentrate on four distinct pairings of A- and G-equilibria that arise in 
Figure 2.4 (each is coded with a 'C' to represent 'comparison'): 
C1. In region I of Figure 2.4 we compare the welfare properties of the G- 
equilibrium of {(I, IV), (1, N); 01 to those of the counterpart A-equilibrium of 
{N; 01. 
C2. In region II of Figure 2.4 we compare the welfare properties of the G- 
equilibrium of ((I, N), (1, N); 01 to those of the counterpart (and selected) A- 
equilibrium of tR; 01. 
C3. In region III of Figure 2.4 we compare the welfare properties of the G- 
equilibrium of ((l, R), (1, R); 0) to those of the counterpart (and selected) A- 
equilibrium of {R; 01. (Note that {(I, R), (1, R); 0) is not a G-equilibrium 
below the lowest dashed line in Figure 2.4. ) 
C4. In region VIII of Figure 2.4 we compare the welfare properties of the G- 
equilibrium of {(2, R), (2, R); R} to those of the counterpart A-equilibrium of (R; 
R}. 
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The welfare comparisons set out in CI - C4 concentrate on small and medium- 
sized markets (y < RHS(6) in Figure 2.4) and on very large markets (, u 
RHS(19) in Figure 2.4). In each of Cl - C4 the A- and G-equilibria considered 
are symmetric (identical) across the two countries, so we can focus on national 
social welfare in a 'representative' country (which on both the consumer surplus 
and profit measures will be exactly half global social welfare). 
First we consider consumer surplus in each pairing of A- and G-equilibria. Let 
S[Xil= lu . (, -Xi)l 2 
denote consumer surplus in countryj at a market price of xj. (The S[. ] expression 
gives the area of the triangle above the market price and below the national 
demand function in (1). We are implicitly assuming that the income effects of 
price changes are negligible, e. g. that the good in question represents a small 
share of the 'representative' consumer's spending. ) Expected consumer surplus 
in a given A- or G-equilibrium is the weighted sum of S[. ]'s, where the weights 
are the probabilities of the various possible (Bertrand) equilibrium market prices. 
Note that S[xj] is strictly decreasing in xj on Xj E [0,1) because price rises reduce 
consumer welfare. (S[-] is also strictly convex in xj on the same domain because a 
given price rise is more harmful, the lower the initial price level since the scale of 
consumption is greater. ) 
The following results for expected consumer surplus, ES[xj], in the three possible 
A-equilibria are straightforwardly derivable: 
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In {N; 0 1, ES [x, ]=S [xm (c)]. 
In {R; 0), ES [xj ]=p-S [0.5] + (1 - p) -S 
[x" (c)]. 
In {R; Rl, ES[xj]=p2-S[01+2. p. (l-p). S[min[c, 0.51] + 
(1 
_ P)2. 
S [C] 
Note that xm(O) = 0.5, so S[O. 5] is the consumer surplus associated with 
monopoly-pricing on the basis of a marginal cost of 0. Note also that S[O. 5] > 
S[x"(c)] for all c>0 because the equilibrium monopoly price is increasing in 
marginal cost. Expected consumer surplus rises as we move (successively) 
through the A-equilibria from {N; 01, to {R; 01, to (R; R). (The comparison 
between {R; 0) and (N; 0) is straightforward because - as noted above - S[O. 5] 
> S[? (c)]. To make the comparison between {R; RI and {R; 0}, rewrite ES[-] in 
{R; R) as 
p . 
[p S[01+(1-p) S[min(c, 0.51]]+ (I -p). 
[p S[min(c, 0.51]+ (1-p) S[c]] 
and note that both tenns in [-] are greater than the respective weights on p and (I 
- in ES[-] under (R; 0}. ) This result is intuitive: extra R&D investments and 
tougher 'competition' (via entry) both benefit consumers. 
Expected consumer surplus in the three G-equilibria in Cl - C4 is: 
In {(I, N), (1, N); 0), ES [xj ]=S [min (c + t, x" (c)J]. 
In {(1, R), (1, R); 0}, 
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ES[xj ]=P2 - S[min ft, 0.51] +p -(I - p) - S[minfc+t, 0.51] 
+p. (I-p). S[minlc, x" 
(t)j] + (I _ P)2 -S 
[min Ic + t, x" (c))]' 
(Here the weighted terms represent (successively) consumer surplus if both 
firms' R&D efforts succeed; if the domestic firm's R&D effort alone succeeds; if 
the foreign finn's R&D effort alone succeeds; and if both firms' R&D efforts 
fail. ) 
In 1(2, R), (2, R); R)) 
ES[x, ] = p'-S[O]+3. p . (l-p)'. S[min(c, 0.51] 
+3. p'. (I-p) - S[01 +(l -p)'- S[c] 
(Here the weighted terms represent (successively) consumer surplus if all three 
finns' R&D efforts succeed; if only one finn's R&D effort succeeds; if only one 
firm's R&D effort fails; and if all three firms' R&D efforts fail. ) 
As with the A-equilibria examined above, it is straightforward to show that 
expected consumer surplus rises as we move (successively) through the G- 
equilibria from {(I, N), (1, N); 01, to {(1, R), (1, R); 01, to {(2, R), (2, R); R). 
(The proof is tedious, so we omit it; however, it involves rearranging one ES[-] 
expression so its weights are the same as those in the comparator, and then 
comparing the weighted terms across ES[-] expressions. See, for example, how 
we rearranged ES[-] in (R; R) above to facilitate the comparison with {R; 0). ) 
The intuition for these rises in consumer surplus is also the same as with the A- 
equilibria: extra R&D investments and tougher 'competition' (both via inward 
greenfield-FDI and de novo, entry) both benefit consumers. 
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Before carrying out the welfare comparisons described in C1 - C4, the results of 
which are summarized below in Proposition 2, we consider total expected profits 
in each pairing of A- and G-equilibria. The useful feature for this purpose of the 
small and medium-sized markets considered in CI- C3 is that entry occurs in 
neither the A- nor the G-equilibrium. Therefore, the comparison of total profits 
between the two equilibria has already been accomplished in our application of 
the GADR, (4). A simple way of undertaking the profit comparison in C4 is to 
note that the entrant firm makes higher expected profits in {R; R) than in {(2, R), 
(2, R); R), so a sufficient (but unnecessary) condition for total expected profits to 
be higher in (R; R) is that the incumbents prefer JR; R). This occurs for large (-ýt 
0.5) p (see the key to Figure 2.4). 
We summarize the results of our welfare comparisons in Cl - C4 in Proposition 
2. 
Proposition 2. (i) Within both the A and G subgames, increases in industry 
spending on R&D and greenfield-FDI increase (expected) consumer 
surplus. (ii) A sufficient condition for consumers to prefer the G- to the A- 
equilibrium is that industry spending on R&D is higher at the G- 
equilibrium. (iii) The weýfare comparison of A- and G-equilibria often 
involves a Williamson (1968)-type trade-off between profits and consumer 
surplus. (iv) The possibility of Pareto improving (dominant) acquisition- 
FDI exists in small markets when industry R&D spending is larger at the 
A- than the G-equilibrium (i. e. in C2). 
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We have proved part (i) of Proposition 2 comprehensively for the A subgame 
above; our analysis of the effects of changes in industrial structure on consumer au 
surplus in the G subgame is limited to the three G-equilibria included in Cl - C4. 
However, it seems likely that (i) will hold generally within the G subgame 
because - within our modelling structure - increases in spending on R&D and 
greenfield-FDI both increase 'competition' (i. e. lower firms' marginal costs). 
Part (ii) of Proposition 2 is clear from the consumer surplus comparisons in C3 
and C4. (That consumers prefer ((I, R), (1, R); 0) to {R; 0}, and {(2, R), (2, R); 
R) to JR; R) is both intuitive and easily demonstrated by using the types of 
manipulations we employed above to show that consumer surplus is higher under 
(R; R) than {R; 01. ) However, note that (ii) is not a necessary condition. For 
example, in CI consumer surplus is strictly higher in {(I, N), (1, IV); 0) than in 
{N; 01 iff x"f(c) >c+t (despite the fact that no R&D is undertaken in either 
industrial structure) because the G-incumbents cannot monopoly-price in {(I, IV), 
(1, N); 0). (If c+tý: ? (c), consumers are indifferent between the A- and G- 
equilibria in Cl. ) Furthermore, in C2 consumers strictly prefer ((I, N), (1, N); 
0) to (R; 0) (despite the fact that more R&D investment is undertaken at the A- 
equilibrium) for all p iff c+t<0.5, which ensures S[min(c + t, X11(c))] > S[0.5] 
(the other end-point condition, S[min(c + t, x4f(c))] ýt S[xm(c)], automatically 
holds). If c+t<0.5, then the equilibrium price at the duopolistic G-equilibrium 
will be less than that at the monopolistic A-equilibrium if the integrated firm's 
R&D effort is successful. 
We turn now to discuss parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 2. In part (iii) the 
Williamson trade-off referred to means that total expected profits are higher, but 
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consumer surplus lower, at the A-equilibrium than at the G-equilibrium. In all of 
CI - C4 the occurrence of acquisition-FDI in equilibrium is sufficient for 
industry profits to be higher at the A-equilibrium than at the G-equilibrium (in 
CI - C3 it is necessary too. ) Acquisition-FDI 4certainly' (i. e. for all permissible 
parameter values) occurs in equilibrium in C2 and C3, and it occurs in 
equilibrium in CI iff XAC) >c+t and in C4 iff p is 'large' (ý: 0.5). On the other 
hand, consumer surplus is 'certainly' lower under acquisition-FDI in C3 and C4. 
Consumer surplus is lower under acquisition-FDI in Cl iff x'ýf(c) >c+t (i. e. iff 
acquisition-FDI arises there in equilibrium); and in C2 consumer surplus is lower 
for all p under acquisition-FDI iff c+t<0.5 (established above). Therefore, the 
occurrence of acquisition-FDI in equilibrium in Cl, C3 and C4 is accompanied 
by a loss of consumer welfare relative to the alternative G-equilibrium (the 
Williamson trade-off), and the occurrence of acquisition-FDI in equilibrium in 
C2 reduces consumer welfare for all p iff c+t<0.5. These differential welfare 
properties (in terms of profits and consumer surplus) of the A- and G-equilibria 
could be used to justify a role for public policy in regulating acquisition-FDI 
flows if the weight placed on consumer surplus in the social welfare function is 
sufficiently large. 
However, there are circumstances in our model when the A-equilibrium Pareto 
dominates the G-equilibrium so no Williamson trade-off exists (part (iv) of 
Proposition 2): both total profits and consumer surplus are higher at the A- 
equilibrium. In C2 (region 11 of Figure 2.4) acquisition-FDI clearly raises total 
profits (relative to the G-equilibrium 'threat point'). Furthermore, for sufficiently 
large p expected consumer surplus is higher under (R; 0) than {(I, N), (1, 
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N); Oj iff c+t>0.5 (i. e. the equilibrium monopoly price if R&D is successful in 
(R; 0) is below the equilibrium price in ((I, N), (1, IV); 01). 
28 Therefore, the A- 
equilibrium can Pareto dominate the G-equilibrium. if industry R&D spending is 
larger following acquisition-FDI than it would be otherwise. This gives some 
(limited) support to the argument that acquisition-FDI can foster 'technological 
progress' (the benefits of which outweigh the costs of monopolization) and 
qualifies our result above (part (iii)) on the Williamson trade-off between the A- 
and G-equilibria (and its related policy implications). 
The finding that for given parameter values R&D can occur in A- but not in G- 
equilibrium is perhaps counter-intuitive because the G subgame is 'more 
competitive': for example, Aghion et al. (2001, p. 468) argue that 'an increase in 
PMC [product market competition] can stimulate R&D by increasing the 
incremental profit from innovating, that is, by strengthening the motive to 
innovate in order to escape competition with "neck-and-neck" rivals'. The key to 
the puzzle lies in comparing firms' 'incentives' to innovate (i. e. increases in net 
revenues) in the A and G subgames. In region II of Figure 2.4 entry by finn 3 
into the A subgame is blockaded (because RHS(5) > RHS(10)), so the acquirer's 
'incentive' to innovate is 2. p. [Rm(O) - Rm(c)]; a G-incumbent's 'incentive' to 
choose (1, R) over (1, N) in response to (1, N) (given that 3 will subsequently 
choose 0) is p. [R(O, c+ t) - R(c, c+ t) + RQ, c)]. The 'incentive' to innovate is 
stronger for the acquirer if and only if condition (Al) in the Appendix fails (this 
is also required for the existence of region II), which occurs for 'sufficiently 
large' t (see Figure A2.2). If t is very large and no greenfield-FDI is undertaken, 
then for either R&D outcome a G-incumbent investing in R&D will be able to 
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monopoly-price at home but will export nothing. Therefore, such a firm 
undertaking R&D would expect to earn exactly hat( the net revenues of the 
acquirer undertaking R&D in the A subgame. This limiting example highlights 
clearly the source of the acquirer's stronger 'incentive' to innovate in region 11 of 
Figure 2.4: its larger output base, over which a process innovation can be spread, 
due to the elimination (jumping') of trade costs following acquisition-FDI. The 
cause of Pareto dominant acquisition-FDI in our model (an 'output base' effect) 
differs from that in Hom and Persson (2001b), where mergers are associated with 
savings in fixed and variable production costs ('synergies'). ' 
2.5. Concluding Comments 
By building a model where theform of FDI (greenfield-FDI or acquisition-FDI) 
is endogenously selected, the key aim of this chapter was to isolate the 
determinants of the equilibrium form of FDI. Furthermore, by allowing other 
aspects of industrial structure to be endogenously determined in equilibrium (i. e. 
firms' investment levels in R&D and the number of firms), our modelling 
structure can be used to investigate the differential relationships between the two 
forms of FDI and those wider industry characteristics. In our illustrative welfare 
analyses (section 2.4), the inclusion of endogenous R&D decisions also allows us 
to examine whether acquisition-FDI can sometimes be justified (despite the 
welfare costs associated with possible monopolization) because it fosters 
'technological development' by increasing industry R&D spending. 
Some of our key positive results are: 
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9 Acquisition-FDI 'often' (i. e. for 'large' sets of parameter values) arises in 
equilibrium in small and medium-sized markets, where it is 'unlikely' to 
encourage subsequent (rent-dissipating) de novo entry. 
e For greenfield-FDI to arise in equilibrium, two conditions appear 
necessary (see Table 2.3): a 'large' market size; and 'small' sunk costs of 
greenfield-FDI and R&D. (In large markets the profitability of 
acquisition-FDI is likely to be reduced by subsequent de novo entry, 
which is 'more likely' if the incumbents choose acquisition-FDI than if 
they choose exporting or greenfield-FDI. ) 
9 The strategic use of greenfield-FDI by the incumbents to deter de novo 
entry by the 'outside' firm may prevent acquisition-FDI from arising in 
equilibrium by bolstering the incumbents' 'disagreement profits' and 
rendering an acquisition unprofitable. This finding illustrates the 
importance of analysing both forms of FDI simultaneously: the option of 
undertaking greenfield-FDI makes acquisition-FDI unprofitable in 
equilibrium, a point that would be missed in models concentrating 
exclusively on one type of FDI. 
e Increases in the sunk costs of greenfield-FDI and R&D can cause the 
substitution (in large markets) of acquisition-FDI for greenfield-FDI in 
equilibrium. (Because the integrated firm formed by acquisition-FDI runs 
only one research lab by assumption, undertaking acquisition-FDI allows 
the incumbent firms to economise on R&D investments. ) 
* The association between trade costs and equilibrium acquisition-FDI is 
positive (as in the case of 'tariff-jumping' greenfield-FDI) if the 
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probability of R&D success is small but negative if it is large. For a large 
probability of R&D success, we show that increases in trade costs offer 
heightened protection to rival national firms in their home markets, thus 
(potentially) rendering integration via acquisition-FDI unprofitable. 
We compared (for a limited set of parameter values) the welfare properties of 
industrial structures associated with acquisition-FDI to those of the 
corresponding 'threat point' equilibria (i. e. where the incumbents choose 
between exporting and greenfield-FDI as means of serving the foreign product 
market). We found some evidence that acquisition-FDI flows are associated with 
a Williamson (1968)-type welfare trade-off between industry profits and 
consumer surplus, which could suggest a role for public policy in protecting 
consumers' interests in the presence of acquisition-FDI flows. However, it is not 
true that acquisition-FDI always reduces consumer welfare (relative to the 'threat 
point'): when acquisition-FDI raises industry R&D spending, it can also raise 
consumer surplus despite monopolization. (Nevertheless, such Pareto dominant 
acquisition-FDI, which could be viewed as verifying the 'failing firm' defence of 
international takeovers, occurs in very special circumstances. ) 
A general conclusion of this chapter is that greenfield- and acquisition-FDI are 
theoretically quite distinct (in terms of both the positive and the nonnative 
aspects of the industrial structures that they are associated with), which casts 
doubt on the legitimacy of many analyses that treat FDI as a homogeneous flow 
of funds. However, further work is needed to test the robustness both of this 
general conclusion and of our more specific results. Our modelling structure is 
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relatively stylised, and future work will attempt to relax some of our 
assumptions. In particular, the implicit assumption that a global 'competition 
authority' permits only one possible takeover (i. e. the integration of the two 
incumbent firms), which requires the 'outside' firm to use de novo entry, could 
be relaxed by using the co-operative game-theoretic methods of Hom and 
Persson (2001a, 2001b) to analyse equilibrium industrial structures while 
continuing to permit greenfield-FDI strategies. 
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2.6. Endnotes. 
1 By using the term 'acquisition-FDI', we have implicitly identified all non- 
greenfield-FDI with international take-overs. However, there are in reality a 
variety of activities that are neither greenfield investment nor cross-border take- 
overs, which nevertheless would generate FDI flows as conventionally measured: 
e. g. the partial acquisition of a foreign firm or a cross-border merger. Essentially, 
the problem is that the distinction between foreign portfolio investment and FDI 
can be made sharper in theory than it is in practice. (See the Appendix to Julius 
(1990) for an accessible dicussion of the compilation methodology for FDI data: 
the key point is that FDI data are constructed to reflect the reach of corporate 
control overseas rather than outright ownership, and a complete acquisition is not 
necessary to exert some control. ) For analytical clarity, we restrict the spectrum 
of forms of FDI to greenfield investment versus take-over (greenfield-FDI versus 
acquisition-FDI), which represents the most interesting distinction from an 
industrial-organization viewpoint; and this is justifiable because they are 
dominant components of FDI data: e. g. '[I]ess that 3 per cent of the total number 
of cross-border M&As are officially classified as mergers... the rest are 
acquisitions' (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 15). 
A related point is that FDI data understate the growth of international production 
because of the balance-of-payments methodology underlying them. (Only funds 
passing through the balance-of-payments accounts are included in reported FDI 
data, so foreign expansion financed by funds raised in the host country is 
omitted. ) Again, our analysis abstracts from this problem, which is primarily 
empirical. 
' Two qualifying observations are in order. First, these models focus on the 
determinants of international integration between rival firms ('equilibrium 
ownership structures' in the terminology of Horn and Persson), rather than on 
international take-overs (and thus acquisition-FDI) per se. Because take-overs are 
a strict subset of all possible forms of interfirm integration (e. g. integration could 
also arise via merger), the emergence of integration in equilibrium is a necessary 
but insufficient condition for a flow of acquisition-M. (A further necessary 
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condition for acquisition-FDI is that the owners of the target live in a different 
country to those of the predator finn. ) Therefore, what we term 'acquisition-FDI' 
could be relabelled 'integration-FDI". Second, in an international oligopoly with 
more than two incumbent firms (as modelled by Hom and Persson) a formal 
analysis of equilibrium ownership structures requires consideration of all 
possible configurations of the incumbents within larger integrated units, rather 
than just one potential acquisition in isolation. However, because our modelling 
structure contains only two incumbents, these complications need not concern us. 
Furthermore, the subsequent arguments in the main text concerning the exclusion 
of greenfield-FDI can easily be extended to the Horn/Persson case. 
3 Indeed, it is a striking fact that models where either greenfield- or acquisition- 
FDI arises endogenously invariably omit the second form of FDI by assumption 
(e. g. compare the Horstmann and Markusen (1992) model of equilibrium 
greenfield-FDI with the Barros and Cabral (1994) model of equilibrium 
acquisition-FDI). 
4 Indeed, many analyses see this 'concentration effect' as the key distinction 
between the two forms of FDI: e. g. 'green-field entry by the MNE adds a new 
enterprise unit to the national market, whereas entry by acquisition does not' 
(Caves, 1996, p. 69). 
5A further necessary assumption for this example is that only the two firms 
mentioned have the competence to produce the good in question (i. e. there are no 
third firms). 
6 Note that under Bertrand competition the foreign firm will not export in 
equilibrium, because the lower-cost local firm will serve the entire market. 
However, its ability to export does affect equilibrium outcomes. Furthen-nore, 
this effect would also operate if Cournot competition were assumed, although it 
would not be as pronounced. Under Cournot competition the foreign firm's 
decision to export would create a monopoly equilibrium in the host country only 
if the local firm's monopoly price is less than c+t: otherwise, monopolistic 
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behaviour by the local firm will induce the foreign finn to export positive 
quantities to the host country, which will itself undermine the monopoly 
equilibrium (i. e. monopolistic behaviour is not a Nash equilibrium). 
7 For example, Schenk (1999, pp. 187-89) catalogues the 'persistent love affair 
with mergers and corporate bigness' (p. 187) that has long characterised 
government policies worldwide. Two recent examples merit specific mention. 
During the 1980s, the Reagan administration promoted horizontal mergers, 
arguing inter alia that only large firms would be able to finance the high R&D 
bills necessary for success. More recently, it appears that the 1992 Single Market 
Programme in Europe was in part viewed by the European Commission as a 
vehicle for restructuring European industry, in order to create 'large pan- 
European firms able to compete on a par with their US or Japanese rivals' 
(Geroski, 1989, p. 29, cited in Schenk, 1999, p. 188). 
8 Therefore c must exceed the monopoly price associated with zero marginal 
cost. 
9 Rm(c) denotes the revenue net of variable costs of a monopolist with a marginal 
cost of c. It is introduced fonnally in Section 2.2. 
10 These results are easily verifiable. If its rival does R&D, a firm will never do 
R&D itself, because that would result in a market price of 0 alongside sunk costs 
of L However, if its rival does not undertake R&D, a firm will do R&D if it 
offers a positive profit, i. e. iff Rm(O) -I>0. Therefore, for Rm(O) > I, the game 
exhibits the characteristics of a game of 'chicken'. 
" This critical I-value is Rm(O) in the duopoly but only Rm(O) - Rm(c) for the 
monopolist. An innovating duopolist benefits not only from zero marginal cost, 
but also from the removal of competitive pressure. (See Stenbacka (1992) for a 
complementary analysis within the context of Cournot competition and R&D 
spillovers. ) 
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12 The decision rule uses a strict inequality to allow for infinitesimal costs of 
administering the take-over. 
13 Von Weizs! icker (1980) argues that entrants into an industry must pay sunk 
costs not incurred by incumbents: whether to pay these costs is the essence of the 
entry decision. By assuming that the potential entrant possesses pre-existing but 
highly (productively) inefficient plants in both countries, our model incorporates 
a von Weizs5cker-type entry decision for the potential entrant without 
introducing a location decision. This restriction on the potential entrant's 
strategic choices, implied by the assumptions of pre-existing plants and constant 
marginal production costs, both simplifies our analysis and generates a 
significant interest (because the credibility of the entry threat is increased relative 
to a model where the potential entrant must sink an investment of G to establish 
each plant). However, the question of how to interpret entry by the potential 
entrant remains. A neat interpretation is to view the potential entrant as a 
diversifying MNE entrant (rather than a de novo entrant), whose pre-existing 
plants produce for a 'related' industry (in terms of production processes) and can 
be adapted to produce the good under analysis. 
14 Note that if firm 3 enters the industry, its marginal cost is restricted to (0, c} 
because firm 3 has two plants by assumption. 
15 The material in this Section is developed more fully in Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 
of chapter 1. 
16 Net revenue is sometimes called 'variable profit'. 
17 Finn i's net revenue if it sets a price of xi and serves the entire market is P-(I - 
x&(xi - ci), which is strictly concave in xi with a maximum at xj = Aci). 
Therefore, for xi < xm(cj), increases in xi will increase i's net revenue; and if i is 
constrained to set xi below ? (cj), it will optimally set xi as close to X"(cj) as 
possible. See Vives (1999, p. 123 and p. 368, n. 8 on the 'open set problem'). 
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18 This definition is formally identical to Definition 2 in chapter 1. 
19 Fudenberg and Tirole's (1984) analysis of investment behaviour in anticipation 
of entry is really only tangentially applicable here. Fudenberg/Tirole examined a 
duopolist's incentives to invest in shifting its best-response function under a 
variety of assumptions about the nature of competition (strategic complements 
vs. substitutes) and the effects of investment (which way the best-response 
function shifts). However, in their model only one firm could vary its level of 
investment and the investment decision variable was continuous; whereas our 
analysis has both firms undertaking discrete investment projects. Nevertheless, 
the investment incentives in our model accord with Fudenberg/Tirole's 
conclusions when investment makes the investor 'tough' and competition is in 
strategic complements. Furthermore, Fudenberg/Tirole use the open-loop 
equilibrium (where all players move simultaneously or cannot observe preceding 
moves), rather than the blockaded case, as a benchmark 
20 RHS(5) > RHS(7) for p :; 1- 0 iff 2- [Rm (0) - Rm (c)] - R(O, c) > 0. For c ý: 0.5 
R(O, c) = Rm(O), so the inequality becomes Rm (0) -2. Rm (c) > 0, which holds 
for all c> 1- -, 
[0--. 5 zý 0.29. For c :50.5 R(O, c) = lk(l - c)-c, and the inequality 
holds for all c. 
21 Note that the interval (Lp, Up) is non-empty iffp > 0.5. 
22 For p# 0 Up> U,, iff R(O, c)>Rm(0)-R"(c). This clearly holds for c*e' 0.5 
when R(O, c) = RM(O). For c:! ý 0.5 the inequality holds iff c. (2 - 3-c) > 0, which is 
satisfied when c< 2/3 (given that c>0 in assumption (A)). 
23 It is important to recognise the distinction between Arrow's 'replacement 
effect' and the 'efficiency effect' (see Tirole, 1988, pp. 392-3). The 'replacement 
effect' compares a monopolist's incentive to innovate to that of a firm within a 
duopoly: the latter is (generally) greater because the innovator can 'escape 
competition'. However, the 'efficiency effect' compares a potential entrant's 
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incentive to become a duopolist (via entry) to an incumbent's incentive to remain 
a monopolist: the latter is (generally) greater because monopoly profits exceed 
industry profits under duopoly. 
24 Assumptions (B), (C) are unnecessary to generate Figure 2.3. However, the 
necessary-and-sufficient conditions are considerably more intractable than (B) 
and (C). 
25 Assumption (B) as presented here is identical to assumption (B)' in chapter 1. 
26 Proof. When G=I (A8) becomes 2. R(O, c) - 2. R(t, c) - R(O, t) > 0. When t= 
0, LHS = 0. Now consider progressive rises in t from 0 to c. aLHS/at >0 requires 
-2. (aR(t, c)lat) > aR(O, t)lat. For t:: ý 0.5, R(O, t) = p. (1 - t)-t and R(t, c) = p. (I - 
c). (c - t) for xlýf(t) ý: c and R"(t) for xm(t) :: ý c. Given either functional form for 
R(t, c), aLHSlat > 0. (Note that aLHSlat >0 when R(t, c) = p-(I - c). (c - t) iff t> 
c-0.5, which is implied by m(t) ý: c for t>0. ) For t ý!: 0.5, R(O, t) = Rm(O), so 
aR(O, t)lat =0 and therefore aLHSlat > 0. 
27 To understand these results intuitively, note that an increase in t affects an 
incumbent's profits under ffl, R), (1, R); RI in two, opposing ways: it reduces 
the incumbent's net revenues abroad when both its rivals' R&D efforts fail (i. e. 
dR(t, c)ldt < 0), but it weakly increases the incumbent's domestic net revenues 
when both incumbents innovate successfully by offering greater protection from 
import competition (i. e. dR(O, t)ldt ý: 0). 
28 t>0.5 -c is compatible with the existence of region Il in Figure 2.4. (Al) fails 
for sufficiently large t: see Figure A4.2 in the Appendix. 
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2.7. Appendix. 
2.7.1. Equilibrium Industrial Structures 
Our derivation of equilibrium industrial structures proceeds in two steps. In step 
one we locate the inter-regional boundaries in the A subgame (Figure 2.2) 
relative to those in the G subgame (Figure 2.3), so that both the A- and the G- 
equilibria are fixed for given parameter values. In step two we determine the 
equilibrium industrial structure by using the GADR to select between the A- and 
G-equilibria. 
Step 1. We begin by locating RHS(7) on Figure 2.3. RHS(7) > RHS(10) iff 
R(O, c +t) + R(t, c) -R(c, c+t) -R(O, c) (A1) 
-ý2-[Rm(0)-Rm(c)]-R(O, c» >0 
From n. 20 (. 1 > 0, so (Al) is more restrictive than assumption (B). However, 
(Al) is satisfied by some (c, t)-pairs within assumption (A): when t =- 0, (Al) 
holds iff R(O, c) - Rm (0) + Rm (c) > 0, which was shown to be satisfied for all c in 
n. 22. We isolate the set of (c, t)-pairs that satisfies assumption (B) in the 
Appendix of chapter 1. There are two immediate problems in analysing 
assumption (B) (and constraints (Al), (M) and (A9) on t, c that we introduce in 
this Appendix): first, t, c do not enter assumption (B) explicitly; and, second, 
each of the five nonzero realisations of R(. ) takes one of two possible functional 
forms, depending on whether the Bertrand equilibrium involves undercutting or 
monopoly-pricing. Therefore 
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. (I-t) -t for t: 5,0.5 R (0, t) =fp [Rm (0) for t 2: 0.5 
R(O, c) = 
p. (I-c)-c forc: ý0.5 
Rm (0) for c ý: 0.5 
R(O, c+ t) = 
u. (I-c-t)-(c+t) forc+t:: ý0.5 
Rm (0) for c+tý: 0.5 
R(t, c) . 
(I -c) -(C-t) for c: 5 xm (t) 
[R m (t) for c ý: xm (t) 
R(c, c+t) = 
p. (I-c-t)-t forc+t: 5xm(c) 
Rm (c) for c+t >- xm (c) 
Figure A2.1 divides (c, t)-space below the 45" line (recall that assumption (A) is 
maintained throughout) up into 9 distinct regions. In each region the functional 
forra of R(-) is fixed, so constraints on t, c can be written explicitly. 
[FIGURE A2.1 IS OVERLEAF] 
Key to Figure A2.1 
Region Form of R(. ) (N. B. U ='undercutting', M 'monopoly-pricing' 
R(O, t) R(O, c) R(O, c+ t) R(t, c) R(c, c+ t) 
I U U U U U 
II U U M U U 
III U U M U M 
IV U M M U U 
v U M M U M 
vi M M M U M 
VII U M M M U 
VIII U M M M M 
Ix M M M M M 
Using the specific functional forms of R(. ), we can derive the sets of t- and c- 
values where our constraints on t, c hold for each region in Figure A2. I. These 
sets are defined in Table A2.1 and plotted in Figure A2.2. 
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0.5 
C 
Figure A2.1: Feasible set of c- and t-values 
Inter-regional boundaries: I/H boundary is c+t= xm(O) = 0.5; IMI1, IVN and 
VII/VIII boundaries are c+t= xm(c); IVNII, VNIII and VI/IX boundaries are c 
= xm(t). 
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Table A2.1: Explicit constraints on t, c. (See notes below. ) 
Region Constraints on t, c imposed by assumptions (B), (Al), (A8) and 
(A9). 
I (B) holds iff t<c- (1 - c) for all CE (0,0.293] 
(Al) holds iff t<c- (1 - 1.5. c) for all CE (0,0.333] 
2-c--, f4-8. c+7 C2 (A8) holds iff t> for all c c= (0,0.392] 2 
(A9) holds iff t> 
(1-c). (5-C-1) for all CE (0,0.333] 2-(l+c) 
(B) holds iff t< for all c c= [0.293,0.423] 2 
2-(I-c)-J(I-cý -1+2 C2 (Al) holds iff t< for all CE [0.333, 2 
0.5] 
3- (I -c) 
47ý-18 
-c + 13 - cý2 (A8) holds iff t> for all cE [0.392,0.5] 4 
(A9) is violated for all Q, c) that satisfy (Al) 
for all CE [0.423,0.5] (B) holds iff t< 4. (l-c) 
(Al) is violated throughout 
(M), (A ): N/A 
IV (B) holds throughout 
2. (1-c)-j(1-cý -1+2 C2 (Al) holds iff t< for all cc [0.5, 2 
0.561] 
3-(I-c)-ý7-18-c+13 . C2 (A8) holds iff t> for all CE [0.5,0.543] 4 
(A9) is violated throughout 
V 
(B) holds iff t<1. (5 -c- 1) for all c r= [0.5,0.6] 4 
(Al) is violated throughout 
(M), (A ): N/A 
VI I (B) holds iff t<-. (5 -c- 1) for all cE [0.6,1) 4 
(Al) is violated throughout 
A8), (A9): N/A 
Vil _ (B) holds throughout 
3-2-c- (Al) holds iff t< for all CE [0.561,1) 5 
5-4-c-47-4-c-2-c2 (A8) holds iff t> for all cE [0.543,1) 9 
(A9) is violated throughout 
Table A2.1 continued... 
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Region Constraints on t, c imposed by assumptions (B), (AI), (A8) and 
(A9). 
VIII (B) holds throughout 
(Al) is violated throughout 
(M), (A9): N/A 
Ix (B) holds throughout 
(AI) is violated throughout 
(M), (A9): N/A 
(Notes: Extreme c-values in each region were calculated using Maple. 
Constraints (A8) and (A9) are only applicable in regions where assumption (Al) 
is not 'violated throughout. Exception of (AS), which is used between RHS(1 1) 
and RHS(6). ) 
[FIGURE A2.2 IS OVERLEAF] 
If (Al) is satisfied (resp. violated), then RHS(7) lies universally above (resp. 
below) RHS(10). In the case where (AI) holds, we can place upper bounds on 
the position of RHS(7). We show below that RHS(I 5) > RHS(6) on pE (0,1), so 
RHS(15) > RHS(7) because RHS(6) > RHS(7). We have RHS(14) > RHS(7) iff 
2 -12 . [Rm (0) - Rm (c)] - R(O, c)1 + [2 - R(O, c) - R(O, t)] -p>0 (A2) 
and RHS(12) > RHS(7) iff 
I 
2-[Rm(O)-Rm(c)]-- . [R(O, c) - R(t, c)] >0 G 
A sufficient condition for both (A2) and (M) to hold is 
2- [Rm (0) - Rm (c)] - R(O, c) > 0, which was shown to hold for all c in n. 20. (To 
verify this sufficiency claim, note that [2 - R(O, c) - R(O, t)] -p ýt 0 for all pE [0, 
in (A2) and that R(O, c >I- [R(O, c) - RQ, c)] in (M) from assumption G 
Therefore, RHS(14), RHS(12) > RHS(7). 
Finally, we need to locate RHS(7) in the case where (Al) holds relative to 
RHS(l 1). RHS(7) > RHS(I 1) iff 
R(O, c +t) + R(t, c) - R(c, c + t) - R(O, c) - 
(2 
-[Rm (0) -Rm(c)] - R(O, c)1 (A4) 
-[R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)-R(c, c+t)-R(O, t)1. p >O 
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I- 
0 9 . - 
0 8 . - 
0 7 . - 
0 6 . - 
0 5 . - 
0 4 . - 
0 3 . 
0 2- . 
0 1 . 
0 - 
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 
c 
Figure A2.2: Feasible (c, t)-pairs 
(c, t)-pairs above the 45* line are ruled out by the maintained assumption (A). 
The upper (resp. lower) bold line is the locus of (c, t)-pairs where constraint (B) 
(resp. (A8)) binds. The dashed (resp. light, solid) line is the locus of (c, t)-pairs 
where constraint (A9) (resp. (Al)) binds. (B), (Al) hold below the lines; (M), 
(A9) hold above the lines. 
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LHS(A4) is linear in p. At p=0 (A4) is identical to (Al), so if (Al) holds then 
RHS(7) > RHS(11) > RHS(10) for small p. (If (Al) fails, then RHS(I I) > 
RHS(10) > RHS(7) for small p. ) At p=I (A4) becomes 
2-[Rm(O)-Rm(c)]-R(O, t)<O, which cannot hold because (from n. 20) 
2- [Rm (0) - Rm (c)] - R(O, c) >0 and R (0, c) ý!: R (0, t) under assumption (A). 
We conclude that RHS(7) takes one of two. possible positions in Figure 2.3, 
depending on whether (Al) holds. If (Al) holds, then RHS(7) lies between 
RHS(11) andRHS(15) forsmallp, and between RHS(10) andRHS(ll) for large 
p. (Note in this case that regions IV and V in Figure 2.3 will lie entirely above 
RHS(7). ) If (Al) fails, then RHS(10) > RHS(7) for all p. As a matter of record, 
we show in the main text that the latter case (i. e. (Al) violated) is 'more general' 
given our assumptions in (A) and (B) on t, c. (Note that it is impossible for 
RHS(7) to lie (strictly) between RHS(1 0) and RHS(1 1) for all p. Both RHS(7) 
and RHS (10) are rectangular hyperbolas, so they cannot intersect on pE (0,1]; 
however, RHS(1 1) -> RHS(10) asp -> 0. Therefore, if RHS(7) E (RHS(10), 
RHS(1 1)) at p=1, RHS(7) must intersect RHS(1 1) at some sufficiently small p. ) 
We turn now to positioning RHS(6) on Figure 2.3. RHS(6) is more 
straightforward to position than RHS(7). It is straightforward to show that forp # 
0,1 RHS(15) > RHS(6) iff R(O, c) > R(O, t), i. e. iff t<0.5. (Therefore, for t ý: 0.5 
RHS(15) = RHS(6). ) On the lower side, RHS(6) > RHS(13) forp# 0,1 iff R(t, c) 
> 0, which is guaranteed by assumption (A). RHS(6) > RHS(1 1) iff 
[R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)-R(c, c+t)-R(O, c)]-(1-p)+p -R(O, t) >0 
which holds because PI >0 from assumption (B). 
Figures A2.3 and A2.4 sum up the results of step one by plotting RHS(6) and 
RHS(7) relative to the inter-regional boundaries from the G subgame. In Figure 
A2.3 we assume that (Al) holds, whereas in Figure A2.4 (Al) is violated. Note 
that, regardless of whether (Al) holds, regions VI to X in Figure 2.3 will be 
associated with (counterpart) A-equilibria of (R; Rj. 
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I" 
D 
RHS(12) 
RHS(l 1) 
RHS(7) 
RHS(10) 
-* p 
0 
Figure A2.3: Relative positions of inter-regional boundaries in the 
A and G subgarnes when (Al) holds 
Inter-regional boundaries from the A subgame are shown in bold. Only the 
position of RHS(7) depends on whether (Al) holds or fails. The space between 
RHS(6) and RHS(15) is non-empty iff t<0.5. 
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I" 
RHS(15) As in Figure 3 in 
the main text 
RHS(6) 
RHS(12) 
RHS(11) 
RHS(10) 
0 
Figure A2.4: Relative positions of inter-regional boundaries in the 
A and G subgarnes when (Al) fails 
Inter-regional boundaries from the A subgame are shown in bold. Only the 
position of RHS(7) depends on whether (AI) holds or fails. The space between 
R. HS(6) and RHS(15) is non-empty iff t<0.5. 
p 
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Step 2. We begin by considering the implementation of the GADR below 
IMS(6). 
A-equilibria of (N; 0) and JR; 01 
For pe (0, min(RHS(7), RHS(10)) the G- and A-equilibria are {(I, IV), (1, N); 
0) and {N; 01 respectively. Using the GADP, {N; 0) is selected iff 
Rm(c)>R(c, c+t), which holds iff t<xm(c)-c. For tý: xm(c)-c the trade 
cost offers the incumbents in the G subgame sufficient protection for monopoly- 
pricing, so integration (acquisition-FDI) does not strictly increase their combined 
profits. 
The interval a (=- (RHS(7), RHS(10)) is non-empty iff condition (Al) fails, in 
which case it is associated with G- and A-equilibria of {(I, N), (1, N); 0) and 
fR; 01 respectively. Using the GADR, {R; 0) is selected iff 
2. p. Rm(O)+2. (I-p). Rm(c)- I> 2. R(c, c+t) 
Because Rm(c)ý: R(c, c+t), it is sufficient for this inequality to hold to have 
2-p- [Rm (0) - Rm (c)] > I, which holds by definition above RHS(7). 
For pE (RHS(IO), RHS(l 1)) the G-equilibrium is {(I, N), (1, R); 0), and there 
are two possible A-equilibria if condition (AI) holds: 
Case (i). For pE (RHS(IO), min(RHS(7), RHS(11)1) the A-equilibrium is {N; 
0}, which is selected iff 
I> 2. [R(c, c+t)-Rm(c)]+[R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)-2. R(c, c+t)]-p (A5) 
which sets a lower bound on I (intuitively, because the A-equilibrium does not 
involve R&D)., U E (RHS(I 0), min (RHS(7), RHS(I 1))) itself implies that 
0.1 2. [Rm(O)-Rm(c)]. p, 
IE max [R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)-R(c, c+t)]. p. (I-p)+R(o, t). pI (A6) 
JR(O, c+ t) + R(t, c) - R(c, c+ t)] -p 
where the first (resp. second) argument in {-) binds as 
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p> (resp. <) 
R(O, c+ t) + R(t, c) - R(c, c+ t) -2- [Rm (0) - Rm (c)1 (A7) 
R(O, c+ t) + R(t, c) - R(c, c+ t) - R(O, t) 
RHS(A7) >0 if (Al) holds. Forp E (0, RHS(A7)) all I in (A6) satisfy (M) iff 
JR(c, c+t)-[R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)-R(c, c+t)-R(O, t)]. pI -p > 2. [R(c, c+t)-Rm(c)] 
where RHS :50; LHS =0 at p=0 and LHS is strictly concave in p (note that [-] 
in LHS >0 from assumption (B) plus R(O, c) ý: R(O, t) under assumption (A)). To 
keep the analysis tractable, we investigate two simple sufficient conditions for 
the above inequality to hold. First, note that LHS >0 on 
O<P< 
R(c, c+t) 
R(O, c+t) + R(t, c) - R(c, c+ t) -R(O, t) 
which holds for allp E (0, RHS(A7)) iff 
R(c, c+t)ý: LHS(Al) 
Second, note that the inequality holds atp =I iff 
(A8) 
2-Rm(c)+R(O, t)-R(O, c+t)-R(t, c) >0 (A9) 
The sets of (c, t)-pairs that satisfy (AS) and (M) are defined in Table A2.1 and 
plotted in Figure A2.2. Together they cover a reasonable proportion of the area 
where (Al) holds. In particular, note that for c<0.2 all t>0 satisfy (A9). 
Finally, we use the following argument to support the conjecture that the 
inequality above holds for all (c, t) that satisfy (Al). For t : --- 0, the 
inequality 
becomes 
2< Rm(c) (AlO) 
R(O, c) 
and 
R(O, c) - Rm (0) + Rm (c) RHS(A7) 
R(O, c) 
(AlO) is satisfied by all P< -ým 
(C 
, so a sufficient condition for (AlO) to hold R (0, c) 
on all p r= (0, RHS(A7)) when t =-t 0 is Rm (0) ý: R(O, c), which holds by 
definition. (Add at start of Case (i) observation that some large I in (A6) will 
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certainly satisfy (M), because 
0> 2-[R(c, c+t)-Rm(c)]-p-R(c, c+t). ) 
For pE (RHS(A7), 1) all I in (A6) satisfy (M) iff 
this requires only 
12-[Rm(0)-Rm(c)j-R(O, c+t)-R(t, c)+2. R(c, c+t». p > 2. [R(c, c+t)-Rm(c)] 
where RHS :: ý 0; the inequality (weakly) holds at p=0,1 (at p=1 the inequality 
becomes 2-Rm(O)>R(O, c+t)+R(t, c), which holds). Therefore, because LHS 
is linear in p, the inequality holds for all pe (0,1). 
Case (ii). For pE (RHS(7), RHS(l 1)), which is non-empty iffp > RHS(A7), the 
A-equilibrium is JR; 0); {R; 0) is selected over {(I,, N), (1, R); 0) iff 
2. p. Rm(0)+2-(1-p)-Rm(c) >[R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)]-p+2-(1-p). R(c, c+t) 
which certainly holds: whether R&D succeeds (coefficients on p) or fails 
(coefficients on (I - p)), the monopolist's profits in the A subgame exceed 
industry profits in the G subgame. 
Case (ii) above encompasses all pE (RHS(10), RHS(l 1)) when condition (Al) 
fails. We conclude that, irrespective of whether condition (Al) holds, the GADR 
selects the A-equilibrium over {(l, IV), (1, R); 0) for pE (RHS(IO), RHS(11)). 
For pE (RHS(11), RHS(6)) a G-equilibrium of {(I, R), (1, R); 01 exists, and 
there are two possible counterpart A-equilibria if condition (Al) holds. 
Case (i). For ge (RHS(I 1), RHS(7)), which is non-empty iff p< RHS(A7), the 
A-equilibrium is {N; 01. (IV; 0) is selected over ((I, R), (1, R); 0) iff 
I> p. (I -p). [R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)]+ P2 R(O, t) (Al 1) 
+(I - p)' - R(c, c+ t) - Rm (c) 
which sets a lower bound on I (intuitively, because the A-equilibrium does not 
involve R&D). u< RHS(7) itself implies that 
I>2-[Rm(0)-Rm(c)l-p (A12) 
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All I satisfying (A12) also satisfy (Al 1) iff 
R(c, c+t) -Rm (c) +[R(O, c+t) + R(t, c) -2- R(c, c +t) - 2. 
(Rm (0) - R" (c)l] -p 
-[R(O, c +t) -R(c, c+t) + R(t, c) - R(O, t)] - p2 <O 
where LHS is strictly concave in p and LHS :: ý 0 at p=0. It is sufficient for the 
inequality to hold to have dLHS/dp <0 at p=0, which occurs when (A8) is 
satisfied. When (A8) fails t is small (ý 0) and the inequality approximates 
-Rm(c) + 2-[R(O, c) -Rm(0) + Rm(c)] -p-2 -R(O, c) p2 <O 
which is also upward-sloping at p=0 (see n. 22). However, it is sufficient for the 
inequality to hold to have R(O, c)-Rm(O)+Rm(c)-p-R(O, c): ýO (i. e. thesumof 
the last two terms on LHS negative) or 
-Rm (c) +2- 
[R(O, c) - Rm (0) + Rm (c)] - p: 5 0 (i. e. the tangent to LHS at p=0 
negative). These two sufficient conditions together cover all p iff 
R(O, c). Rm(c)ý: 2. 
[R(O, c)-Rm(O)+Rm (C)]2 . 
For c >- 0.5 R(O, c) = Rm (0), and 
this becomes Rm (0) ýý 2- Rm (c) , which 
holds for all c ýý 1- 
(I / -s[2-) =_ 0.29. For c 
:50.5 the inequality becomes (1 - c)' >_ (c / 2). (2 -3 C)2, which holds for all c: ý 
0.74 (root calculated using Maple). 
Case (ii). For uE (max(RHS(7), RHS(11)), RHS(6)), where the first (resp. 
second) argument in {. ) binds asp < (resp. >) RHS(A7), the A-equilibrium is {R; 
01. If (Al) fails, then (R; 0) is the counterpart A-equilibrium to {(I, R), (1, R); 
01 for allu c= (RHS(I 1), RHS(6)). {R; 0} is selected over {(l, R), (1, R); 0) iff 
I>2. p -(1-p) -[R(O, c+t) + R(t, c)]+ 2 p2 - R(O, t) (A13) 
+2 . (1_P)2 - R(c, c+t) -2-p. Rm (0) -2 - (1 - p) - Rm(c) 
which sets a lower bound on I (intuitively, because the A-equilibrium 
economises on sunk investments in R&D). p< RHS(6) itself implies that 
I> R(O, c)-p-(1-p), which is at least as restrictive as (A13) iff 
R(O, c). p. (I -p) ý: 2-p- 
[(I 
-p)-R(O, c+t)+ p-R(O, t)-Rm(0)] (A14) 
+2- (1 -p) . 
[p 
-R(t, c) +(I -p) -R(c, c+t) -Rm(c)] 
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(AW) is analytically intractable; however, because 
Rm(O)ý: Q-p)-R(O, c+t)+p-R(O, t) for allp, we can work with the following 
(simpler) sufficient condition for (A14) to hold: 
2- [R(c, c+ t) - Rm (c)] + [2 - R(t, c) -2- R(c, c+ t) - R(O, c)] - p:! ý 0 (A15) 
(Al 5) holds (weakly) at p=0, and it holds at p=I (and therefore via linearity 
for all p) iff 
R(O, c) -e 2- [R(t, c) - Rm (c)] (A16) 
In terms of the specific functional forms of R(O, c) and RQ, c), there are three 
cases to consider under assumption (A) (see Figure A2.1). First, for 0<t<c:: ý 
0.5 R (0, c) =u- (I - c) -c and R (t, c) =p- (I - c) - (c - t) ; therefore, (A 16) requires 
t ý: (3 / 4) -c- (I / 4), where RHS = 0.125 at c=0.5 (however, note that RHS :: ý 0 
on CE (0,1/3]). Second, for CE [0.5,1) and tE [2-c - 1, c) R(O, c) =, u 14 and 
R(t, c) =p- (I - c) - (c - 1); therefore, (A16) requires 
t ý: [2-Q-c)-(5-c-l)-l]1[8-(l-c)j, where RHS = 0.125 at c=0.5 and RHS = 
2-c -10.18 at c= l- 
(, [6- / 6) 0.59. Third, for CE [0.5,1) and tE (0,2-c - 1] 
R(O, c) p /4 and RQ, c) 4) - (1 - t)'; therefore, (A16) requires 
I- VO. 5 + (I - cý . In general, the sufficient condition (Al 6) fails for small t. 
For t -: = 
0 (A 14) is approximated by 
0 ý: -2 - Rm (c) + 
13 
- R(O, c) -2- Rm (0) + 2. Rm (c)] -p-3- R(O, c) - p' 
which has a global maximum in c on (0,1). (At p0 
dRHS/dp=3. R(O, c)-2. Rm(O)+2. Rm(c)>O from n. 22, and at pI 
dRHS/dp=2. Rm(c)-2Rm(O)-3. R(O, c)<O. ) Setting dRHS/dp = 0, the 
maximum value of RHS is (weakly) negative iff 
24 - R(O, c) - Rm (c) ýý 
[3 
- R(O, c) - 2. Rm (0) +2- Rm (c)]' (A17) 
For c :! ý 0.5 R(O, c) =P- (I - c) -c and (Al 7) becomes 96 - (1 - c)' >- c- (4 -5. C)2 ý 
which holds on all ce (0,0.5]. For c ý: 0.5 R(O, c) /4 and (A17) becomes 
_ C)2 > _C)2 
2 
24. (1 -[1+2. 
(l ], which holds on c(-=[0.5,2+6/2)=-: 0.78]. 
Despite this finding that the maximum of (A14) is strictly positive for t -= 0 and c 
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hLý 
> 0.78, it should be noted that when t =-ý 0 (A14) holds for all c if p is sufficiently 
small or large. The reason for the difficulty in comparing expected industry 
profits under {(I, R), (1, R); 0) and {R; 0) (which, intuitively, would appear to 
be a staightforward comparison between monopoly and duopoly profits) is that 
the number of R&D investments differs between the two equilibria under 
comparison. (If the acquirer undertook two R&D investments, which the 
structure of our model does not permit, then the comparison would be 
considerably easier. ) 
Irrespective of whether (Al. ) holds or fails, G-equilibria of {(I, N), (1, N); R) 
(region V of Figure 2.3) and ((1, N), (2, R); 0) (regions IV and V of Figure 2.3) 
both have counterpart A-equilibria of (R; 0). It is straightforward to show that 
both G-equilibria are dominated by (R; 01. Q(I, N), (1,, N); Rj is dominated by 
JR; 0) iff p> RHS(8), where RHS(8) < RHS(7) from Lemma 2. The (2, R)-finn 
in {(1, N), (2, R); 0} incurs higher sunk costs and earns lower global net 
revenues for either R&D outcome (because 'competition' from the (1, N)-firm 
prevents monopoly-pricing) than the acquirer in (R; 0). Therefore, {R; 01 
dominates {(I, N), (2, R); 0). ) 
The general conclusion from the preceding implementation of the GADR for P< 
RHS(6) is that the A-equilibrium dominates the G-equilibrium. Of course, this is 
intuitively appealing because for p< RHS(6) the A-equilibrium is a monopoly 
equilibrium. However, we isolated two notable exceptions. First, for t -::: 0 and c 
'sufficiently large' some (low) I-values exist where ffl, R), (1, R); 0) dominates 
{R; 0) for some interior p-values. However, sufficiently large I is always 
associated with acquisition-FD1. Second (and more interestingly), for small P 
ffl, IV), (1, N); 01 dominates (N; 0) when t is sufficiently large to permit 
monopoly-pricing at the G-equilibrium. 
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A-equilibrium of JR; RI 
Implementation of the GADR for p> RHS(6) is unaffected by whether (Al) 
holds or fails (i. e. Figures A2.3 and A2.4 are identical for p> RHS(6)). For t< 
0.5 RHS(15) > RHS(6) and therefore a p-interval exists where the G-equilibrium 
is {(I, R), (1, R); 0). [R; R) is selected over {(I, R), (1, R); 01 iff 
I> 2-p- (I -p)-[R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)-R(O, c)] (AI8) 
+2 P2 -R(O, t)+2 . 
(I 
_ P)2 R(c, c+t) 
However, u> RHS(6) implies that I< R(O, c) -p- (I - p), which is inconsistent 
with (Al 8) iff 
2. p . (I -p) -[R(O, c+t) +R(t, c)]+ 2- p-R(0,1) +2- (1 _ P)2 R(c, c+t) (A19) 
ý: 3-p-(I-p)-R(O, c) 
where both LHS and RHS are strictly concave in p (from assumption (B) in the 
case of LHS), and LHS > RHS at p=0,1. Given that R(O, c+ t) ý: R(O, c), two 
simple sufficient conditions for (A19) to hold are 
[R(O, c) -2- R(t, c) +2- R(O, t)] -pý: R(O, c) -2- R(t, c) (A20) 
[R(O, c)-2-R(t, c)+2-R(c, c+t)]. p: 52-R(c, c+t) 
I 
for all p#0,1. The upper (resp. lower) condition in (A20) is derived from (Al 9) 
by adding 2. (I-p). ([R(O, c)-R(O, c+t)]. p-(I-p). R(c, c+t)1<0 (resp. 
2-p- [(I - p) - [R(O, c) - R(O, c+ t)] -p- R(O, t)j < 0) to the LHS, and simplifying. 
Both conditions in (A20) are linear in p, which makes them analytically tractable. 
Suppose that R(O, c) >2- RQ, c) , which guarantees that [-] >0 in the LHS of both 
conditions in (A20). Therefore, the upper condition in (A20) defines a lower 
bound on p of (R(O, c) -2- R(t, c))I(R(O, c) -2- RQ, c) +2- R(O, t)), and the lower 
condition defines an upper bound on P of 
2. R(c, c+t)I(R(O, c)-2-R(t, c)+2. R(c, c+t)). Because R(O, t)>R(c, c+t), the 
denominator of the lower bound is certainly larger than that of the upper bound 
(Proof. at t=0, R(c, c+ t) = R(O, t) = 0. Now consider progressive increases in t 
towards c. For t<0.5 aR(O, t) / at =, a - (I -2- t), and aR(c, c+ t) / at =0 (R(c, C+t) 
is M) or u-(1-c-2-t) (R(c, c+t) is U). Given either expression for 
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aR(c, c+t)10t, aR(O, t) / at > aR(c, c+ t) / at. For t>0.5 
aR(O, t) / at = aR(c, c+ t) / at = 0. R(O, t) is kinked at t=0.5, so aR(O, t) / at is not 
defined. ). Therefore, a sufficient condition for the upper bound to be greater than 
the lower bound (so that the two conditions in (A20) cover all p) is 
2- [R(c, c+ t) + R(t, c)] > R(O, c) (A21) 
(i. e. that the numerator of the upper bound be greater than that of the lower 
bound). We use (A21) as a sufficient condition for (A19) to hold. (Note that 
(A21) was derived under the assumption that R(O, c)>2-R(t, c). However, if 
2- R(t, c) > R(O, c) , which is more restrictive than (A2 1) and thus implies that 
(A21) will hold, then both conditions in (A20) hold for all p: rewrite the upper 
condition in (A20) as 2- R(O, t) -pý: (1 - p) - [R(O, c) -2- R(t, c)] and the lower as 
2. (l-p). R(c, c+t)ý: [R(O, c)-2. R(t, c)]. p, where in both cases LHS >0> 
RHS, to verify this. ) 
Given that t<0.5, which is necessary for the G-equilibrium of ffl, R), (1, R); 0) 
to coincide with the A-equilibrium of [R; R), there are seven regions in Figure 
Al to consider when investigating the explicit forms of (A21). For CE (0,1/3], 
(A21) holds for all t (0, c) (regions I and 11 of Figure A2.1). For cE [1/3,0.51, 
(A2 1) holds iff t< (1 4) - (I + c), where RHS = 1/3 at c= 1/3 and increases to 3/8 
at c= 1/2 (in region III of Figure A2.1). For cE[0.5, l-(, T101l0)=_0.684], 
(A21)holdsiff t<[2. (I-c). (1+3. c)-1]1[8. (I-c)], where RHS =0.375 atc= 
0.5 and 0.368 at c=0.684 (in region V of Figure A2.1). Finally, for CE [0.684, 
1), (A2 1) holds iff t<I- J5 - (1 - cy , where RHS = 0.368 at c=0.684 and 
decreases to 0.293 at c=1 (in region VIII of Figure A2.1). Therefore, our 
analysis of the sufficient condition (A21) shows that (A21) is satisfied for all t, c 
under assumption (A) if c:: ý 1/3, and that for c ý! 1/3 (A21) holds iff the gap (c - 
t) is 'sufficiently large'. Of course, (A21) is a sufficient condition, so we cannot 
conclude that (A19) fails whenever (A21) fails. Note, however, that if I=0.5 and 
c ý! t, then R(0, c+t)=R(0, t)=R(0, c)=p14; R(c, c+t)=(, u14)-(l-c)' 
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because c+0.5 > x' (c) ; R(t, c) =p/ 16 (resp. p- (I - c) - (c - 0.5) ) for c> (resp. 
0.75; and that (A19) reduces to 
0.5. (l-c)'+[(I-c). (3-c-2)-0.25]. p-[0.5-(5-c-3). (I-c)-0.751. p' >0 
for ce (0.5,0.75] 
and 
0.5 - (1 - c)' - 
[0.125 + (1 - c)'] -p+ 
[0.125 + 0.5 - (1 - c)' 
1. P 
2 >O forcE: - [0.75,1) 
where the coefficients on p and p2 are strictly negative and strictly positive 
respectively. Both quadratics are strictly decreasing at p=0 and strictly 
increasing at p=1 and so have global minima on (0,1). Evaluating the 
quadratics at their global minima reveals that the minimum is strictly positive for 
c r= (0.5,0.75] but strictly negative for cE [0.75,1). Therefore, it appears that 
(A19) holds for 'most' relevant (c, t)-pairs (as defined by assumption (B) and t< 
0.5). 
For, u E (RHS(15), min(RHS(17), RHS(16)}) (i. e. region VI of Figure 2-3) the 
G-equilibrium is either ffl, R), (1, R); R} or {(I, R), (2, R); 0), depending on 
whether entry-accommodation or -deterrence is selected (i. e. on whether 
condition (22) from the main text holds). The counterpart A-equilibrium is {R; 
R). If the G-equilibrium of ffl, R), (1, R); R} is selected, then the A subgame is 
played iff 
I> 2-p-(1-p)'-R(t, c)-2- P2 - (I - p) - [R(O, c) - R(O, t)] (A22) 
if the G-equilibrium of {(l, R), (2, R); 0) is selected, then the A subgame is 
played iff 
I p. (I - p) - [R(O, c+ t) + R(t, c)] +P2 -R(O, t) + 
(1 
_ P)2 -R(c, c+t)-G (A23) 
Both RHS(A22) and RHS(A23) set lower bounds on I because selection of the 
A-equilibrium halves the incumbents' sunk investments in R&D. Furthermore, 
dRHS(A23)/dG <0 so that ceteris paribus a rise in G makes the selection of the 
A-equilibrium over [(I, R), (2, R); 01 'more likely'. This is a straightforward 
'substitution effect' between the alternative forms of FDL 
Region VI is such that 
p RHS(15) =>I< R(O, c). p. (l-p)'+R(O, t) p2. (I_p) (A24) 
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,u< 
RHS(l 6) => G> [R(O, c) - R(t, c)] -p- (1 - P) (A25) 
1 
p< RHS(l 7) =: > I> R(O, c) -p- (I - P)' +-. R(O, t) p2. 
(I_P) (A26) 
2 
Because assumption (C) imposes G ýt I>0, (A25) binds iff RHS(A25) > 
RHS(A26), i. e. iff 
1 
R(t, c)+p- 
[2 
. R(O, t) - R(O, c)] <0 (A27) 
forp:;, - 0,1. (A27) certainly fails for small p; however, for large p (A27) requires 
2- R(O, c) -2- RQ, c) - R(O, t) > 0, which holds. (Proof. When t=0, LHS = 0. 
Now consider progressive rises in t from 0 to c. aLHS/at >0 requires 
-2-(aR(t, c)1at)>aR(O, t)1at. For t :50.5, R(O, t)=p-(l-t)-t and 
RQ, c)=p-(l-c)-(c-t) for xm(t)ý: c and Rm(t)forxm(t):! ýc. Given either 
functional form for R(t, c), &HSlat > 0. (Note that &HSlat >0 when 
R(t, c) =p- (I - c) - (c - t) iff t>c-0.5, which is implied by xm (t) ý: c for t>0. ) 
For t ý: 0.5, R(O, t) = Rm (0), so aR(O, t)lat =0 and therefore &HSlat > 0. ) If 
(A25) binds (i. e. RHS(A25) > RHS(A26)), we will still have RHS(A24) > 
RHS(A25). (Proof. for p :;, - 0,1 RHS(A24) > RHS(A25) requires 
R(t, c) +p- [R(O, t) - R(O, c)] > 0, which certainly holds at p=0 and holds at p= 
1 iff R(t, c) + R(O, t) - R(O, c) > 0. For t ýt 0.5, LHS = R(t, c); furthermore, LHS = 
0 at t=0, c, so a sufficient condition for LHS >0 is LHS concave in t for cE (0, 
1), t c= (0, min(c, 0.51), which comprises two cases: (a) in regions I to V of 
FigureA2.1 R(t, c)+R(O, t)=p- (C - (I - C) +t-C-t, 
1; and (b) in regions VII and 
'132 Vill of Figure A2.1 R(t, c)+R(O, t)=p- ;+. t-. tI -) Therefore, region VI 
of Figure 2.3, as defined by (A24), (A25) and (A26), takes two distinct forms in 
(G, I)-space, depending on whether p is 'small' or 'large'. 
Figure A2.5 examines the G/A choice in region VI when p is small and (A25) is 
made irrelevant by assumption (C). 
[FIGURE A2.5 IS OVERLEAF1 
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I 
[S(A24) 
IS(A22) 
IS(A26) 
G 
Figure A2.5: The G/A choice in region VI of Figure 3 for small p 
The A (resp. G) subgame is chosen above (resp. below) RHS(A22) and 
RHS(A23). 
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0 RHS(A25) RHS(A22) G' G* 
If the entry-accommodating G-equilibrium of f(l, R), (1, R); R} is selected, then 
the A subgame is played for all G, I in region VI iff RHS(A26) > RHS(A22), i. e. 
iff 
R(O, c)-2. R(t, c)+p- R(O, c)+2-R(t, c)---R(O, t) >O (A28) 
1 
for p#0,1. (A28) holds for p -= 0 
if t is sufficiently large. (Note that LHS(A28) 
>0 at p -= 1, so 
if R(O, c) >2- R(t, c) then (A28) holds for all p; alternatively, if 
R(O, c) < 2. RQ, c) then (A28) holds for sufficiently large p. ) The A subgwne is 
played for no G, I in region VI iff RHS(A22) > RHS(A24), i. e. iff 
2 R(t, c) -R(O, c) +p -[R(O, t) -R(O, c)-2 R(t, c)] >0 (A29) 
for p :;, - 0,1. (A29) holds for p -= 0 
if (A28) fails for p =- 0. Therefore, for small p 
the G/A choice depends on t: for large (resp. small) t, {R: R) (resp. {(I, R), (1, 
R); R) is played for all G, I in region VI. (Note that LHS(A29) <0 at p =- 1, so if 
2. R(t, c) > R(O, c) then (A29) only holds for sufficiently small p. ) 
If the entry-deterring G-equilibrium of ffl, R), (2, R); 01 is selected, then the 
G/A choice is determined by the position of RHS(A23) relative to RHS(A24) and 
RHS(A26). Two observations follow. First, because RHS(A23) is downward- 
sloping whereas RHS(A22) is horizontal, for sufficiently large G in region VI the 
I-interval where {(I, R), (1, R); R} (resp. {R; R)) is chosen over {R; R) (resp. 
ffl, R), (1, R); R}) is weakly larger (resp. smaller) than that where ffl, R), (2, R); 
01 (resp. (R; Rj) is chosen over {R; R) (resp. ffl, R), (2, R); 01). Strictness 
requires RHS(A22) > RHS(A26). (Note, however, that rises in G ceteris paribus 
make the selection of the entry-deterring G-equilibrium. 'less likely', see 
Proposition G3(i), so for large G RHS(A22) determines the G/A choice. ) For 
sufficiently small G in region VI the I-interval where {(I, R), (2, R); 01 (resp. 
JR; Rj) is chosen over [R; R) (resp. {(I, R), (2, R); 0)) is weakly larger (resp. 
smaller) than that where j(1, R), (1, R); RI (resp. {R; Rj) is chosen over [R; R) 
(resp. ffl, R), (1, R); R)) iff G* > RHS(A22) (as in Figure A2.5). In addition, 
strictness requires G' > RHS(A26) and RHS(A24) > RHS(A22), so that the 
triangle formed by RHS(A22), RHS(A23) and the 45' line when G* > 
RHS(A22) lies at least partly between RHS(A24) and RHS(A26). G* > 
RHS(A22) iff 
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p- (1 - p) - [R(O, c+ t) + R(t, c)] + p2 - R(O, t) +(J-P)2 -R(c, c+t) (A30) 
>4-p . (I-P)2 R(t, c)-4 P2 - (I - p) - [R(O, c) - R(O, t)] 
Solving (A30) requires manipulation of a cubic in p, a complicated analytical 
task. However, (A30) certainly holds for p =-ý 0,1, where LHS =- R(c, c+t), R(O, t) 
and RHS -=, 0. Further 
insight can be obtained by noting that a sufficient 
condition for (A30) to hold is p-(I-p)-[R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)j >RHS(A30), which 
forp # 0,1 becomes 
R(O, c+t)+R(t, c) > 4-JR(t, c)-p. [R(t, c)+R(O, c)-R(O, t)lI (A3 1) 
(A3 1) certainly holds at p -= 
1 where RHS :50. (A3 1) holds for all PE (0,1) iff 
R(O, c+ t) >3- R(t, c), which requires t 'sufficiently large'. (For example, if t> 
0.5 then R(O, c+t)=E and R(O, c+t)>3. R(t, c) becomes (a)-' >(1-t)2 if 43 
R(t, c) = Rm(t); or (b) t> c- 
I 
both of which hold. ) 12. (I-c) ' 
The immediately-preceding analysis formally establishes an important result. For 
p =- 0 (i. e. 'small p'), we have G* > RHS(A22); furthermore, the 'strictness 
conditions' G' > RHS(A26) and RHS(A24) > RHS(A22) both hold. (Proof: at p 
I 0 G' > RHS(A26) because G'=- -. R(c, c+ t) and RHS(A26) 2-0; 
RHS(A24) > 
RHS(A22) for sufficiently large t from (A29). ) Therefore, for p =-ý 0 and t 
'sufficiently large' there exists a triangle on the 45' line in (G, I)-space, lying (at 
least partly) between RHS(A24) and RHS(A26), where ffl, R), (2, R); 0) 
dominates {R; R) dominates {(I, R), (1, R); R) from the GADR; this is the 
triangle bordered by RHS(A22), RHS(A23) and the 45" line in Figure A2.5. 
Finally, from Proposition G2(iii) in the main text we know that {(I, R), (2, R); 
01 is selected over ffl, R), (1, R); R) within the G subgarne for sufficiently large 
t and G _= 
L Therefore, within the RHS(A22)/ RHS(A23)/ 45" line triangle in 
Figure A2.5 the G-equilibrium is {(I, R), (2, R); 0), which dominates JR; R); 
however, if greenfield-FDI strategies were excluded from the G subgame, the G- 
equilibrium would be {(I, R), (1, R); RI, which is dominated by {R; R), and so 
analysis would (mistakenly) predict acquisition-FDI in equilibrium. The intuition 
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for this result concerns the entry-deterring effects of a sunk investment in 
greenfield-FDI, which by bolstering the G-incumbents' profits makes 
acquisition-FDI (which implies entry) unprofitable. 
Figure A2.6 below examines the G/A choice in region VI of Figure 2.3 when p is 
large and (A25) binds. 
[FIGURE A2.6 IS OVERLEAF] 
The rightwards shift in RHS(A25) does not affect the choice between ffl, R), (1, 
R); R) and {R; R). Because (A28) holds at p =- 1, we conclude that {R; R) is 
selected over {(I, R), (1, R); RI for all G, I in region VI at p =_ý 1. Therefore, for 
sufficiently large G in region VI {R; R) arises in equilibrium irrespective of 
equilibrium selection in the G subgame (because RHS(A23) is downward- 
sloping). 
If {(I, R), (2, R); 0) is selected in the G subgame, then our first observation 
from the small-p case (i. e. that the selection of {R; R) over ffl, R), (2, R); 0) 
becomes 'more likely' than the selection of {R; R) over ffl, R), (1, R); R) as G 
rises), which relies on RHS(A23) being downward-sloping, carries over to large 
p. The second observation from the small-p case, which gives conditions for the 
selection of ffl, R), (2, R); 0} over {R; R) to be 'more likely' than the selection 
of ffl, R), (1, R); R) over {R; R), requires modification for large p. G* > 
RHS(A22) from the small-p case is replaced by G* > max(RHS(A25), 
RHS(A22)) to ensure the existence of a space in region VI where RHS(A23) > 
RHS(A22). The 'strictness conditions', G' > RHS(A26) and RHS(A24) > 
RHS(A22), carry over directly to large p. For p 1, G* > max{RHS(A25), 
RHS(A22)) holds because 
G* =- p- (I - p) - [R(O, c+ t) + R(t, c)] + P2 R(O, t) + (1 P)2 -R(c, c+t)-2- P. (I _ P)2 -R(t, c) 
+2. P2 - (I - p) - [R(O, c) - R(O, t)] =- R(O, t) 
and RHS(A25), RHS(A22) =_ 0; G' > RHS(A26) holds because 
G1=-1 -jp-(l-p)-[R(O, c+t)+R(t, c)j+p1 R(O, t) +(l_P)2 -R(c, c+t)j = 
1. R(O, t) 
22 
and RHS(A26) =- 0; and RHS(A24) > RHS(A22) holds because RHS(A26) > 
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I 
'S(A24) 
[S(A22) 
IS(A26) 
G 
Figure A2.6: The G/A choice in region VI of Figure 3 for large p 
The A (resp. G) subgarne is chosen above (resp. below) RHS(A22) and 
RHS(A23). 
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0 RHS(A25) RHS(A22) G' G* 
RHS(A22). Therefore, the second observation from the small-p case (together 
with its implications) carries over to large p. 
For p r=- (RHS(17), RHS(19)) there is a G-equilibrium. of {(I, R), (1, R); R), and 
the counterpart A-equilibrium is {R; R). (For the moment we ignore equilibrium 
selection within the G subgame in region VIII. ) The A subgarne is played iff 
(A22) holds., U E (RHS(17), RHS(19)) implies that 
I< RHS(A26) 
and 
G >P_(l_P)2 -[R(O, c)-R(t, c)] (A32) 
The G/A choice depends on RHS(A22) relative to RHS(A26). For all G> 
RHS(A32) there exists an I-interval where the A subgame is played iff 
RHS(A26) > RHS(A22), i. e. iff (A28) holds. Recall that (A28) certainly holds 
for p =- 1, and it holds for all pe (0,1) iff R(O, c) >2- R(t, c) , which requires t 
tsufficiently large'. Therefore, for small t and small p RHS(A22) > RHS(A26) 
and ((I, R), (1, R); R) is selected over [R; R) for all G, I in regions VIII and IX; 
otherwise, (R; R) is selected for some (sufficiently large) L For RHS(A22) <0 
{R; RI is selected over {(I, R), (1, R); RI for all G, I in regions VIII and IX; for p 
# 0,1 RHS(A22) <0 iff p> RQ, c)I[R(O, c) - R(O, t) + RQ, c)] (i. e. p 'sufficiently 
large'; although note that for t ý: 0.5 RHS(A22) >0 for all pE (0,1)). 
For pE (RHS(16), RHS(18)) there is a G-equilibrium of {(2, R), (2, R); 0) and 
the counterpart A-equilibrium is {R; R). The A subgame is played iff 
I> 2-p-(1-p)-R(O, c)-2. G (A33) 
and G, I are such that 
p> RHS(16) =::. G< RHS(A25) 
,u< 
RHS(18) => I> R(O, c) . P. 
(1 
_ P)2 
which, given assumption (C), define a non-empty set of (G, I)-pairs iff 
RHS(A25) > R(O, c). p. (1 _ p)2, i. e. iff p> R(t, c)IR(O, c) (< 1) for p#0,1. 
Given p> R(t, c)1R(O, c), the G/A choice is illustrated in Figure A2.7. 
[FIGURE A2.7 IS OVERLEAF] 
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I 
0 RHS(A25) 
Figure A2.7: The G/A choice for pE (RHS(I 6), RHS(l 8)) in Figure 3 
The A (resp. G) subgame is chosen above (resp. below) RHS(A33). 
G 
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Two interesting cases emerge from Figure A2.7. First, {R; R) is selected for all 
G, I iff R(O, c) . P. (I _ P)2 >RHS(A33) at G=R(O, c)-p . (1 _ P)2; this requires 
P<I for p#0,1. Second, {(2, R), (2, R); 0) is selected for all G, I iff 
3 
RHS(A25) < RHS(A33) at G= RHS(A25); this requires 3- R(t, c) > R(O, c) for p 
# 0,1, which is satisfied for 'sufficiently small' t. Suppose that 
R(O, c) >3- R(t, c), so that 
I>RQ, 
c)IR (0, c) therefore, on 
3 
p c= 
(R(t, 
c)IR(O, c), 
3) 
{R; RI is selected for all G, P, and on p c= 
(3 
l) either 
{R; R) or {(2, R), (2, R); 0) can be selected, depending on G, I (the smaller are 
G, I, the 'more likely' is {(2, R), (2, R); 0) to be chosen; moreover, {R; R} will 
always be chosen for sufficiently large G, 1). Alternatively, if 3-R (t, c) > R(O, c) 
then R(t, c)1R(O, c)> 
I, 
and {(2, R), (2, R); 0) is selected for all G, I on 
3 
p r= (R(t, c)IR (0, c), 1). 
For p> RHS(19) the G- and A-equilibria are ((2, R), (2, R); R) are (R; RI 
respectively. (R; R} is selected iff 
I> 2-p-(1-p)-(1-2. p)-R(O, c) -2-G (A34) 
where RHS(A34) is downward-sloping in (G, l)-space., u > RHS(19) implies that 
G< RHS(A32) 
Because (I -p). (l - 2p) =0 atp = 0.5,1 and is strictly convex inp, forp E [0.5, 
1) all G, I in region X satisfy (A34). Therefore, for p c= [0.5,1) JR; R) is selected 
for all G, I in region X. For p ci (0,0.5) p-(1 - p)-(j - 2p) > 0, so ((2, R), (2, R); 
R) is selected for some G, I in region X. Two cases are noteworthy. First, for all 
G in region X there exists some sufficiently small I such that {(2, R), (2, R); RI is 
selected iff RHS(A34) >0 at G= RHS(A32); this requires 
p< R(t, c)I[R(t, c) + R(O, c)] (< 0.5). Second, 1(2, R), (2, R); R) is selected for 
all G, I in region X iff RHS(A34) > RHS(A32) at G= RHS(A32); this requires 
p <[3. R(t, c)-R(O, c)11[3. R(t, c)+R(O, c)] (< R(t, c)1[R(t, c)+R(O, c)]), where 
RHS >0 iff t is 'sufficiently small'. 
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Chapter 3 
Inter- and Intra-Firm Technology Transfer in an 
International Oligopoly 
3.1. Introduction. 
This chapter aims to provide a theoretical analysis of the sources of foreign- 
owned firms' widely-documented 'productivity advantages' over domestic firms. 
For the UK this 'productivity gap' has been documented by Davies and Lyons 
(1991), Griffith (1999), and Oulton (2001). In particular, Oulton's study 
concludes that the labour productivity of forcign-owned firms, measured by 
value-added output per employee, has been continuously around 40 per cent 
higher than in UK-owned finns (a result derived from the respective shares of the 
-ns in output and employment). Our analysis will focus on two two groups of fin 
spcciric features of this strand of empirical literature. First, it appears that this 
productivity advantage' is not entirely due to a concentration of foreign-owned 
firms in sectors with particularly high physical and human capital intensities (i. e. 
ratios of physical capital to labour and of skilled to unskilled workers). For 
example, Oulton found that US-o%vned plants in the UK enjoyed a significant 
additional advantage, over and above that due to higher (physical and human) 
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capital intensities, which was equivalent to 40 per cent of their overall 
'productivity advantage'. One of Oulton's conjectures on the cause of this 
additional US advantage is 'better process technology' (Oulton, 2001, p. 132), 
and we develop this line of enquiry. Second, it appears that the 'productivity 
advantage' of foreign-owned firms is not a peculiar characteristic of the UK 
economy. Globerman, Ries and Vertinsky (1994) found a similar 'productivity 
advantage' among foreign-owned finns in Canada, and in their study of US 
manufacturing Doms and Jensen (1998) found that the significant difference - in 
terms of 'productivity gaps' - is between multinational enterprises (MNEs) and 
non-NiNEs, not between foreign- and domestically-owned firms. Both of these 
studies suggest that 'nationality effects' are not central to explaining foreign- 
owned finns' 'productivity advantages'. 
We model the relationships between foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and 
outflows and national 'productivity distributions' across firms (plants) in an 
international oligopoly. Industrial structure is detennined endogenously (as a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a four-stage game) in the manner of 
Horstmann and Markusen (1992) and Rowthom (1992). The world comprises 
two countries with identical (linear) demand functions for a homogeneous good. 
There are three firms: two incumbents (M and 7), who initially each own one 
plant in different countries; and one potential de novo entrant (E), who initially 
owns no plants. In the early stages of our game the firms choose how to serve the 
two national product markets: exporting, greenfield-FDI ('greenfield 
investment'), or acquisition-FDI (cross-border mergers and acquisitions, M&As). 
Although both greenfield-FDI and acquisition-FDI entail sunk costs (the price of 
222 
a new plant, or 'field', for the former and an acquisition price for the latter), an 
incentive to undertake FDI is provided by the existence of a strictly positive per- 
unit trade cost: undertaking FDI allows the trade cost to be 'jumped'. 
In our model no firm will ever optimally operate more than one plant in either 
country (because marginal production costs are constant and there is a strictly 
positive set-up cost for additional plants), so when examining a national 
'productivity distribution' the mapping from plants to firms is one-to-one. Fixed 
(and sunk) costs are incurred only for greenfield-FDI, and 'productivity' 
differences across firms are associated with differences in (constant) marginal 
production costs (i. e. with differences in process technologies). Under reasonable 
(and conventional) assumptions, the marginal production cost is inversely 
proportional to 'labour productivity' as measured in the empirical studies. ' Two 
process technologies exist for production of the homogeneous good, and given 
our assumption that technology is unidimensional (i. e. affects only the marginal 
production cost) they can be unambiguously ranked in 'productivity' terms. One 
of the incumbents initially owns the 'more productive' (i. e. lower marginal 
production cost) technology, and the potential entrant and rival incumbent 
initially own the 'less productive' technology. 
There are three ways in which firms' FDI decisions interact with a national 
&productivity distribution' in the industry modelled. First, undertaking (either 
forin of) FDI can lead to inter-firm technology transfer between the MNE's 
newly-established branch plant abroad and rival firms located in the host country. 
Inter-firm technology transfer is identical to what are sometimes labelled 
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'spillovers'. In our model spillovers can flow in both directions between a 
foreign branch plant and local rivals: for example, a technological laggard may 
undertake FDI in an attempt to 'source' technology via spillovers from 
(technologically superior) local finns. The relationship between FDI decisions 
and spillovers is two-way: if a foreign technological leader undertakes inward 
FDI, the productivity of local firms may be raised via spillovers (obviously, this 
cannot occur if the inward investor is a technological laggard); however, the 
technological leader will consider the potential for spillovers (and the dissipation 
of its advantage) when choosing between exporting and (both fonns of) FDI. FDI 
inflows thus potentially affect national 'productivity distributions' in two ways: 
directly through the addition of a new plant (only in the case of greenfield-FDI), 
and indirectly through spillovers (both forms of FDI). It is also the case that 
outward FDI flows may affect the source country's national 'productivity 
distribution'. We assume that technology is a public good within the finn, so if 
the foreign branch plant of a technological laggard receives a spillover, the 
technological improvement can be costlessly applied to its domestic production 
(i. e. 'brought home') too. (Doing so risks that local firms in the home country 
may receive the technological improvement via 'second-hand' spillovers, but 
within our specific modelling structure this is a risk that a technologically- 
lagging MNE that receives spillovers abroad would always be willing to take. ) 
The second way in which fimis' FDI decisions interact with national 
4productivity distributions' relates specifically to acquisition-FDI. Our modelling 
structure allows the high-productivity incumbent to purchase the low- 
productivity incumbent abroad. Following this flow of acquisition-FDI, intra- 
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firm technology transfer occurs: the high-productivity purchaser is able 
costlessly to install its (superior) technology in the acquired plant abroad. The 
concept of intra-firm technology transfer is identical to that employed by Van 
Long and Vousden (1995) in their model of cross-border mergers, who assume 
that every plant in a merged firm operates at the minimum marginal cost of its 
constituent plants before the merger. Although we did not use this terminology in 
the previous paragraph, intra-firm technology transfer also occurs when a firin 
'brings home' a spillover received abroad by its foreign branch plant. 
Third, FDI decisions interact with national 'productivity distributions' through 
the relationship between the greenfield-FDI/ acquisition-FDI choice (i. e. which 
fonn of FDI to choose) and the potential entrant's decision. As we show below, 
greenfield- and acquisition-FDI result - when the potential entrant comes to 
make her choice - in different industrial structures (duopoly vs. monopoly), and 
thus different entry 'incentives'. (In terms of post-entry industrial structures, 
greenfield- and acquisition-FDI result in triopoly and duopoly respectively. ) 
Furthermore, a reverse relationship exists (from the likelihood of subsequent de 
novo entry to the greenfield-FDI/ acquisition-FDI choice): for example, if entry 
never occurs following greenfield-FDI, then the 'incentive' to undertake 
acquisition-FDI will be weaker if it is accompanied by subsequent entry than if it 
is not. 
It is clear from the three broad observations above that two characteristics of the 
national 'productivity distributions' (across plants) in the industry considered are 
endogenously determined in our model: first, plants can be either high- or low- 
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productivity (there are two technologies), depending on which types of 
'technology transfer' occur; and, second, the number of plants is endogenously 
determined at equilibrium (a single potential-entrant firm exists). In both of these 
respects the number of degrees of freedom afforded by our model is limited. 
However, our analysis makes several novel contributions to the related 
theoretical literature. Both Fosfun and Motta (1999) and Siotis (1999) present 
two-country, two-firm models of the choice between greenfield-FDI and 
exporting in the context of spillovers. Our analysis extends this work by 
admitting an alternative (and empirically important) form of FDI, acquisition- 
FDI, and by allowing for potential entry. Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi (2001) 
examine how the equilibrium market structure of a single host country depends 
on a foreign MNE's choice between greenfield- and acquisition-FDI (exporting 
is excluded) in the presence of intra-finn technology transfer; spillovers, 
potential entry, and influences on the (global) equilibrium industrial structure 
through firms' actions in the MNE's home country (i. e. the international aspects 
of the equilibrium) are excluded. In terms of this (admittedly selective) literature 
review our model offers a 'richer' (i. e. 'more general'; additional, intuitively- 
important strategic effects are accommodated) framework within which to 
consider how firms' FDI choices interact with national 'productivity 
distributions'. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes the 
model and our equilibrium concepts formally and derives some useful results on 
Cournot equilibria when firms' marginal costs differ. Section 3.3 derives the 
model's equilibrium industrial structures and examines their comparative-statics 
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properties. Section 3.4 discusses the broader implications of our results for the 
sources of foreip-owned finns' obseiyed 'productivity advantages'. We also 
contrast our findings on the sources of MNEs' 'productivity advantages' with 
those which (it is claimed) are implicit in Dunning's famous (1977) OLI 
paradigm. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes. Some of our more interesting results 
are highlighted, and a number of suggestions for future research are made. 
3.2. The Modelling Structure. 
3.2.1. Sequence of Moves and Corporate Structure Choices. 
There are two countries in the world, H Chome') and F fforeign'), and two 
incumbent firms, one in each country: at the start of the game firm M (the 
potential MNE via acquisition-FDI) owns a plant in H and finn T (the potential 
acquisition target) owns a plant in F. The firms in our model produce 
homogeneous goods for sale on the identical national product markets of H and 
F, which are perfectly segmented (i. e. consumers are immobile internationally, 
so well-defined 'national' demand curves exist, although international trade can 
occur at a per-unit trade cost of t). Market demand in either country is 
Qd 
In (1) Qd and p are the national quantity demanded and price respectively; Qd is 
independent of the product price abroad because of our assumption of perfectly 
segmented national product markets. 
(1) 
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There are two distinct technologies for producing the homogeneous product, both 
of which exhibit constant marginal I(= average variable) costs. Technology is 
assumed to be a public good (non-rival) within the firm and intra-firm 
technology transfer is costless, so firms always use their 'most productive' 
(lowest marginal production cost) technology in all their plants. Firm Ms initial 
technology has a marginal production cost of cm, and firm rs initial technology 
has a marginal production cost of cT. We assume that labour is the only variable 
productive input and that money wages are constant across both locations and 
firms so that any difference between cm and CT is due entirely to differences in 
labour productivity between the two technologies. In this Section and the next we 
maintain the following assumption on cm, cT. 
O<CM <CT <1 
Assumption (A) implies that Ms initial technology is 'more productive' than Y's. 
It is quite conventional in the literature to assume that acquiring MNEs possess 
"productivity advantages' over their targets (e. g. Mattoo, Olarreaga, and Saggi, 
2001). In Section 3.4 we discuss the reasons behind this conventional 
assumption, and we explore the implications of relaxing assumption (A) to allow 
for cy > cT. For the moment, however, invoking assumption (A) greatly 
simplifies the exposition. 
Given the initial conditions of our model described above, Figure 3.1 illustrates 
the extensive form of our four-stage game. In stage one M chooses its corporate 
structure from a strategy space of of {X, G, A), where each element represents a 
different method of serving the product market in country F. X is Ms exporting 
option: M builds no additional plants (to its initial plant in H), and it serves frs 
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product market with local production at a marginal cost of cm and Fs product 
market via international trade at a marginal cost of cm + t. G represents 
greenfield-FDI- M builds an additional plant in F at a sunk cost of G and serves 
both countries' product markets from local production at a marginal cost of cm. A 
represents acquisition-M. - M makes Ta take-it-or-leave-it offer of a take-over 
price. If T accepts Ms offer, M transfers its superior technology to 7s plant 
(forward intra-firm technology transfer) and serves both countries' product 
markets from local production at a marginal cost of cAr, thereafter, we skip stage 
two (J"s corporate structure choice). If T rejects Ms take-over offer, then M 
must choose between X and G. We show below (in Section 3.2.3) that these 
assumptions on the structure of moves uniquely determine the equilibrium take- 
over price, which equals I's expected profits under Ms next-best strategy (X or 
G), and imply that M captures the entire surplus created by the take-over (i. e. the 
surplus of Ms expected profits under A over the combined expected profits of M 
and T under Ms next-best strategy). However, although these implications may 
appear restrictive, we show in Section 3.4 that the equilibrium industrial 
structures we derive are consistent with a much more general formulation of the 
bargaining process preceding the take-over. Our current assumptions on 
bargaining merely help to fix ideas. 
[FIGURE 3.1 IS OVERLEAF) 
in stage two, which only arises if M chooses X or G in stage one, T chooses its 
corporate structure from a strategy space of JX, G), where the elements are 
analogous to those in A's strategy space. The key difference is that I's initial 
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Figure 3.1: Game Tree 
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technology has a marginal production Cost Of CT ýý' cm. To secure a marginal 
production cost of cm T must rely on inter-firm technology transfers (spillovers), 
which are described below. 
In stage three a single potential entrant (finn E) decides whether to enter the 
industry at a global level. E's stage-three strategy space is (0, GH, GF, G21, 
whose elements represent: stay out (0); greenfield-FDI in country H (GH); 
geenfield-FDI in country F (GF); and geenfield-FDI in both countries (G2). E's 
initial marginal production cost is cT, so M possesses a 'productivity advantage' 
over both its rivals under assumption (A), and E incurs sunk costs of G under GH 
or GFand 2-G under G2. Like T, E must rely on inter-finn technology transfers to 
obtain a marginal production cost of cm. 
Stage four is the market stage: at the end of stage four all firms in the industry 
compete A la Cournot to serve both national product markets. 2 Inter-firm 
technology transfers (spillovers) occur at the start of stage four before the 
production of outputs. With probability 0E [0,1] the 'most productive' (lowest 
marginal production cost) technology used in a country spills over to all the rival 
plants within that country (i. e. becomes common knowledge within that country). 
Therefore, spillovers are localized. We assume that the rival plants can absorb 
spillovers costlessly. If a technological laggard with two plants (firm T under G 
or firm E under G2) benefits from a spillover in one country, it can costlessly 
apply its new technology to production in both countries (intra-finn technology 
transfer is costless). We assume that the probability of spillovers is identical and 
independent across countries. After spillovers have occurred, firnis produce 
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outputs. We assume that marginal production costs are common knowledge (i. e. 
finns know the characteristics of their rivals' technologies even if they fail to 
obtain the blueprints via spillovers). 
In Section 3.4 we discuss some of the mechanisms through which localized 
spillovers might occur and how the characteristics of those mechanisms affect 0. 
We also discuss for several spillover mechanisms the strategies that 
technological leaders (laggards) could use to try to minimize (maximize) 0. 
There are three obvious advantages to our method of modelling spillovers. First, 
it implies (ceteris paribus) a simple game structure relative to that where the 
spillover mechanism is explicitly modelled (e. g. Fosfuri, Motta and Ronde, 
2001). In turn, this allows us to extend the game structure in other directions 
while retaining tractability. For example, Fosfuri, Motta and Ronde (2001) 
restrict their attention to market equilibria in a single host country for greenfield- 
FDI. By contrast, our model comprises two host countries for FDI and two types 
of FDI. Furthermore, note that leaving the spillover mechanism as a 'black box' 
is quite familiar in the R&D literature (e. g. d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). 
Second, our modelling of spillovers abstracts from patterns of technology flows 
between specific pairs of rival plants, which quickly become very complex when 
we move beyond the conventional duopoly case. For example, if there are three 
rival plants in a location, then there are three distinct pairs of plants that 
technology can flow between; this contrasts with only one pair in the duopoly 
case. 3 Third, our method of modelling spillovers, while simple, does permit the 
investigation of some interesting strategic effects. For example, it is possible for 
a laggard to receive (indirectly) a spillover from M even if its plant is not in the 
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same country as Ms. Assume that M, T and E choose strategies of X, G and GF 
respectively (the same point applies to choices of X, X and G2 respectively). T's 
probability of receiving a spillover from M, which it applies in both its plants, is 
0. Therefore, if spillovers occur in both countries with probability 02 ,E (located 
in F) will receive a spillover from M via T. The underlying message is intuitively 
appealing: it is not necessary to locate near a high-productivity firm's plant to 
receive spillovers of its technology; locating near a third firm's plant (and relying 
on indirect spillovers) may be sufficient if that third firm has another plant near 
the high-productivity firm. A related observation concerns the impact of 
spillovers on firms' 'incentives' to undertake greenfield-FDI, which might 
strengthen or weaken the 'tariff-jumping' motive for greenfield-FDI. Assume 
that the model's structural parameters are such that T and E will choose X and 0 
respectively. Ms choice between X and G will clearly reflect the conventional 
tariff-jumping motivation for greenfield-FDI (i. e. M is 'more likely' to choose G, 
the higher is t and the lower is the sunk cost of additional plants). However, a 
disincentive for M to choose G is provided by the probability that its technology 
may spill over to T. Conversely, if M has chosen X and (the model's structural 
parameters are such that) E will choose 0, an additional (to tariff-jumping) 
incentive for T to choose G is provided by the probability that it will receive 
spillovers from M. 
3.2.2. Market Equilibria in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly 
In this Section we report standard results for a Cournot oligopoly whose firms 
are asymmetric in terms of their cost structures. These results will later be used 
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to describe market equilibria in both countries. We emphasise the implications 
for Cournot equilibria of marginal cost differences across firms, both because 
these variations are central to our analysis and because most textbook treatments 
downplay them, concentrating instead on the symmetric case. 
Consider a homogeneous-good Cournot oligopoly, operating in a market with 
demand given by (1). There are N firms, each with constant (but possibly 
different) marginal costs; and for the moment we assume away fixed costs. The 
marginal cost of representative firm i (=- {1,2, ..., NJ is ci, and the labelling of 
firms with i-indices ensures that elements of the industry's set of marginal costs 
fc, ), N are increasing in i: 
0'5C,: 5C2: ý',..: 5c.. (The reason for this indexing 
procedure will become clear below. ) The profits of firm i are given by 
; r, =- (p - ci) - qj, and at i's optimum the following two conditions hold with 
complementary slackness: 4 
First-order condition: 
2; 
-r' = qj - 
ap 
+p-c, :: ý 0 (2) aqi aQ 
Non-negativity constraint: q, >0 
Underlying the first-order condition (2) is the fact that i uses the Cournot 
conjecture when setting qj: i behaves as if 
ap Jp-- because it takes its rivals' aqi aQ 
outputs as data (i. e. 
aQ 
= 1), which is conventionally justified by assuming that aqi 
firms set their outputs simultaneously (and therefore independently) in a Cournot 
oligopoly. Using (1) to give the slope of the inverse demand curve as -ýP-- = -1, aQ 
(2) and (3) can be combined to give i's best-response function: 
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1 
qi = max 0, -. (1-Ci)- q-j 
12 
where, as conventional, Q= qj +q -, 
is total industry output and q-, j*1 q, 
is 
the combined output of i's N- I rivals. 
We are now in a position to explore the impact of marginal cost asymmetries on 
Cournot equilibria. In any asymmetric Cournot equilibrium there will generally 
be a mixture of 'active' and 'inactive' firms. Active firms are ones for whom the 
first-order condition (2) binds and the non-negativity constraint (3) is generally 
slack (although there is the limiting case where (2) holds with equality at qj = 0). 
Inactive firms are ones for whom the first-order condition (2) is slack and the 
non-negativity constraint (3) binds. Let M:: ý N be the number of active firms in 
equilibrium, so N-M is the number of inactive firms. We will demonstrate 
below, in Lemma 1, that the lower a firm's marginal cost, the 'more likely' it is 
to be active in equilibrium. Therefore, equilibria where high-cost firms are active 
but low-cost ones inactive are impossible. This observation explains our ordering 
of 
(Cil N: in any Cournot equilibrium, the active firms will be those with iE fl, I 
Af}, and the inactive firms will have iE (M + 1, M+2, ..., NJ. Therefore, 
industry output in equi i num s given by 
mNm 
QF-: Eq. +l - , qi qi =E I U+t 
where use is made of the fact that an inactive firm's output is zero by definition: 
qj =- 0 for all ie IM + 1, M+2, ..., N), so 
N qj ý 0. Rearranging the best- M+I 
response function (4), an active finn's output is qj =I - c, -Q, and summing 
across all M active firms this gives 
(5) 
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=I. M-Mci) M+l 
and, therefore, at Coumot equilibrium: 
qi =ý M1+1- 
(1 -M-c, + c-, ) Vir. ýl9 2,..., MI 
ýO 
Vi r= (M + 1, M+2,..., NI 
Note that in (7) we set c-, = J: m, cj - ci . This definition is idiosyncratic, and 
it is 
meaningful only for active firms: for an active firm, c-i gives the sum of its active 
rivals' marginal costs. 
(6) and (7) provide a complete description of industry equilibrium given the 
number of active firms, M. The next task is to deten-nine M itself. For a 
symmetric oligopoly, this procedure is simple: if every firm's marginal cost is c, 
1 
(7) gives q, = M+1 . 
(1 - c) or qj =0 for all i. Thus, all firms are active iff c :51 
(the reservation price), and M equals 0 or N. This is the 'textbook' case. To 
determine M for an asymmetric oligopoly, we use the intuitively-appealing result 
in Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1. Ofall the activefirms in an asymmetric-cost Cournot equilibrium, the 
firm with the highest marginal cost will produce the lowest output. 
M 
Proof. From our ordering of fc, ), ' 9 cvf =-max 
(cil, 
, although cm may not be a 
M 
unique maximum. Therefore, c-m =- min I iý-j) I. 
From the upper line of (7), 
aq, lac, <0 and aqjla, ý-j >0- Therefore, 
establishes the Lemma. QED. 
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qu =min (q, ), m, which 
(6) 
(7) 
The equilibrium value of Min an asymmetric-cost Cournot oligopoly is such that 
M-1 
I-M-cm+zcjý: o (8) 
1 
and 
m 
1-(M+I)-CM, l -I]CI <0 (9) 
Using Lemma 1, we can verify that the M-value that satisfies (8) and (9) is 
associated with all N firms playing best-responses in outputs (i. e. a Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium). Take (8) first. (8) gives a necessary-and-sufficient condition for 
firm Ms first-order condition to bind in equilibrium (so M is active), given that 
(a) firms 1,2, ..., M-1 also have binding first-order conditions; and (b) firms M' 
1, M+2, ..., N have 
binding non-negativity constraints. Furthermore, we know 
from Lemma I that if firm M is active in equilibrium, then all the lower-cost 
firms 1,2, ..., M-I will also be active in equilibrium. Therefore, (8) can be 
interpreted as a necessary-and-sufficient condition for firms 1,2, ..., M to be 
playing best-responses given that finns M+1, M+2, ..., N produce zero output. 
(9) gives a necessary-and-sufficient condition for firm M+ l's first-order 
condition to be slack (so M+1 is inactive) in a hypothetical equilibrium 
constructed on the assumption that it would be active (i. e. a contradiction). Put 
slightly differently, if (9) holds, then firm M+1 will optimally produce zero 
output in equilibrium, given that (a) firms 1,2, ..., M are active; and (b) firms M 
2, M+3, ..., N also produce zero. Furthermore, we know from Lemma 1 that if 
firm M+I is inactive in equilibrium, then all the higher-cost firms M+2, M+3, 
..., N will also 
be inactive. Therefore, (9) can be interpreted as a necessary-and- 
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sufficient condition for finns M+1, M+2, ..., N to be playing best-responses 
given that firms 1,2, ..., M are active. 
If (8) and (9) hold simultaneously, then all the firms in the industry are playing 
best-responses (and therefore have no incentive to deviate), so M must be in 
equilibrium. (8) and (9) both have useful economic meanings. Note from (1) and 
(6) that the equilibrium market price in terms of the number of active firms is 
m l+E, ci 
M+l 
Furthermore, (8) and (9) can be rearranged to give, respectively: 
(10) 
>cm 
(9) => 
I+EMci 
ýý Cm+l M+l 
where the LHS of (11) is the market price with M-I active firms, and the LHS 
of (12) is the market price with M active firms. From (11) it is clear that (8) that 
firm M will be active in equilibrium because, if it is not, the market price will 
exceed cm. Therefore, taking the combined outputs of firms 1,2, ... ' M-1, M 
1, ..., N as given, 
firm M can supply the product market with some qm >0 and 
still make a positive profit, because although production will depress the market 
price, it will still exceed cm. (12), derived from (9), states that firm M+1 will 
find any production unprofitable when firms 1,2, ..., M are active but firms M 
2, M+3,..., N inactive: the market price with M active firms is strictly less than 
5 
cm+,, and any production by firm M+1 will merely depress the price further. 
238 
We now apply these general results to the specific framework of this chapter. 
Consider a Coumot triopoly, where (as above) we index firms so that the set of 
marginal costs 
fc, 13, 
= 
jq, 
c2, c3l has 0: ý c, :5 c2 :5 q3 . We use (8) and (9) to derive 
the following results on the equilibrium M-value: 
M =1 iff q <1 and c. > 
I+c 
2 
M=2iff c2 :: ý 
1+ cI 
and C3> 
1+cl +C2 
(13) 
23 
M=3iff c3 < 
'+Cl +C2 
3 
where 
L-c-1 
and 
+C'+C' 
are (respectively) I's monopoly price and the 23 
equilibrium price in a Cournot duopoly comprising firms I and 2. Of course, the 
number of active firms has implications for all three firms' net revenues (i. e. 
revenue minus variable CoStS). 6 In general, the net revenues of firrn i at Cournot 
equilibrium are (from (7) and (10)) 
(11 
-m- ci + Cý-i ViE (1, 
(p-cl)-qi= 
ý 
M+j 
) 
0 Vic=(M+I, M+2,..., Nl 
Two specific cases will be of interest in our analysis. First, if finn 3 quits the 
market entirely, then 
R" (cl) =- 
(, 
_ cl 'ff C2 ýý' 
I+C, 
Firm I eams RD (cl, CO 
1-2-c, +c2 
22 
C2 -< 
I+cl 
2 
32 
and 
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1+cl 0 'ff C2 
Finn 2 eams RD 
(C2 
2 cl 
) 
--': 
22 
1-2-C2 +Cl 
iff C, <+C, 
1( 
32 
where Rm (c, ) is i's monopoly net revenue and RD(ci, cj ) is i's net revenue in a 
Cournot duopoly with firmj. Second, with firm 3 in the market we have 
RD (C,, C, ) iff C, > 
1+cl +C2 
Fimi I eams RT 
(clsc29c3) 
1-3-c, +C2 +C3 
23 1+cl +C2 1( 
4 -) 
'ff C3 
3 
RD (C', C, ) iff C, > 
1+Cl +C2 
3 
Finn 2 cams RT 
(C2 
2 Cl 10 C3 1-3-c2 +q +c3 )2 'ff C3 -< 
1+Cl +C2 1( 
43 
and 
0 'ff C3 ý" 
1+cl +C2 
Firm 3 eams RT 
(c35cl5c2) 
1-3. c3+ c, 
32 
+ C2 
C3 Sý 
1+cl +C2 
43 
where RT 
(Ci)Cj'Ck) 
with c, ýt c, is i's net revenue in a Cournot triopoly with 
firms j and k. (Although only the sum (cj + c, ) is relevant for i's net revenue if i 
is active in equilibrium, the distribution of marginal costs across firms 
determines whether i is active in equilibrium. Therefore, we do not adopt the 
tempting notation RT 
(q, 
c, + ck) when describing the general forms of the R(-) 
functions. ) 
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3.2.3. Equilibrium Industrial Structures. 
We solve the game in Figure I by backwards induction. Definitions 1 and 2 
formally characterise the game's subgame perfect Nash equilibria (in pure 
strategies) for a given choice by M. (Definition I applies if M chooses A, and 
Definition 2 applies if M chooses from {X G). ) Definition 3 gives the 
equilibrium take-over price if A chooses M, and Definition 4 uses this result to 
state Ms decision rule between A and (X, G). 
Definition 1. If Ms strategy space is restricted to A, then the equilibrium 
industrial structure is 
* 
where 
IASE I 
SE=- arg max E; rE(A; SE) 
SE 
for all SEEIO, G,, G,, GI. 
If M chooses A, then the equilibrium industrial structure is determined by the 
straightforward requirement that E play its best response to A. 
Definition 2. If Ms strategy space is restricted to (X, G), then the equilibrium 
industrial structure is 
*; *; *1 
where 
ISA 
ST SE 
A 
(S.. 
sBR (S. ); SEBR (S ; SBR (S SA arg max Er TATA 
SA 
SBR 
( *) 
= SEBR ST SA ; and SE -T T 
(SA; 
S*) 
and the SBR (. ) functions 
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S, " (S, ) = arg max E; r, (S,; S,; Sf' (S,; S, )) ST 
SE"' (SA; ST) 
= arg max DrE 
(SA; ST; SE) 
SE 
for all S., cz (X, Gl; ST r= (X, Gl; and S, c= 10, G, G, G, 1 
give the best responses of T and E to their (upstream) rivals' choices. 
E's equilibrium choice is (in the penultimate stage of the game) is determined by 
the requirement that E play its best response to S, 
*, S. (which E takes as given). 
However, firm T must consider the knock-on effects of its choice of S,. on E's 
optimal choice; therefore, S, " is endogenized within ST". Likewise, firrn M (the 
first-mover) must consider the implications of its choice of Sm for T and E's 
optimal choices; therefore, the only independent variable in A's objective 
function is S, - 
Definition 3. If M chooses A in the equilibrium industrial structure, then the 
equilibrium take-over price is EirT SA ST SE where S* are ;; SA ý ST 31 E 
determined in Definition 2. 
Given that M makes Ta take-it-or-leave-it offer, the minimal take-over price that 
T will accept is Oust above) rs expected profits in equilibrium if M chooses 
from {X, G). This is a standard result (see, e. g., Gilbert and Newbery, 1992). 
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Definition 4. M chooses A in the equilibrium industrial structure iff 
E; rm 
(A; 
SE) - EirT > Eirm (14) 
SA ST SE SA; ST SE 
where E; rm (.; -) is determined in Definition 1, and E7r, (.; .; . ), E7rm (.; .; -) 
are determined in Definition 2. 
Definition 4 ulitmately ties down the equilibrium industrial structure of the game 
in Figure 3.1. Condition (14) is straightforward: the LHS gives Ms expected 
payoff if acquisition-FDI occurs in equilibrium, and the RHS gives Ms expected 
payoff if acquisition-FDI does not occur in equilibrium. An implication of 
condition (14), which is clear on rearrangement, is that acquisition-FDI occurs in 
equilibrium iff Ms expected profits following acquisition-FDI are (strictly) 
greater than the combined expected profits of M and T if acquisition-FDI does 
not occur. Therefore, the decision rule for acquisition-FDI in our model is 
formally equivalent to the familiar co-operative decision rule for mergers of 
Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), and our assumptions on the bargaining 
process do not restrict equilibrium behaviour. However, the assumption that M 
makes Ta take-it-or-leave-it offer does restrict equilibrium payoffs following 
acquisition-FDI (i. e. T receives none of the 'surplus' from acquisition-FDI; see 
Definition 3), which are indeterminate under the co-operative decision rule. This 
restriction on equilibrium payoffs would primarily be a problem if we planned to 
undertake welfare comparisons across industrial structures, which we do not. We 
shall make use of the formal equivalence between condition (14) and the co- 
operative decision rule in Section 3.4 below. 
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When solving the model we place restrictions on cm, cT, t so that the functional 
forms of R D(. -) and RT(-, -, -) are independent of their arguments. This enables us 
to avoid extensive (and unrewarding) taxonomy. Specifically, we assume that all 
firms in the industry will be active in both countries in product market 
equilibrium. This assumption is additional to our maintained assumption (A) on 
cm, cT. Therefore, for example, for given cm and cT, t is constrained not to be so 
large that M can monopoly-price in its home market when T chooses X and E 
chooses 0 or GF. The key implication of this assumption is that all firms always 
earn strictly positive net revenue in both countries in product market equilibrium 
(although, of course, low-marginal cost firms earn more than high-marginal cost 
ones). If E chooses 0, then the net revenues of M and T in product market 
equilibrium are described by the duopoly net revenue function, R D(. . ). The 
necessary-and-sufficient condition for R' (-, -) >0 for every possible permutation 
of arguments is RD 
(cT+ 
t, cm )>0, becauseCT+ t iSthe maximum possible value 
of a firm's own marginal cost and cm is the minimum possible value for its 
rival's marginal cost (and OR' (c,, cj )1ac, :: 5 0, aRD (ci, cj )Iacj ý: 0 ). 
RD (ci + t, c,,, )>0 requires cT<(l-2-t+cm)12 (i. e. the monopoly price 
associated with cm is strictly greater than cT + t). The necessary-and-sufficient 
condition for R'(.,.,. )>O for every possible permutation of arguments is 
RT (cT+ t, c. t cf 
)>0. because the equilibrium price in a Cournot duopoly is 
lowest when both firms have marginal costs of cm. RT(cT +t, c,,, c,, 
)>0 
requires cT < (I -3-t+2- cjf )/3 (i. e. the equilibrium price in Cournot duopoly 
when both firms have marginal costs of cm is strictly greater than CT + t). Given 
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that CT cm from assumption (A), cT< (I -3t+2-c. )/3 is more restrictive than 
cT< (I -2-t+c. )/2 (which is intuitive because for a constant marginal cost 
across firms of cm the monopoly price is strictly greater than the duopoly price). 
Therefore, our assumption that all firms are active in both countries in product 
market equilibrium translates into 
cc=(0,1-3-t); cr= c., 
1-3-t+2-c. ( 
Given the assumptions on marginal costs in (B), we are able to derive some of 
the equilibrium properties of our model analytically (specifically, we solve 
backwards to stage 2- inclusive - analytically). However, as will be shown in 
the next Section, deriving the model's equilibrium industrial structures 
analytically is complicated by the model's mathematical intractability. Therefore, 
we solve for Ms stage-one choice numerically for three sets of the marginal cost 
parameters; these are 
(SI) t=0.05; c. = 0.2; cT= 0.25 
(S2) t=0.05; cm = 0.2; c,. = 0.4 
(S3) t=0.15; c. = 0.2; c. = 0.25 
(Sl) is the benchmark case. If wages are constant across both countries and 
firms, then Ms labour productivity is 25% higher than Y's in (S I). Compared to 
(S 1), (S2) represents a widening of the (labour) productivity gap between M and 
T; in (S2) Ms labour productivity is double I's. Compared to (SI), (S3) 
represents a trebling of trade costs. (Note that all of (SI), (S2), (S3) are 
consistent with assumption (B). ) 
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3.3. Analysis. 
3.3.1. E's optimal choice (stage three). 
In stage three E chooses a corporate structure from (0, GH, GF, G2) (see Figure 
1). We deal first with the (relatively simple) case where Ms prior corporate 
structure choice was A (and thus T does not exist as an independent entity). 
Clearly E7r,, (A; O) = 0. We also have 
DrE (A; GH) == E'rE(A; GF)=O-[R 
D (c. 
4f, cm) +RD 
(CM +t, CM)] 
+(I-O)-[R 
D (cT, cm)+R 
D (CT 
+t, cm)]-G 
and 
EgE(A; G2)=2-[0+(1-0)-0]-R D (c., c, )+2-(1-0)" -R D (c., c. )-2. G 
E7rE(A; GH) = Eir,, (A; GF) (and hence E is indifferent between GH and GF 
following A) because following acquisition-FDI the two countries are identical, 
both containing one plant (in common ownership) with a marginal production 
cost of cm. (We adopt two conventions throughout when writing down E; r,, (-). 
First, if E has only one plant, we write local net revenue as the first term in 
square brackets and net revenue from exports as the second. Second, if E has two 
plants, we write net revenue in H before net revenue in F. ) EirE(A; GH) is linear 
and strictly increasing in 0, which makes intuitive sense because spillovers 
reduce E's marginal production cost. In the expression for EirE(A; G2) 0+ (I - 
0) -0 measures the probability that a spillover occurs in at least one country (note 
that (I - U)-O is the probability of spillovers in a country given that none occur 
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abroad) and (1 _ 0)2 measures the probability that spillovers occur in neither 
country. EirE(A; G2) is increasing and strictly concave in 0 on [0,1], which is 
again intuitive because d 
2[0 + (I - 0). O]/d 
02 <0 so increases in 0 have 
progressively smaller impacts on the overall probability of receiving spillovers. 
As noted above, E has GH - GF in response to A. Furthermore, in response to A 
G, v, 
GF >-O 
E has G2>-O iff I 
G2 >- G, GF 
iff ERE(A; GH)>G 
I. 
ERE(A; G2) >G 2 
iff ERE(A; G2)-ERE(A; Gff)>G 
(15) 
where ER-F(-) denotes E's expected net revenues in a given industrial structure. 
iff 
2-ERE(A; GH) ýý'ERE(A; G2) 
then the plot of E's best responses to A in (0, G)-space resembles Figure 3.2. 
Condition (16) holds in all of (Sl), (S2), (S3). The sufficiency of (16) for Figure 
3.2 is obvious from inspection; its necessity is made clear by considering E's best 
responses to A if (16) fails. (If ERE(A; G2) ý: 2-ERE(A; GH), then E would never 
optimally choose GH, GF in response to A; the best response to A would be G2 
(16) 
(resp. 0) iff ERE(A; G2) > (resp. <) 2-G. Therefore, an alternative interpretation of 
(16) is that it ensures that the region where GHor GFis E's best response is non- 
empty. ) Necessary-and-sufficient conditions akin to (16), which states that twice 
the net revenue from exporting (from a single plant) must strictly exceed the net 
revenue from undertaking (additional) greenfield-FDI (and establishing a second 
plant), will occur repeatedly in our analysis of E's best responses. Those familiar 
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with the literature on tariff-jumping greenfield-FDI might find it difficult to 
conceive of circumstances where (16) fails since, if a foreign market can be 
served via exporting, undertaking greenfield-FDI will typically increase but not 
double total net revenues. 7 Consider, however, E's expected net revenues in {A; 
GH) and JA; G2) when t is so large that no international trade occurs in product- 
market equilibrium. In this case ERE(A; GH) = OR 
D(CM, 
CM) + (I - 6). R 
D(CT9 
CM) 
because RD (Cm + t, C=RD (CT +4 cm) = 0, and straightforward but tedious 
algebra shows that (16) fails for all 0E [0,1] (since CT ý" CM)- 
8 The intuition for 
this (surprising) result (i. e. that adding a second plant more than doubles E's 
global expected net revenues) is that only local producers serve product markets 
in equilibrium if t is 'very large' so (i) all of E's variable profits abroad under 
greenfield-FDI represent a net increase in its global variable profits, and (ii) 
because E 'meets' M in two markets rather than one, adding a second plant 
increases E's probability of receiving spillovers. 
[FIGURE 3.2 IS OVERLEAF] 
The effects of changing G in Figure 3.2 are entirely intuitive: increases in G 
decrease E's optimal number of plants. The effects of changing 0 are more 
complex, however, because it is not the case that increasing 0 always increases 
E's equilibrium number of plants. Where ERE(A; G2) - ERE(A; GH) is downward- 
sloping, an increase in 0 (for given G) can reduce E's equilibrium number of 
plants from two to one: this occurs because increases in 0 raise ERE(A; GH) more 
than ERE(A; G2) for large 0, so the gain in expected net revenue from choosing 
two plants over one, ERE(A; G2) - ERE(A; GH), falls. 
9 
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Sunk cost of 
greenfield-FDI, G 
1; GH) 
4; G2)/2 
4; G2)- 
(A; GH) 
Figure 3.2: E's best responses if M chooses A 
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0 Probability of 
spillovers, 0 
We can also examine the comparative-statics effects of changing the marginal 
cost parameters cm, cT, t in Figure 3.2. Increasing t reduces ERE(A; GH) as net 
revenues from abroad fall, but ERE(A; G2) is unaffected because no international 
trade occurs in {A; G2) (A and E produce locally in both countries). Therefore, 
the top (0) and bottom (G2) regions in Figure 3.2 both increase in size, and the 
middle (GH or GF) region is squeezed from both directions. (This is the case in 
(S3) relative to (S I). ) Intuitively, an increase in t strengthens both E's preference 
for zero plants over one (i. e. ERAA; GH) falls) and E's preference for two plants 
over one (i. e. ERE(A; G2) - ERE(A; GH) rises, an enhanced 'tanff-jumping' 
motive); thus the regions where 0 and G2 are best responses grow at the expense 
of that where GH or OF is optimal. 
We next consider the effects of raising CT on Figure 3.2. (This is the case in (S2) 
relative to (Sl). ) Note first that both inter-regional boundaries in Figure 3.2 are 
independent Of CT at 0=1. This is because neither firm will have a marginal 
production cost in the product-market competition stage Of CT if spillovers are 
certain, so cT becomes irrelevant. ERE(A; GH), the upper inter-regional boundary 
in Figure 3.2, shifts downwards for all 0E [0,1) when CT rises, because E's 
preference for zero plants over one strengthens (if spillovers do not occur, higher 
CT reduces E's net revenues under GH or GF). ERE(A; G2) - ERE(A; GH), the lower 
inter-regional boundary in Figure 3.2, shifts downwards for small 0 but upwards 
for large (but <1) 0 when cT rises, reflecting the fact that a two-plant entrant has a 
higher probability of receiving spillovers than a one-plant entrant and so is less 
hanned by rises in cr. 10 Therefore, increasing CT can strengthen E's preference 
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for G2over GHor GF, implying that the bottom region in Figure 3.2 expands at 
the expense of the middle one. 
Finally, we consider the effects on Figure 3.2 of varying cm, which are more 
complex than the effects of varying t, cr. Reducing cm shifts ERE(A; GH) 
downwards at 0=0 but upwards at 0=I (in the linear Cournot duopoly 
considered here a common cut in both firms' marginal costs increases both firms' 
net revenues because the 'own' effect outweighs the 'cross' effect). Therefore, 
for appropriate G and small 0 (e. g. just below the upper inter-regional boundary 
in Figure 3.2) a cut in cm shifts E's best response to A from GH or GF to 0: entry 
is discouraged because M becomes a tougher competitor. However, for 
appropriate G and large 0 (i. e. just above the upper inter-regional boundary in 
Figure 3.2) a cut in cm shifts E's best response to A in the opposite direction, 
from 0 to GH or GF: despite the tougher competition from M, entry is on balance 
encouraged by the desire to receive spillovers of its (now more valuable) 
technology. Turning to the lower inter-regional boundary in Figure 3.2, 
L'T)E(A; G2) 
- ERE(A; GH) shifts in the same direction as ERE(A; Gll) near and at its Lýlv- ý 
end-points (0; -- 0,1); however, further analysis is excessively complex given the 
illustrative comparative-statics exercise at hand. " 
If M and E do not choose A and 0 respectively, then both national product 
markets will be served by Cournot triopolies in stage four. Finn i's net revenue 
in a Cournot triopoly with f 'rins i and k was described by the function RT(ci, cj, 
. ck) in Section 3.2.2. However, if the Coumot first-order condition (2) binds 
(which is guaranteed by assumption (B)), then firm i's best-response output 
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depends only on the sum of its rivals' marginal Costs,, Ci + Ck. Therefore, to 
lighten notation we write i's net revenue function in a Cournot triopoly as R(ci, 
cj + ck) given assumption (B). 
We next consider E's best responses to {G; G), {G; X), JX, G) and {X; X). E's 
expected profit functions for each case are presented in the Appendix; some 
commentary on them is also provided, and the more mechanical (i. e. less 
economically interesting) aspects of E's best responses are derived. In each of 
these four cases we can state a necessary-and-sufficient condition analogous to 
(16) for E's best responses in (0, G)-space to resemble Figure 3.2. ('Resemble' is 
used here loosely to mean that each plot would have three distinct regions, which 
are ordered identically to those in Figure 3.2. Inter-regional boundaries may be 
shaped differently to those in Figure 3.2. ) The relevant necessary-and-sufficient 
conditions are 
For E's best responses to (G; GI: 
2-ERE(G; G; Gj > E& (G; G; G2) (17) 
For E's best responses to {G; X}: 
2- ER, (G; X; GH) > ERE(G; X; G2) (18) 
For E's best responses to {X; Gj: 
2- max f ERE (X; G; Gj, E& (X; G; GF)l > ERE (X; G; G2) 
For E's best responses to (X; X}: 
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2-ERE(X; X; Gm) > ERE 
(X; X; G2) (20) 
(17) - (20) hold in all of (SI), (S2), (S3) (and they are unconnected to 
assumption (B) 12) . Note that 
(17) - (20) share the same structure as (16): all five 
conditions state that twice the expected net revenue from establishing one plant 
must (strictly) exceed the expected net revenue from establishing two plants. (17) 
- (20) have two other characteristics in common with (16): first, if (17) - (20) 
fail, then E will never establish a single plant as a best response; second, (17) - 
(18) fail if t is so large that no international trade occurs in product-market 
equilibrium because in that case establishing a second plant (and thus meeting M 
in an additional product market) more than doubles E's expected net revenues 
(E's probability of receiving spillovers rises). 13 Even if (16) - (20) all hold, E's 
best responses will differ across cases in one noteworthy aspect: namely, E's 
optimal choice of where to locate a single plant when E's best response is one 
plant. In response to A, E is indifferent between GH and GF; this is also so in 
response to (G; G} - In response to both {G; Yj and {X; X) GH strictly dominates 
GFfor all parameter values. E's optimal one-plant choice in response to JX; G) is 
more complex: in the region where E optimally chooses a single plant GF is 
certainly (strictly) preferred to GH for extreme O-values (i. e. O; ze 0,1). However, 
E's choice between GH and OF at more central O-values depends crucially on the 
marginal cost parameters cm, cT, t. For example, in (SI) and (S2) E strictly 
prefers GH to GF in response to (X; GI for central O-values, whereas in (S3) E 
strictly prefers GF to GH in response to {X, G} for all 0 c: [0,1]. " We do not 
explore in any detail how the marginal cost parameters affect E's choice between 
GHand GF in the one-plant region because for our purposes the fact that E 
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chooses one plant is much more significant than its location. However, we can 
provide some simple intuition on why E's best response to JX; G) might be GH 
for central O-values but GFat the extremes. In {X-, G; GH) E's probability of 
receiving a spillover is 0, whereas in (X; G; GF) it is 0 
2. Clearly these 
probabilities are equal at 0=0,1; but for 0e (0,1) E is strictly more likely to 
receive a spillover if it chooses GH. Therefore, a desire to maximize the chance 
of receiving spillovers could (intuitively) explain a preference by E for GH over 
GF central O-values in response to {X; G). 
In Figure 3.3 and 3.4 we plot, respectively, E's best responses if M chooses G 
and X in (0, G)-space. Both Figures cover both of 2's possible choices (X and G) 
and so allow us to investigate, for a given choice by M, E's best response to a 
change in 7s choice. In the Appendix we show that the necessary-and-sufficient 
condition for the construction of Figure 3.3 is 
ER, (G; G; G, 1) + ERE 
(G; X; Gff) > ER, - 
(G; X; G, ) (21) 
which holds in all of (Sl), (S2), (S3). Note that (21) is more restrictive than (17) 
and (18) (see the Appendix for prooo. " 
[FIGURE 3.3 IS OVERLEAF] 
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Sunk cost of 
greenfield-FDI, G 
Figure 3.3: Els best responses if M chooses G 
Inter-regional boundaries. A/B: ERE(G; X; GH); B/C: ERE(G; G; Gm or GF); C/D: 
ERE(G; X; G2) - ERE(G; X; GH); D/E: ERE(G; G; G2) - ERE(G; G; GH or GF). 
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0 Probability of 
spillovers, 0 
Key to Figure 3.3 
E's BR to (G; G) E's best response (BR) to (G; X} 
0 GH G2 
0 region A region B 
GH or GF region C region D 
G2 region E 
Note (*): In regions C and D, E is indifferent between GH and GF in response to 
{G; G) - 
in Figure 3.3 increases in G reduce E's optimal number of plants. Note that the 
critical G-values where E optimally switches from two plants to one and from 
one plant to zero are both higher if T chooses X (horizontal movements between 
cells in the key to Figure 3.3) than if T chooses G (vertical movements). This 
implies that two distinct (and mutually exclusive) cases exist in Figure 3.3. First, 
E's optimal number of plants if M chooses G may be independent of I's 
intervening choice (the diagonal cells in the key to Figure 3.3). Second, E's 
optimal number of plants if T chooses X may be one greater than if T chooses G 
(the off-diagonal cells). However, it is never the case that E optimally chooses 
(strictly) more plants if T chooses G than if T chooses X. To provide some 
intuition for the existence of the second case above, note that (ceteris paribus) 
total expected net revenues ('rents) in product-market equilibrium will be lower 
if T chooses G over X, because (a) 'competition' in H is more intense since the 
trade cost does not enter 7's marginal cost; and (b) T has a higher probability of 
receiving spillovers from M since T and M 'meet' in two countries rather than 
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one. Therefore, it is possible to imagine situations where there is 'room' in the 
industry for an additional E-plant if T chooses Xbut not if T chooses G. 
Figure 3.4 shows E's best responses if M chooses X for either of 7s possible 
choices. In the Appendix we show that the necessary-and-sufficient conditions 
for the construction of Figure 3.4 are 
CT'sufficiently larger' than cm 
2-max[ERE(X; G; GH), ERE(X; G; GF)l > ERE(X; G; G2) (19) repeated 
maxIERE(X; G; G, u), ERE(X; G; G)1+ERE(X; X; Gm»ERE(X; X; G, 
) (22) 
all of which hold in (S I), (S2), (S3). It is unclear from inspection which of (19), 
(22) is the more restrictive: we have both LHS(22) > LHS(19) and RHS(22) 
RHS(19). However, from Figure 3.4 it is clear that for small 0 (22) is the more 
restrictive, whereas (19) is more restrictive for large 0. (This follows from how 
the inter-regional boundaries in the lower part of Figure 3.4 intersect. ) A final, 
brief technical point worth making is that, although the form of Figure 3.4 is 
robust to all of (S I), (S2), (S3), the B/C, C/D and E/F inter-regional boundaries 
need not be kinked: in (S3) they will all be smooth. 
[FIGURE 3.4 IS OVERLEAF] 
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Sunk cost of 
greenfield-FDI, G 
Figure 3.4: E's best responses if M chooses X 
inter-regional boundaries. A/B: ERE(X, X; GH); B/C: max {ERE(X; G; GH)s ERE(X; 
G; GF)J; C/D and E/F: ERE(X; G; G2) - Max {ERE(X; G; GH)2 ERE(X-, G; GF)); C/E 
and D/F: ERE(X; X*, G2) - EREM X; GH). 
Note that we do not locate the maximum O-value in region E relative to the kink in the 
OF inter-regional boundary. Therefore, although E will always choose one plant in 
region E, it may not always be in the same location. Furthermore, region F may not 
extend entirely to 0=I- 
z 
I 
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0 Probability of 
spillovers, 0 
Key to Figure 3.4 
E's BR to JX; G} E's best response (BR) to {X; X) 
0 GH G2 
0 region A region B 
GH or GF region C region E 
G2 region D region F 
Note (*): In regions C and E, E is not indifferent between GH and GF in response 
to {X; G). Rather, one of (GH, GFJ will be chosen by E in response to (X, G} 
with strict preference. 
Figure 3.4 shares several comparative-statics properties with Figure 3.3: in both, 
E's optimal number of plants falls for a given choice by T as G rises. However, it 
is no longer true that E's optimal number of plants is always (weakly) greater if T 
chooses X over G; that is, the argument that there is more 'room' for entry by E 
(and thus E chooses more plants in equilibrium) if T chooses X, which was 
invoked to rationalise the structure of Figure 3.3, does not (universally) hold in 
Figure 3.4. The exception occurs in region D, where E chooses two plants in 
response to (X; G) but only one plant in H in response to JX; X). The 
explanation for this lies in the fact that region D does not exist for small 0. If the 
probability of spillovers is significantly greater than zero (as in D), then by 
choosing G2in response to {X; X) E runs a significant risk (probability 02) of 
providing a channel for T to receive Ms technology (which would make Ta 
more aggressive competitor). However, this risk is not present if M has 
previously chosen G. Therefore, for large 0 E's gain in expected net revenues 
from choosing two plants over one is greater following (X-, G) than (X-, X). Note 
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that for small 0 the counterpart region to D is region E where the intuitive 'room' 
argument does hold: E chooses two plants in response to (X, X) but only one in 
response to {X-, G) because the risk of indirectly providing T with Ms 
technology is considered insignificant. It can easily be shown that the existence 
of region D crucially depends on CT being 'sufficiently larger' than cm. 16 This 
makes intuitive sense: if CT'ýý CM, then the cost to E in (X; X; G21 of providing T 
with spillovers of Ms technology will be negligible (despite the fact that the 
associated probability, 02, may be large). 
3.3.2. M and Is optimal choices (stages one and two). 
We begin by examining I's optimal choice in stage two, which itself exists only 
if M chooses X or G in stage one (see Figure 3.1). In stage two T chooses a 
corporate structure from {X, G), taking account of E's subsequent best response 
in stage three. Y's expected profit functions in every possible industrial structure 
are presented for reference in the Appendix. A key feature of them for our 
purposes is that ETc7(. ) is generally strictly decreasing in the number of plants 
chosen by E for given choices by M, T. 17 This makes intuitive sense because 
additional entry by E (i. e. adding an extra E-plant) will typically increase 
ccompetition' in both host-country markets (i. e. E's marginal cost of supplying a 
market will fall if it establishes a local plant because trade costs are eliminated 
and E's probability of receiving spillovers typically rises). Therefore, we can 
describe how I's incentive to undertake grccnficld-FDI changes as we move 
between cells in the keys to Figures 3.3 and 3.4 (i. e. how E's subsequent location 
choice affects Y's decision ceteris paribus). First, a rightwards movement 
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between cells in either key generally strengthens rs incentive to undertake 
greenfield-FDI because I's expected net revenues from exporting fall but those 
from greenfield-FDI are unchanged so the gain to undertaking greenfield-FDI 
rises. The exception to this rule occurs in the key to Figure 3.4 when E's best 
response to {X; X) changes from GH to G2: because we can have ER7ýX-, X, G2) > 
ERI-(X; X; GH) (see end-note 16), a rightwards move from the middle to the 
righthand column can weaken I's incentive to undertake greenfield-FDI. Second, 
a downwards movement between cells in either key always weakens I's 
incentive to undertake greenfield-FDI because I's expected net revenues from 
greenfield-FDI fall but those from exporting are unchanged. These two points 
can be illustrated by considering the critical G-value, G*, that governs I's choice 
between greenfield-FDI and exporting for any given cell in the key to either 
Figure 3.3 or Figure 3.4. G* equals Y*s gain in expected net revenues from 
choosing greenfield-FDI over exporting, and it depends on the marginal cost 
parameters and 0 in a form determined by the corporate structure choices of M, 
E. Clearly, T optimally chooses greenfield-FDI iff G< G* and exporting iff G 
G* (by definition T is indifferent iff G= G*). The first point above implies that 
G* rises if we move rightwards between cells in either key, and the second 
implies that G* falls if we move downwards between cells. 's 
Figure 3.5 plots the optimal corporate structure choices of T and E if M chooses 
G in (S I), (S2) and (S3). Because the inter-regional boundaries in Figure 3.5 are 
identical to those in Figure 3.3, it would be straightforward to derive the general 
necessary-and-sufficient conditions on 0 and the marginal cost parameters 
underlying Figure 3.5; however, we do not do so here because the remainder of 
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our analysis will be concerned with the parameter values in (S 1), (S2) and (S 3). 19 
One point to note is that the pattern of optimal choices by T depicted in Figure 
3.5 is consistent with (and explanable by) our analysis above of the effects of E's 
subsequent choices on I's incentives. For example, G* (the critical G-value 
where T switches between greenfield-FDI and exporting, which reflects 7s 
'incentive' to undertake greenfield-FDI) is higher for region B in Figure 3.3 than 
for region A because entry by E is strategically deterred if T chooses G in region 
B whereas in region A entry is blockaded. Given our parameter restrictions, we 
find that the A/B inter-regional boundary lies between these two values f 20 or G*. 
[FIGURE 3.5 IS OVERLEAF] 
Key to Figure 3.5 (in the form [best response of T; best response of E)) 
Region A: JX; 01; region B: {G; 01; region C: JX, GH); region D: (G; GH or 
GF) -E is indifferent between GH and GF; region E: {G; 
G21. 
Figure 3.6 plots the optimal corporate structure choices of T and E if M chooses 
X in (S 1), (S2) and (S3). Again, we could straightforwardly derive the general 
necessary-and-sufficient conditions on 0 and the marginal cost parameters 
underlying Figure 3.6 but for brevity do not do so. 21 Three features that Figures 
3.5 and 3.6 have in common are noteworthy. First, increases in the sunk cost of 
greenfield-FDI are associated with reductions in the number of plants that T and 
E, taken together, subsequently build. (If the sunk cost of greenfield-FDI is 
sufficiently small, then three plants are subsequently built following choices of 
both X and G by M. In both Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 increases in the sunk cost 
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Sunk cost of 
greenfield-FDI, G 
Figure 3.5: Best responses of T and E if M chooses G 
Inter-regional boundaries (as in Figure 3). A/B: ER E(G; X; GH); B/C: ERE(G; G; GH 
or GF); C/D: ERE(G; X; 
G2) - ERE(G; X; GH); D/E: ERE(G; G; G2) - ERE(G; G; GH or 
GF)- 
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0 Probability of 
spillovers, 0 
of greenfield-FDI successively reduce the number of new-builds to two, then 
one, then zero. ) Second, although the total number of subsequently-built plants is 
decreasing in the sunk cost of greenfield-FDI, the number built T individually is 
not. 22 In region B of both Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 T switches, as the sunk cost 
of greenfield-FDI rises, from choosing X to G, before re-switching back to X in 
region A. The reason for this is that in region BT can strategically deter entry by 
E by undertaking greenfield-FDI, which is not possible in either region A or 
region C (in A entry is blockaded, and in C it is inevitable). Therefore, Y's 
incentive to undertake greenfield-FDI is greater in region B than in either region 
A or region C. Third, where the inter-regional boundaries in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 
are upward-sloping, which is generally the case, increases in 0 tend to increase 
the total number of subsequently-built plants. This reflects the strengthening of 
the motive for technology-sourcing greenfield-FDI (i. e. undertaking greenfield- 
FDI in the hope of benefitting from 'reverse' spillovers) as the probability of 
receiving spillovers rises. 
[FIGURE 3.6 IS OVERLEAF] 
Key to Figure 3.6 (in the forra (best response of T-, best response of E)) 
Region A: {X-, 0); region B: (G; 0); region C: {X; GH); region D: {G; GH) or 
(G; GF) -E is not indifferent between GH and GF; region E: (G; G2) - 
We turn finally to consider firm Ms stage-one choice between (X, G, A) and 
thus our game's equilibrium industrial structures. The analysis of Ms optimal 
choice occurs in two steps. First, we consider which of fX, G) M prefers; by 
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Sunk cost of 
greenfield-FDI, G 
Figure 3.6: Best responses of T and E if M chooses X 
inter-regional boundaries. A/B: ERE(X; X; GH); B/C: max (ERE(X; G; GH), ERE(X; 
G; GF)); C/D: ERE(X*, X; G2) - ERE(X; X; GH) for small 0, and min (ER7(X; G; GH), 
ERI(X; G; GF)j - ERKX; X; GH) for large 0; and D/E: ERE(X; G; 02) - max 
(ERE(X; 
G; GH), ERE(X; G; GF)J. 
Notes. In (S3) the B/C and D/E inter-regional boundaries will be smooth (by analogy 
with Figure 4). It is possible that region D may not exist continuously for all 0: for 
some parameter values a C/E inter-regional boundary may exist for a small interval of 
interior O-values. 
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identifying Ms potential alternative strategy to A, this detennines the acquisition 
price that M would have to pay for T. Second, we determine Ms choice between 
A and its preferred candidate from {X, G) using the decision rule in (14). 
The first step involves locating the inter-regional boundaries from Figure 3.5 and 
those from Figure 3.6 on the same diagram, and then calculating whether M 
prefers X or G in each distinct region (no inter-regional boundary is the same in 
both Figures, so the potential number of distinct regions thus created is large). 
Because of the complexity of the proposed analytical task, we solve stage one 
numerically. As will be demonstrated below, this still yields some useful 
suggestive insights. We work with three distinct numerical simulations: (S 1), 
(S2) and (S3), where variation in the marginal cost parameters is allowed for. In 
each simulation we consider a 55-cell grid in (0, G)-space: we consider O-values 
belonging to {O, 0.25,0.5,0.75,11 and G-values (the sunk cost of greenfield- 
FDI) belonging to (0,1,2,..., 8,10,12 1.23 
In Tables A3.1, A3.2 and A3.3 in the Appendix we report Ms preferred choice 
from {X, G} in each of (S I), (S2) and (S3) respectively. Analytic representations 
of Ms expected profit functions are also given in the Appendix for reference. (in 
each Figure bold lines are used to group together cells where M makes the same 
optimal choice from (X, G). ) Here we report only some of the key features of 
those Figures, which relate to the determination of the acquisition price for T. 24 
(AP stands for 'acquisition price', and each proposition holds 'other things' 
constant. ) 
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AP1. If the sunk cost of greenfield-FDI rises, then the number of plants 
subsequently built by T and E (weakly) falls. 
AP2. If 0 rises, then the number of plants subsequently built by T and E (weakly) 
rises. 
AP3. If M switches its choice from X to G, then the number of plants 
subsequently built by T and E (weakly) falls. 
AP4. If M chooses X and CT rises, then the number of plants subsequently built 
by T and E (weakly) falls for small 0 but (weakly) rises for large 0. However, if 
M chooses G and CT rises, then the number of plants subsequently built by T and 
E does not change. 
AP5. If t rises, then the number of plants subsequently built by T and E (weakly) 
rises. 
AP6. M is 'more likely' to choose G over X, the lower is the sunk cost of 
greenfield-FDI. If CT rises, then M becomes 'less likely' to choose G over X. 
However, if t rises, then M becomes 'more likely' to choose G over X. 
Note that propositions API - AP6 only catalogue general properties of Figures 
A3.1 - A3.3: exceptions do exist, but the propositions are correct in the majority 
of cases (cells) considered. API. and AP2 summarise features of Figures 3.5 and 
3.6 that were discussed in more detail above. The rationale for AP 1 is a 
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straightforward substitution effect away from greenfield-FDI following a rise in 
the price of fields; that for AP2 is a strengthening of the technology-sourcing 
motive for greenfield-FDI as the probability of spillovers rises. AN illustrates 
how incumbents' undertaking greenfield-FDI can pre-empt de novo entry (Smith, 
1987) by reducing the amount of 'room' in the industry for additional plants. 
(The mechanism here is that the incumbent's marginal cost of serving a host- 
country product market falls if it undertakes geenfield-FDI rather than 
exporting, thereby reducing a de novo entrant's expected net revenues. ) 
API - AP3 were concerned with movements between or within cells in a given 
Figure. By contrast, AN and AP5 compare the same cell across different 
Figures. AN compares (S2) to (SI), i. e. Figure A3.2 to Figure All, to gain 
insight into the effects of a rise in cT. The results in AN are primarily driven by 
Y's behaviour, although E's choices do play a role. (The rise in CT makes 'entry' 
'less likely', but - in particular - it appears primarily to affect E's choice 
between one plant and none, rather than its choice between two plants and one. 
Furthermore, the effect of the rise in CT on E's behaviour is weaker, the larger is 
0. ) If M chooses X, then T can use greenfield-FDI to source technology from M 
to use in both its plants. The strength of this motive is increasing in both 0 and 
cT, which given the constancy of cm reflects Ms technological lead. Therefore, if 
M chooses X, T becomes 'more likely' to choose G over X for large 0 (= 0.75,1), 
where the technology-sourcing motive is stronger than the straightforward profit- 
reducing effect of a rise in CT if spillovers do not occur, but 'less likely' to choose 
G over X for small 0 (= 0,0.25), where the latter effect dominates. 25 However, if 
M chooses G, then the technology-sourcing motive for T also to choose G is 
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weakened (because T can receive spillovers from M without undertaking 
greenfield-FDI). In our reported numerical simulations this results in the rise in 
CThaving relatively little effect on rs choice between G and X. 
AP5 compares (S3) to (Sl), i. e. Figure A3.3 to Figure A3.1, to gain insight into 
the effects of a rise in t. The effect of higher t on I's behaviour is relatively 
straightforward to interpret: higher t encourages 'tariff-jumping' (or trade cost- 
jumping) greenfield-FDI, thus making a choice of G by T 'more likely'. The 
effect of higher t on E's behaviour is more complex: 'initial' entry by E (i. e. one 
plant vs. none) is discouraged because its viability relies on net revenues from 
exporting, but 'expansion' by E (i. e. two plants vs. one) is encouraged via the 
same 'tariff-jumping' effects that influence T. Therefore, if t rises, the region 
where E optimally chooses one plant is squeezed - both from below (by the two- 
plant region) and from above (by the zero-plant region). 26 
Finally, we consider AP6, which describes Ms optimal decision between X and 
G both within and between Figures A3.1 - A3.3. In each of Figures A3.1 - A3.3 
a bold line groups together cells where M makes the same optimal choice. The 
first observation in AP6 says that M optimally chooses G below the bold lines in 
each Figure. This is not surprising: a rise in the sunk cost of greenfield-FDI 
causes a substitution effect away from greenfield-FDI. The second observation in 
AP6, which compares Figure A3.2 to Figure A3.1, captures the fact that a rise in 
cr (i. e. in Ms technological lead given constant cm) reduces Ms incentive to 
undertake greenfield-FDI because Ms technological lead might be dissipated 
through spillovers to local rivals in the host country following greenfield-FDI; 
269 
and obviously this loss is more costly to M, the greater is Ms technological lead. 
(This effect is stronger, the larger is 0, e. g. 0=0.5,0.75. At 0=IT and E's 
subsequent location of plants in H (for sufficiently small sunk costs of 
greenfield-FDI) implies that the probability that M loses its technological lead is 
independent (= 1) of Ars choice between X and G, and Ms initial - rather than 
equilibrium - technological lead, CT - CM, is irrelevant to Ms choice between X 
and G. Therefore, M continues optimally to choose G for sufficiently small sunk 
costs of greenfield-FDI at 0=I when OT rises. ) In the next Section we compare 
this finding to the contrasting conclusion of Dunning's (1977) OLI paradigm. 
The third observation in AP6, which compares Figure A3.3 to Figure A3.1, 
records how Ms incentive to undertake 'tariff-jumping' greenfield-FDI rises as t 
rises, an intuitive result. 
We now turn to the second (and final) step in the determination of the game's 
equilibrium industrial structures: the comparison of Ms expected profits under 
acquisition-FDI (A) with the combined expected profits of M and T at the 'threat 
point' (i. e. if M chooses between X and G). From (14), acquisition-FDI occurs in 
equilibrium in stage one of the game if and only if Ms post-acquisition profits 
can (more than) cover M and 7s combined profits if the acquisition does not 
occur. In Tables 3.1 - 3.3 we report the game's equilibrium industrial structures 
in (Sl), (S2) and (S3) respectively. In each Table bold lines are used to group 
together cells where M makes the same optimal choice between A and (X, G}. 
Some noteworthy features of the Tables are summarised in the following 
propositions (where EIS stands for 'equilibrium industrial structure' and - as 
above - 'other things' are held constant). 
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EIS1. As the sunk cost of greenfield-FDI rises from 0, the sequence of Ms 
equilibrium choices is (X, G), A, JX, G), A (The bold lines divide each of Table 
3.1 to Table 3.3 into four regions to reflect this sequence. 27 ) Rises in the sunk 
cost of greenfield-FDI also reduce the number of plants built by T and E in 
equilibrium. 
EIS2. (A weaker property than EISI. ) For intermediate sunk costs of greenfield- 
FDI, rises in 0 shift Ms equilibrium choice from A to (X, G) if 0 is initially 
small but from (X, G) to A if 0 is initially large. 
EIS3. Where M chooses from (X, G) in equilibrium, an increase in cT makes M 
'less likely' to choose G but T 'more likely' to choose G. An increase in CT also 
shifts all four regions defined in EIS I downwards (especially for small 0). 
EIS4. Where M chooses from {X, G) in equilibrium, an increase in t makes both 
M and T 'more likely' to choose G. Where M chooses A in equilibrium, an 
increase in t makes E 'more likely' to choose G2 over GH or GF. An increase in t 
also shifts all four regions defined in EIS I downwards. 
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{X; G; 01 {X; G; 01 {A; GIIIGF) 
{X; X; 01 {X; G; 0) {A; GHIGF} {A; GHIGF} {A; GIIIGF) 
{A; GHIGF} {A; Gii/GF) {A; GHIGF) {A; GHIGF) {A; GHIGF) 
{A; GIIIGFI {A; GHIGF} {A; GHIGFI {A; GIIIGFI {A; GHIGF) 
{A; GiiIGF) {A; GHIGF} {A; GHIGF) {A; GH/GFI {A; GIIIGFI 
{A; GHIGFI {A; G21 {A; G21 {A; G2) {A; GHIGF} 
{A; G2) {A; G2) {A; G21 {A; G2} {A; G2) 
{G; G; G21 {G; G; G2} {G; G; G21 {G; G; G2} {G; G; G21 
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 
Probability of spillovers, 0 
Table 3.1: Equilibrium industrial structures in (Sl) Q=0.05; cm = 0.2; 
cT = 0.25) 
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{A; G2} {A; G2)_ 17; G; G21 {X; G; G21 1 {G; G; G21 
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 
Probability of spillovers, 0 
Table 3.2: Equilibrium industrial structures in (S2) Q=0.05; cm = 0.2; 
cT = 0.4) 
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0 0.25 0.5 0.75 
Probability of spillovers, 0 
Table 3.3: Equilibrium industrial structures in (S3) (t = 0.15; cm = 0.2; 
0.25) 
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EIS I to EIS4 describe the comparative-statics effects on industrial structure of 
exogenous changes in the (sunk and marginal) cost parameters of our game and 
0. They are derived from inspection of Tables 3.1 to 3.3, which show our game's 
equilibrium industrial structures in each of our three numerical simulations. EIS I 
and EIS2 list the effects of changes in the sunk cost of greenfield-FDI and 0 
respectively and, therefore, catalogue properties of each Table considered 
individually. The key to understanding the sequence of equilibria described in 
EIS1 is to consider the effects of changes in the sunk cost of greenfield-FDI on 
E's decision if M chooses A or {X, G}. The basic distinction between choices of 
A and {X, G) by M is that, when contemplating de novo, entry, E faces a 
monopoly (at a global level) following A but a duopoly following {X, G). 
Therefore, following de novo entry by E, the global industry will be a duopoly 
following A but a triopoly following JX, GI (conduct is always Cournot), so that 
subsequent 'entry' is 'more likely' (i. e. occurs for a larger set of parameter 
values) following A than {X, G). (I write 'entry' because it encompasses any 
choice on {GH, GF, G2) by E. We have seen in Figure 3.2, which - as discussed 
in the Appendix - extends readily to all possible pre-entry industrial structures, 
that E's optimal number of plants switches from two to one to none as the sunk 
cost of greenfield-FDI rises. By claiming that 'entry' is 'more likely' following A 
than JX, GI, I mean that the inter-regional boundaries in Figure 3.2 are higher 
than the analogous inter-regional boundaries when E faces {G; G), {G; X), JX; 
GI or {X; X). Put another way, compared to the four alternative pre-entry 
industrial structures, E will always optimally choose as many (and sometimes 
more) plants following a choice by M of A. ) 
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Applying this insight to EIS1, in the bottom two regions in Tables 3.1 to 3.3 E 
optimally chooses from {GH, GF, G21 (i. e. some form of 'entry') regardless of 
whether M has previously chosen A or one of {X, GI. From the point of view of 
Ms decision, 'entry' (broadly construed) is inevitable: choosing A will result in a 
global duopoly in equilibrium, whereas choosing one of JX, G) will produce a 
global triopoly. Therefore, Ms preference for A in the higher of the bottom two 
regions in Tables 3.1 to 3.3 reflects a substitution of acquisition-FDI for the 
combined greenfield-FDI investments of M and T at the threat-point equilibrium 
as the sunk cost of greenfield-FDI rises. In the top region of Tables 3.1 to 3.3, 
where the equilibrium industrial structure is {A; 0), entry is blockaded: E 
optimally chooses 0 regardless of Ms prior choice. Therefore, the occurrence of 
acquisition-FDI in equilibrium at the top of Tables 3.1 to 3.3 reflects the fact that 
industry profits are maximised under a low marginal cost (i. e. cm) monopolist. 
Finally, we consider the second-from-top region in Tables 3.1 to 3.3, where (in 
general) M chooses from {X, G) in equilibrium. Here the fact that 'entry' is 
&more likely' following A than (X, GI is crucial. In the second-from-top region 
4; entry' is conditional on Ms prior choice: if M chooses A, then E optimally 
chooses from IGH, 
GFG2j; whereas if M chooses from JX, G), then E optimally 
chooses 0. Therefore, regardless of Ms decision, the global industry is always a 
duopoly in equilibrium, and the non-occurrence of acquisition-FDI in 
equilibrium reflects the (generic) fact that industry profits in a Cournot duopoly 
are larger than eitherfirm's profits in a 'similar, Coumot duopoly. 
The non-monotonic relationship in EIS I between (the occurrence of) acquisition- 
FDI and the sunk cost of greenfield-FDI contrasts with the finding of Gilbert and 
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Newbery (1992, Proposition 1 and pp. 138-9) that a rise in the sunk cost of new 
plants will always make a single 'outside' firm 'more likely' to choose 
acquisition ('buying') over de novo entry ('building'). The contrast arises 
because the Gilbert/Newbery model does not allow for subsequent de novo entry 
following a finn's buy/build choice, whereas in our game (see Figure 3.1) firm E 
chooses whether to build plants in the industry at stage three following Ms 
choice between acquisition-FDI, greenfield-FDI and exporting at stage one. 
Because a choice by M of acquisition-FDI (A) rather than greenfield-FDI (G) or 
exporting (X) alters the industry's 'concentration' (i. e. replaces a duopoly with a 
monopoly), E's 'entry incentive' is stronger following acquisition-FDI. In the 
second-from-top region of Tables 3.1 to 3.3 the sunk cost of greenfield-FDI is 
such that E chooses (some form oo 'entry' following acquisition-FDI but 0 
(inactivity) if M selects greenfield-FDI or exporting: there is 'room' for 
additional plants only if E faces a monopoly. Firm M takes E's subsequent best 
responses into account when making its own choice and optimally selects from 
JX, G) in order to deter subsequent rent-dissipating de novo entry. This contrasts 
with Ms choice in the second-from-bottom region of Tables 3.1 to 3.3 where E 
always 'enters' and M chooses acquisition-FDI to economize on the sunk costs of 
geenfield-FDI. 
EIS2 is (like EIS I) rationalised by considering E's decision in stage three. EIS2 
exploits the upward slopes of the (bold) inter-regional boundaries between the 
top three regions in each of Tables 3.1 to 3.3. Because, in each Table, the top two 
inter-regional boundaries are upward-sloping, a rise in 0 from a low level can be 
associated (for an appropriately-selected sunk cost of greenfield-FDI) with a 
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switch in Ms equilibrium choice from A to X, but a rise in 0 from a high level 
can be associated (again, for an appropriately-selected sunk cost of greenfield- 
FDI) with a 're-switch' in Ms equilibrium choice from one of (X, G) back to A. -1 
For example, starting at the point (0.25,6) in Table 3.2, where the equilibrium 
industrial structure is {A; 01, an increase in 0 to 0.5 or 0.75 shifts the 
equilibrium industrial structure to {X-, G; 01; however, a further increase in 0 to 
shifts equilibrium industrial structure to {A; GH1 GF). The intuitive reason why 
the (top two) inter-regional boundaries in Tables 3.1 to 3.3 are upward-sloping is 
that 'entry' by E is 'more likely', the larger is 0 (because the probability of 
access to a marginal production cost of cm via spillovers is higher). Therefore, 
recalling our earlier result that 'entry' is 'more likely' following A than {X, G), 
when increasing 0 from a low level we are moving from a position of blockaded 
to conditional entry: the increase in 0 makes 'entry' following A (but not (X, G)) 
profitable. Moreover, when increasing 0 from a high level we are moving from a 
position of conditional to inevitable entry: the increase in 0 makes 'entry' 
following both A and (X, G) profitable. 
EIS3 and EIS4 report the results of a comparison between Table 3.1, the 
benchmark case, and (respectively) Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. In the absence of 
spillovers we might reasonably expect a rise in cT (relative to cm) to make M 
'more likely' to choose G but T 'less likely'. (For example, Ms gain in net 
revenue from choosing G over X if spillovers are assumed away and E chooses 0 
is R D(CM, cT) -R 
D(Cm + t, cT), which will be increasing in cT under the sort of 
linear Cournot model we are considering here because, although both terms are 
individually increasing in cT, the scale of Ms output - and hence its ability to 
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benefit from industry price rises - is greater in the first term. ) As we discuss in 
the next Section, these are the implications of the OLI paradigm; however, we 
find converse results. Comparing the bottom region of Table 3.1 to that of Table 
3.2, we find M optimally switching from G to X as CT rises - presumably to 
reduce the chance of its (now more valuable) technological lead being dissipated 
via spillovers. (In the second-from-top region in both Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 M 
generally chooses X, thus indicating little effect of a rise in CT on Ms equilibrium 
behaviour. ) On the contrary, if we compare I's optimal behaviour in the second- 
from-top regions of Tables 3.1 and 3.2, we find T optimally switching from X to 
as CT rises: Ms greater technological lead makes technology-sourcing 
greenfield-FDI more worthwhile when CT rises. (In the bottom regions of both 
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 T always chooses G, so the rise in CT has no effect on 7s 
equilibrium behaviour. ) 
if t rises (comparing Table 3.3 to Table 3.1), we find (a) both M and T 'more 
likely' to choose G over X in the second-from-top region, and (b) E 'more likely' 
to choose G2 over GH or GF in the second-from-bottom region. These effects, 
which all boil down to a strengthened preference for two plants over one when t 
rises, can be rationalised in terms of greenfield-FDI's ability to 'jump' the trade 
cost. Finally, we find in EIS3 and EIS4 that increases in CT and t both tend to 
push the four regions identified in each Table downwards. These effects share a 
common cause: rises inCTand t both make 'entry' less profitable, so the spaces 
where entry is 'blockaded', 'conditional' and 'inevitable' (as defined above) all 
shift downwards in (0, G)-space. A rise inCThas relatively little effect for large 0 
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(and no discernable effect at 0= 1) because the 'more likely' is E to receive Ms 
technology via spillovers, the less relevant is CT for market equilibria. 
3.4. Discussion. 
in this Section I want to discuss some of the broader features and implications of 
our analysis. First, I shall consider some aspects of the spillover process (the 0- 
parameter); and second, I shall draw out some of the implications of our results 
for the sources of foreign-owned firms' 'productivity advantages'. 
In our model 0, the 'probability of spillovers', is exogenous. We identify three 
factors that might be expected (partially) to determine 0 in reality. 28 First, the 
degree of standardization (homogeneity) of products between foreign and local 
firms will be important: the 'more similar' are the products offered on the market 
by the two groups of firms, the 'more applicable' (useful) to their production 
processes will any spillovers received by local firms be. (Note that this point is 
independent of the direction in which spillovers are assumed to flow, and it could 
alternatively be stated as: 'absorptive capacity' is a decreasing function of the 
tspace' between products. ) Second, to the extent that finns' 'productivity 
advantages' are embodied in their workers (via, e. g., on-the-job training), the 
level (or probability) of spillovers will increase in the degree of (intra-industry) 
worker mobility. Third, government policy can play a role in determining the 
probability of spillovers. Increases in the degree of 'patent protection' offered in 
law to new products would be expected (ceteris paribus) to reduce the probability 
of spillovers. (More precisely, spillovers might still occur - e. g. via 
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'demonstration effects' and reverse engineering - but the knowledge so gained 
could not lawfully be applied to the production process by the receiving finns. ) 
Altematively, government policy can attempt to raise the probability of 
spillovers: for example, by building 'business parks, where domestic and foreign 
finns are induced (by high-quality infrastructure) to locate side-by-side. If such a 
policy is successful, the probability of spillovers should rise (however, the UK 
evidence is not encouraging: see, e. g., Driffield, 2001). 
Given the three mechanisms described above that affect 0 (product 
differentiation, worker mobility, government policy), an interesting question (for 
extended work) is: How might the firms in our model use strategic behaviour to 
determine 0 endogenously? After all, it seems reasonable to expect that the 
technological leader (firm M will have a strong incentive (in an extended game 
with endogenous 0) to attempt to minimize 0, whereas firms T and E will have 
the converse incentive. From firm Ms perspective the following strategies may 
prove attractive: maximal (or, at least, increased) product differentiation; wage 
premia to prevent trained workers moving to local rivals (see Fosfuri, Motta and 
Ronde, 2001, for a neat analysis of this phenomenon); lobbying to strengthen 
4patent protection'; and the - choice of relatively (geographically) isolated 
locations for production plants, rather than locating in 'business parks i. 29 
We turn now to consider our model's implications for the sources of foreign- 
owned firms' 'productivity advantages'. Before doing so, I want briefly to set out 
a reference point: Dunning's (1977) OLI (ownership-location-intemalisation) 
paradigm. (Recent restatements of the OLI paradigm are given by Markusen, 
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1995,1998. ) The OLI paradigm starts from the assumption that an MNE 
establishing a production plant abroad via FDI incurs costs of co-ordinating 
business activities across national and cultural boundaries which are not incurred 
by local firms in the host country. Given this, the OLI paradigm identifies three 
conditions for FDI to occur, which taken together are necessary and sufficient: 
(a) the potential MNE must possess an 'ownership advantage' relative to its host- 
country rivals (e. g. a highly productive, proprietary process technology), the '0'; 
(b) the foreign country must possess a 'location advantage' relative to others (e. g. 
low factor prices), the V; and (c) FDI must possess an 'intemalisation 
advantage' relative to licensing (e. g. because opportunistic use of blueprints by 
the licensee cannot be contracted against), the T. In the context of our analysis 
of 'productivity advantages', the key element in the OLI paradigm is the 
necessity of 'ownership advantages' for multinational operations (a 'productivity 
advantage' is the only possible 'ownership advantage' in our model). It follows 
that, according to the OLI paradigm, the observed 'productivity advantages' of 
foreign-owned MNEs are embodied in their FDI inflows: either a (relatively) 
highly productive new plant is established via greenfield-FDI, or the technology 
in a pre-existing plant is upgraded (intra-firm technology transfer) following 
acquisition-M. (It is interesting to consider why the OLI paradigm predicts that 
MNEs require 'ownership advantages'. one possible explanation is that 
underlying OLI analysis is an implicit assumption that product markets are 
monopolistically competitive, so the 'representative' local firm in the foreign 
market earns only normal profits in long-run equilibrium. Given the cost 
disadvantage of operating internationally, MNEs would then require some 
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offsetting 'ownership advantage' - relative to the 'representative' local firm - to 
break even. 
30) 
We now compare the relationships of equilibrium national 'productivity 
distributions' to FDI inflows and outflows in our model to those predicted by the 
OLI paradigm (as reconstructed above). In Tables 3.1 to 3.3 we see that the role 
played by FDI inflows in shaping the equilibrium 'productivity distribution' in 
country F generally conforms to the OLI predictions. For example, in the 
equilibrium industrial structures of {G; G; G21 (all three Tables), (G; G; 0) 
(Tables 3.2 and 3.3) and {G; X; 0) (Tables 3.2 and 3--3), finn Ms inflow of 
greenfield-FDI into F directly adds a relatively productive new plant to F and 
indirectly raises the productivity of other plants in F via the probability of 
spillovers. Furthermore, in the equilibrium industrial structures of {A; 0), {A; 
GH1 GF) and (A; 
G21 (all three Tables), firm Ms inflow of acquisition-FDI into 
F directly raises the productivity of the acquired (T-) plant (intra-firm technology 
transfer) and - in (A; GF) and (A; G2) - indirectly raises the productivity of the 
E-plant in F via the probability of spillovers. 
However, there are three noticeable features of our model's equilibrium 
industrial structures that do not conform to the OLI predictions. First, in several 
equilibrium industrial structures (e. g. fG; G; G21, {X; G; 0), fG; G; 0) and (X-, 
G; G21) firm T undertakes greenfield-FDI in country H. This occurs despite "s 
`ownership disadvantage' (i. e. technology CT is 'less productive' than technology 
cm). The reason why 'ownership advantages' are unnecessary for greenfield-FDI 
in our model is that the scale of potential entry is limited, so the 'representative 
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firrn' can earn supernormal profits in equilibrium (there is also the important 
integer constraint on the number of firms). This is a replication of Fosfuri and 
Motta's (1999) 'multinationals without advantages' result. Indeed, stronger anti- 
OLI evidence in the same vein is provided in proposition EIS3 in the previous 
Section: if cy. rises relative to cm (i. e. Ms 'ownership advantage' becomes 
greater), then M becomes 'less likely' to undertake greenfield-FDI but T 'more 
likely'. This result runs directly counter to the OLI predictions, and (as discussed 
in the previous Section) it is explained by Ms greater reluctance to risk losing its 
technological lead through spillovers when that lead lengthens. 
The second equilibrium feature of our model that fails to conform to OLI 
predictions concerns acquisition-FD1. Although we set the model up by assuming 
that firm M is the potential acquirer, the decision rule for acquisition-FDI in (14) 
carries directly over to cases where the sequence of moves is modified so that (a) 
firm T is labelled the potential acquirer or (b) firms M and T are considered to 
merge. 3 1 This is so because the decision rule is co-operative (i. e. the decision 
depends only on the sum of 'disagreement profits') and because the 
characteristics of the integrated firm are independent of the identity of the 
purchaser. Therefore, unless we assume a purchaser (as in our model), the 
direction (internationally) of acquisition-FDI flow in equilibrium in our 
modelling structure is indeterminate. It follows that whenever incentives for 
'technology-injecting' acquisition-FDI exist in our model (i. e. the purchase of T 
by M, identical incentives for 'cherry-picking' acquisition-FDI (i. e. the purchase 
of M by 7) will also exist. Therefore, our model gives no support to the OLI 
prediction that the purchaser in an acquisition-FDI transaction will be the 
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technological leader: indeed, there is no reason to suppose anything a priori 
about the relative technological strengths of acquirer and target. 
The third aspect of our model that fails to conform to OLI predictions concerns 
its distinction between greenfield- and acquisition-FDI (the two forms of FDI are 
conflated in the OLI paradigm). Because of the limited scope for potential entry 
in our model, we found that Ms choice between A (acquisition-FDI) and (X, G) 
(exporting or greenfield-FDI) frequently (i. e. for 'large' sets of parameter values) 
mattered for the equilibrium number of firms. Indeed, we used this feature of our 
model in explaining its 'pattern' of equilibrium industrial structures (see 
proposition EISI and the commentary on it in the previous Section). This 
suggests that more attention should perhaps be given to the distinction between 
greenfield- and acquisition-FDI (in shaping equilibrium industrial structures in 
industries without perfectly free entry or where integer constraints are important) 
than is afforded it in the OLI paradigm. 
3.5. Concluding Comments. 
in this chapter we have developed an equilibrium model of the relationship of 
FDI inflows and outflows to the national 'productivity distribution' across rival 
plants within an industry. We allowed for 'technology transfer' between plants in 
two fonns: inter-firm, which represents 'spillovers'; and intra-firm, which 
reflects the 'public good' characteristic of technology within the firm. One of our 
key aims was to shed fresh (theoretical) light on the sources of foreign-owned 
firms' widely-documented 'productivity advantages'. Some of our principal 
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findings in the comparative-statics analysis of equilibrium industrial structures in 
Section 3.3 were 
* Acquisition-FDI arises in equilibrium for two distinct sets of parameter 
values, medium-sized and very large sunk costs of greenfield-FDI; 
between them (i. e. large greenfield-FDI sunk costs) and for small 
greenfield-FDI sunk costs, firms optimally choose between exporting and 
greenfield-FDI in order to serve foreign product markets. The consequent 
gre-switching' between greenfield- and acquisition-FDI that occurs as the 
sunk cost of greenfield-FDI rises is a typical feature of our model. 
e Rises in the trade cost make the occurrence of greenfield-FDI (rather than 
exporting) in equilibrium 'more likely' in regions where acquisition-FD1 
does not occur. This is analogous to the 'tariff-jumping' greenfield-FDI 
observed in other models. 
Rises in the technological lead of an incumbent firm make that firm 'less 
likely' to undertake greenfield-FDI in equilibrium (because its 
technological lead could consequently be dissipated via localized 
spillovers in the host country), but they make foreign technological 
laggards 'more likely' to undertake ('technology-sourcing') greenfield- 
FDI in the leader's home country. 
The third property above contradicts the prediction of the popular OLI 
(ownership-location-intemalisation) paradigm that the possession of 'ownership 
advantages' (highly productive, firm-specific assets) is necessary for (greenfield- 
)FDI. In addition, we found that the incentives for 'technology-injecting' 
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acquisition-FDI (leader purchases laggard) are identical to those for 'cherry- 
picking' acquisition-FDI (laggard purchases leader), so the view that foreign 
MNEs' 'Productivity advantages' are necessarily embodied in acquisition-FDI 
inflows is without theoretical support. There is some empirical support for this 
view. For example, Conyon, Girma, Thompson and Wright (2002) found that, 
over the period 1989 - 1994, UK firms acquired by foreign MNEs exhibited an 
increase in labour productivity of 13% (ceteris paribus). This contrasts with a 
(labour) 'productivity advantage' for foreign-owned firms in their dataset of 
nearly 30% over domestic firms (at the industry level), which suggests that, as 
well as raising the labour productivity of the plants they acquire, foreign N1NEs 
choose to purchase plants with above-average productivity. 
Our analysis leaves open a number of avenues for future research. Two seem 
immediately relevant to the types of questions we have been asking. First, inter- 
industry spillovers (i. e. 'vertical' spillovers to up- and downstream industries) 
could be modelled (our game contains only 'horizontal' or intra-industry 
spillovers). For example, a foreign MNE might demonstrate to indigenous firms 
in an upstream (input-supplying) industry better production techniques; indeed, 
to do so may well be in the MNE's private interest. Recent empirical work 
(Smarzynska, 2003) finds more support for 'backward' vertical spillovers than 
for horizontal spillovers. Second, we could consider some of the possible 
dynamic effects of FDI flows on national 'productivity distributions'. For 
example, inward FDI could - by increasing 'competition' (i. e. allowing the 
newly-created MNE to supply the host-country product market at a lower 
marginal cost) - promote skill and technology 'upgrading' within domestic firms 
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over time (e. g. increased training of workers and extra spending on R&D). It 
could also lead to the 'weeding out' (exit) of (technologically) inefficient 
domestic firms. These two topics (inter-industry and dynamic effects) will fon-n 
the basis of future work. 
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3.6. Endnotes. 
1 Assume, first, that firms make no purchases of intermediate goods, so all gross 
output is value added (the acquisition price is the profits of the integrated firm 
that accrue to the owners of the target firm, and the sunk cost of greenfield-FDI 
is rent for the 'field'); second, that average variable cost is constant (= marginal 
production cost); and third, that firms are price-takers in factor markets and 
operate with a constant ratio of labour to (variable) capital. Then, if the two 
variable factors of production are labour (L) and capital (K), the marginal 
production cost is L. (w + r-KIL)IQ, where (-) is constant by assumption. Both 
labour productivity (QIL) and capital productivity (QIK) , are 
inversely 
proportional to the marginal production cost. 
2 We adopt Coumot competition, rather than Bertrand, as the solution concept 
because it allows variations in marginal costs (labour productivities) across 
active firms in equilibrium: a key aspect of our analysis. 
3 To further illustrate this point, assume that three rival firms compete to serve a 
host-country product market (either via local production or via international 
trade) and that one is a clear technological leader over the other two, who both 
share the same inferior technology. This is the basic modelling structure of the 
current paper: assuming uni-dimensional technologies and imposing a simple 
pattern of technological leadership both restrict the number of possible inter-firm 
spillover flows. However, significant modelling complications remain. For 
example, if the spillover process is deterministic (e. g. a given share of the 
leader's marginal-cost advantage automatically spills over to the laggards), then 
the laggards' equilibrium marginal costs will vary continuously with the 
spillover-share parameter if they produce locally, and the number of active firms 
in market equilibrium will also potentially depend on the spillover-share 
parameter. Therefore, the analysis of the game's market stage becomes very 
burdensome (especially if one fin-n chooses to serve the market by international 
trade and a trade cost enters its marginal cost). Although expected marginal 
production costs are the same 
in our modelling of spillovers and the just- 
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described deterministic case, the expected profit functions differ because profits 
depend on squared marginal costs (Jensen's Inequality). If the spillover process 
is random (as in our model) but 0 is defined as Prob {technology flows between 
the leader and a given laggard), then if all three firms produce locally Prob(a 
given laggard receives a spillover) = 0+(1-0). 0. Because expected profits 
depend on intersections of events, e. g. Prob{both laggards receive spillovers), 
the expected profit functions would contain high-powered terms in 0 (making 
analytical manipulation difficult). The two examples above illustrate the 
difficulties in building deterministic spillovers and spillover flows between 
specific pairs of rival plants into even a relatively simple triopoly model. 
4 Complementary slackness means that at most one of (2), (3) can be slack. 
Given the market demand curve in (1), the second-order condition is o'27rilaq? =- 
2<0, which ensures that 7ri is globally strictly concave in qj. 
5 Lemma 1 proves that if firm M is active in Coumot equilibrium, then firms 1,2, 
..., 
M-I will also be active. However, it is not immediately clear that (11) 
1+ J-1 
holding is incompatible with cj > 
Ci for some jE (1,2, ..., M- 1), 
where the RHS is the equilibrium market price with only firms 1,2, j 
I+ j-1 
active. If ci > 
c' for some i<M, then 1+c, < cj (11) requires 
J-1 M-1 
m-c, <l+Zc-+j]cj, a sufficient condition for which to fail is 
m. c, f >max(RHS) 
(where max(RHS) is the maximum possible value that 
j-1 M-1 j-1 
I+zCi+zCI can assume). Using I+Eci<j. cj, we get 
IiI 
max JRHS) cj -6+ (M - j) - cm where e is strictly positive but arbitrarily 
small. Therefore, the sufficient condition M -cAf >max JRHSJ becomes 
6 (c, - c. 
), which holds because cm ýt cj so RHS :50 but LHS > 0. 
290 
i Therefore, 
if (11) holds, then >- cj for allj <M and the equilibrium M 
from (11), (12) is unique. 
To make the preceding algebra a little less abstract, assume a three-firin world 
(as in the current paper) with C3 
ýý: C2 ýý C1 ": ý 01 If c2 > (1 + c, )/2 , then firms 2,3 
will be inactive in equilibrium. To see that it is impossible to have I+q<2- c2 
(i. e. c2>(1+c, )/2) and 3-c3 : 
ý1+c, +c2 (i. e. c3 ::! ý 
(1 + c, + c2)/3), note that 
max 11 + c, + c2j=3-c2-e and 3. c3>3. c2- c because c3 
ý: c2. 
6 Net revenue is sometimes called 'variable profit'. 
7 Consider a world comprising two identical countries and a monopolistic firm in 
a given market who has a pre-existing plant in one country and is contemplating 
undertaking greenfield-FDI to establish a second plant abroad. Let RAO denote 
the monopolist's net revenues (variable profits) in either national product market 
given a marginal production cost of c, and let t be the trade cost. Then the 
monopolist's global net revenues from exporting are NRx = Rm(c) + RU(c + t), 
and its global net revenues following greenfield-FDI are NRG = 2. RY(c). Clearly, 
NRx,, -, NRG < 2. NRx if 0< Rm(c + t) < Rm(c) (as is conventionally assumed) 
because (intuitively) the foreign product market is served under both exporting 
and greenfield-FDI 
8 With very large t (16) becomes 0(1 - 0). [R 
D(CT, cm) - RD(CM2 CM)] > 0. [. 3 .: ý 0 
becauseC T ýý" cm and &(I - 0) -2: 0, which together imply that the strict inequality 
can never hold. 
9 Whereas dERE(A; GH)1dO-"O is constant, dERE(A; G2)IdO = 4-(1 - 
0). [RD(cxf, cm) 
-R 
D(CT, CM)] >0 tends to 0 as 0 tends to 1. 
10 dERE(A; Glj)ldcT = (I - 6). d[R 
D(CT2 
cm) +RD (CT + t, cm)]IdCT <0 for 0E [0,1), 
and the shift is larger, the smaller is 0. Because dERE(A; G2)ldcT = 2-(1 - 
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6)2. dRD(CT, cm)1dcT< 03, the direction of shift in ERE(A; G2)- ERE(A; Gll) is given 
by sgn[(l - 2-6). dRD(CT, cm)ldcT - dR 
D (cT + t) cm)ldcT], where sgn[. ] =- implies 
that a rise inCTshifts the lower inter-regional boundary in Figure 2 downwards. 
is linear in 0, and [-] < (resp. >) 0 at 0=0 (resp. 1). Note, however, that 
_dRD(CT + tq cm)IdCT >0 at 
0=0.5, so 0 << 0.5 is necessary for 'low U. 
11 For 0, ý-, 0 ERAA; G2) - ERE(A; GH) shifts downwards when cm falls because 
dRD(CT, CM)IdCM. - '. dRD 
(CT + t, cm)ldcm. For 0 szý 1 ERE(A; G2) - ERE(A; GH) shifts 
upwards when cm falls because 
dRD(Cm + t, cm)ldcm > dRD(CM, cm)ldcu. Both 
inequalities can be verified straightforwardly. 
12 In a strict, but rather limited, sense this may not be true. Under (B) we are able 
to place certain a priori restrictions on E's choice between Gil and GF (see the 
Appendix), which may not hold if (B) is abandoned. The necessary-and- 
sufficient condition on E's best responses {G; G), (17), is certainly independent 
of (B) because the two countries are identical at the point of entry irrespective of 
the marginal cost variables. However, in the other cases the necessary-and- 
sufficient condition may need to be expanded to take the fon-n of (19). For 
example, it seems sensible to conjecture that E has GF strictly preferred to GII 
for small 0 in response to {X; X) if t is very large: given the low probability of 
receiving spillovers, E would rather produce in the protected F-market than face 
competition from M in H. 
" Note, of course, that M and E can only 'meet' in two markets if M chooses A 
or G: conditions (16), (17) and (18). With very large t, (17) and (18) become 00 
- 
0). [RT(cT, 2-cm) - RT(cm, 2-cm)] >0 and 
6L(1 
- 0. [R 
D(CT, 
cm) -R 
D(Cm 
CM), > 0, 
both of which fail. If M chooses X, then conditions (19) and (20) apply to E's 
best responses. With very large t, (19) becomes O-RT(cm, 2-cm) + (I - 
0). RT(cT, cAf 
+ cT) > OLR D(Cm CM) + (I _ 6). R 
D(CT, 
cT) if max (. I = ERE(X; G; Gil) and 2-(1 - 
O-R D(CT, cT) + 2-6L(l - O-R 
D(CT, 
CM) +2.0 .2R 
D(CM, 
CU)] > O[RT(Cm, 2-cm) + 
R D(CH, CU)] + (I - 
6). [RT(cT, cm + cT) +R D(CT, Cm if Maxn = ERE(X-, G; GF). 
The former condition fails, but the latter certainly holds near its end-points, i. e. 0 
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0, l. The intuition is that if E chooses two plants rather than one in response to 
{X; X}, then E risks passing spillovers (indirectly) from M to T. With very large 
t, (20) becomes 2-OR 
D(CM, 
cu) + 2-(1 - 6). R 
D(CT' 
CM) : ý. (I - 0). [R 
D(CTP 
CM) + 
R D(CT9 CM + 0(l - 0)-[R 
D(CM" 
cm) +R 
D(CM9 
CTA +2- 02 -R 
D(CM9 
cm), which fails. 
The reason for the appearance in the inequalities reported above of R 
D(., 
. ), which 
is absent from all the expected profit functions, is that very large t is 
incompatible with assumption (B) (which was invoked when writing down the 
E's expected profit functions in the Appendix). 
14 Note that in both (S I) and (S2) the intervals of O-values where E chooses GF 
are very small: in (Sl) GF is optimally chosen in the one-plant region following 
JX; GI for 0 c= [0,0.039) and for 0 c: (0.961,1]; and in (S2) the corresponding 
intervals are even smaller, [0,0.014) and (0.986,1]. 
15 A brief explanation of the role of assumption (B) (that all firms in the industry 
serve both national product markets in Cournot equilibrium) in deriving (2 1) is in 
order. Assumption (B) is invoked when deriving (21) in the Appendix, although 
we do not investigate formally whether this is necessary. (Our use of assumption 
(B) takes the form of assuming that a firm's net revenue in Cournot equilibrium 
depends on the sum of rivals' marginal costs but not on their distribution. ) 
Furthermore, note that some cm, cT, t in (B) violate (21): for example, (21) fails 
for 'most' 0 (except the extremes) when cxf = 0, CT : -- 0.03, t=0.3, values 
compatible with (B). Likewise, we invoke (B) when deriving the necessary-and- 
sufficient conditions that underlie Figure 3.4. 
On the contrary, note that (B) is not invoked when deriving (16) - (20). 
However, some cm, cT, t in (B) do violate (16) - (21): for example, (17) fails for 
c mo st, 0 (except the extremes) when cm = 0, CT = 0.03, t=0.3. 
16 If CT = CM, then it is straightforward to show that EREM G; G2) - ERE(X, G; 
GH) = ERE(X; X; G2) - ERE(X; X; GH) at 0=1. Therefore, if CT = CM, region D in 
Figure 4 would be absorbed into region F, and region E in Figure 3.4 would exist 
for all 0 
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17 in the {G; G), {G; X) and {X; G) cases (where the first element indicates Ms 
choice and the second T's) it is immediately obvious that additional entry by E 
(i. e. changing E's choice from 0 to GH or GF, and from GH or GF to G2) reduces 
. 
rs expected profits. This is because adding an extra E-plant makes Ea tougher 
competitor in at least one market (by eliminating the trade cost from E's 
marginal cost and perhaps increasing E's probability of receiving spillovers) but 
leaves T's probability of receiving spillovers unchanged. However, in the {X, X) 
case comparisons are more complicated because by switching from G11 or GF to 
G2, E increases I's probability of receiving spillovers, from 0 to 02 . Therefore, 
we might have ERI(X; X; G2) > ER7(X, X; GH); in fact, it is straightforward to 
show that this holds for sufficiently large 0 iff RT(cm, 2-cm + t) + RT(cm + t, 2-cm) 
> RT(cT, 2-cm + 2-t) + RT(CT + t, 2-cm) (which ensures ERI(X; X; G2) > ER7(x; X; 
GH) at 0=1; the inequality cannot hold at 0= 0), which is satisfied in (S 1), (S2), 
(S3). 
18 Of course, the opposite effects occur if we move in the opposite directions. 
19 For example, because T optimally chooses X throughout region A of Figure 
3.3, one such necessary-and-sufficient condition would be ERE(G; X. G> 
ERI(G; G; 0) - ERI(G; X; 0) for all 0, where the LHS is the lower boundary of 
region A and the RHS is I's gain in expected net revenues from undertaking 
greenfield-FDI in A, i. e. the G* in A. Furthermore, because T optimally chooses 
G throughout region D in Figure 3.3, another necessary-and-sufficient condition 
underlying Figure 3.5 would be ER7(G; G; GH) - ER7(G; X; G2) > ERE(G; X; G2) 
- ERE(G; X; 
GII) for all 0 (which simplifies to ERE(G; X; GH) > ERAG; X; G2) 
for all 0 because ERAG; G; GH) =- ERE(G; X; G2), and always holds), where the 
LHS is the G* in region D and the RHS is the upper boundary of region D. 
Therefore, we could state five necessary-and-sufficient conditions, one relating 
to each region in Figure 3.3. (Note, however, that the condition relating to region 
E would be trivial because G* =- upper boundary in E. ) 
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We should finally note, although it will not affect our subsequent analysis, that 
the implicit necessary-and-sufficient condition underlying region B of Figure 3.5 
is violated in (S 1) and (S2) for O; zý 1 (0 > 0.975 in (S 1) and 0>0.988 in (S2)), 
where T optimally chooses X for some G near the A/B inter-regional boundary. 
20 Likewise, G* is higher for region B in Figure 3.3 than for region C, where one- 
plant entry occurs regardless of 7s choice. This ranking of G* is necessary (but 
insufficient) for the optimal choices by T depicted in regions B and C of Figure 
3.5. 
21 The derivation would follow the principles used in end-note 19 above. Note 
that T optimally chooses X throughout region A of Figure 3.4 and G throughout 
regions B, D, E and F of Figure 3.4. By comparing the relevant boundary of each 
of those five regions to the region's G*, we can derive a necessary-and-sufficient 
condition for T to make the desired choice in that region of Figure 3.6. (Note also 
- as in end-note 19 - that the 
derived necessary-and-sufficient conditions can 
sometimes be usefully simplified. For example, EREM G; G2) - ERE(Xt G; GF) 
== ERI(X; G; G2) - ER7(X; X, G2), where the LHS is always (weakly) above the 
upper boundary of region F in Figure 3.4 and the RHS is T*s gain in expected net 
revenue from undertaking greenfield-FDI in that region (the G*). Therefore, we 
are guaranteed that T will optimally choose G in region F of Figure 3.4. From 
this it follows that T optimally chooses G in region D of Figure 3.4 because the 
rightwards; movement from cell D to cell F in the key to Figure 3.4 is associated 
with a weakening of I's incentive to undertake (technology-sourcing) greenfield- 
FDI; see cnd-note 17. ) 
It is more difficult to derive a necessary-and-sufficient condition to apply to 
region C of Figure 3.4, where Y's optimal choice changes from G to X as the 
sunk cost of greenfield-FDI rises. A possible approach would be to restrict 
ERI(X; G; GH) - ERI(X; X; GH), which measures I's incentive to undertake 
greenfield-FDI in region C of Figure 3.4, to lying strictly below region C at 0=0 
but strictly within region C at 0=1. However, we do not propose to explore this 
issue any further in the present chapter. 
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22 However, E's optimal number of plants is decreasing in the sunk cost of 
greenfield-FDI, thus reflecting the aggregate (T plus E) pattern. 
23 For convenience we scale the sunk costs of greenfield-FDI upwards by a factor 
of 100 when reporting our results. 
24 When listing properties of the industrial structures where the acquisition price 
is determined, we adopt the organising principle of considering how a change in 
the environment affects the number of plants T and E, taken together, optimally 
choose to build. This organising principle is useful because it collapses T and E's 
decisions into one another, thus allowing us to focus on aggregate effects. 
Although the AP propositions (and the EIS propositions later) are framed in 
dynamic terms (e. g. 'if X rises, then Y will happen'), this is merely a convenient 
shorthand. Strictly, we are performing comparative-statics exercises on a one- 
shot game, and so we are comparing alternative equilibria rather than changes in 
an equilibrium over time. 
25 For illustrative purposes, assume that M and E choose X and 0 respectively. If 
0=1, then the gain in expected net revenue to T from choosing G over X is 
approximately R 
D(CM, 
cm + t) +R 
D(CM, 
CM) _ [RD(CT, cm+ t) +RD (CT + ts CM)b 
which is clearly increasing in cT. This reflects a strong technology-sourcing 
motive for greenfield-FDI. 
However, if 0 =- 0, then I's gain is approximately 
R D(CT' cm) -RD (CT + t, cm), which 
is decreasing in CT because 7s output base in 
the former term is larger. This reflects the straightforward effect of a higher 
marginal cost on profits. 
26 A noteworthy point, consistent with these observations, is that the rise in t may 
sometimes alter the composition of a given number of subsequently-built plants. 
For example, (X; GH) sometimes switches to (G; 0), and in both cases one new 
plant is built by T and 
E, taken together. 
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27 In Table 3.2 the (G; X-, 01 cell at (0,2) should be considered part of the 
second (X, G) region. 
28 For a much more detailed discussion of the issues briefly considered here, see 
Blomstr6m and Kokko (1998). 
29 The discussion here is intended to be suggestive rather than conclusive. For 
example, it is well known (see, e. g., d'Aspremont, Jaskold Gabszewicz and 
Thisse, 1979) that there are formidable analytical difficulties in endogenising the 
location choices of rival duopolists on the Hotelling line (when consumer 
transport costs are linear in distance). Therefore, we do not propose that a 
technological leader would choose maximal product differentiation in 
equilibrium, but rather that - ceteris paribus -a technological leader may 
reasonably be expected to have an incentive to differentiate its good more in 
order to reduce the probability of spillovers. 
30 Although monopolistic competition is rarely (if ever) explicitly mentioned in 
OLI analysis, it is consistent with OLI's emphasis on normal profits 
(necessitating 'ownership advantages) and product differentiation (as a source of 
cownership advantages'). Furthermore, formalizations of the OLI paradigm (e. g. 
Helpman, 1984; Ethier, 1986; Markusen and Venables, 1999) have tended to 
assume monopolistically competitive market structures. (Monopolistic 
competition also seems intuitively consistent with OLI's downplaying of the 
distinction between greenfield- and acquisition-FDI: for example, if firms are 
symmetric, then long-run free entry makes the buy/build choice irrelevant to 
equilibrium market structure. 
) 
31 For example, in case (a), stage zero of the game would be firm, T making a 
(take-it-or-leave-it) takeover to M. If the offer is accepted, we would move down 
the RHS of the game tree in Figure 3.1 to E's decision. If the offer is rejected, 
firm Mwould choose betweenXand G and we would move down the LHS of the 
game tree. 
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0 3.7. Appendix. 
Under the following four headings we present E's expected profit functions (if M does 
not choose A) under assumption (B) (i. e. that all firms serve both national product 
markets in Cournot equilibrium). We also derive some of the basic properties of E's 
best responses. In Section 3.7.5 we construct Figure 3.3, and in Section 3.7.6 we 
construct Figure 3.4. 
3.7.1. E's expected proffis under JG; G). 
E7rE (G; G; 0) =0 
EgE (G; G; Gu) = EirE (G; G; Gj, ) =0- 
[RT (c., 2- cm) + R" (cm + t, 2-c, )] 
0). 
[R" (clr, 2-c. ) 
+(1-0)1. 
RT (c., c. + c, ) 
1 +R T 
(CT 
+t, 2 . CM)i 
[+R 
T (CT +t, cm +CT)i 
E; rE(G; G; G2)=2- 
[, 
_(1_0)2 
IRT 
(cm, 2-cm)+2 . (1_0)2 - 
RT (cT, cm +CT)-2-G 
In EnE(G; G; GH) and EnE(G; G; GF) the terms in 0 reflect (successively) market 
equilibria if spillovers occur 
in the country where E locates; if spillovers, occur in the 
country where E does not 
locate but not in E's chosen country; and if spillovers occur 
in neither country. (In the middle case T, who owns two plants, benefits from 
spillovers but E does not. 
) E7rE(G; G; GH) = EnE(G; G; GF) (and hence E is indifferent 
between GH and GFin response to [G; G)) because the two countries are identical at 
the start of stage three, both containing an M-plant and a T-plant. In EnE(G; G; G2) 1 
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_ (1 _ 0)2 is the probability that spillovers occur somewhere; because T and E both 
own two plants, both will receive spillovers that occur anywhere. 
iff 
2-ERE(G; G; GH) > ERE(G; G; G, ), ) 
then E's best responses to (G; GI in (0, G)-space can easily be shown to fall into 
three distinct regions, which are ordered identically to those in Figure 3.2. 
Analogously to Figure 3.2, the inter-regional boundaries are ERE(G; G; GH) (upper) 
and ERE(G; G; G2) - ERE(G; G; GH) (lower). ERE(G; G; GH) is increasing and strictly 
convex in 0, and ERE(G; G; G2) - ERE(G; G; GH) is hump-shaped (i. e. strictly 
concave with an interior maximum) becaue ERE(G; G; G2) is increasing but strictly 
concave in 0 and flat at 0=1. 
3.7.2. Els expected proffis under JG; X). 
E)rE(G; X; O)=O 
E'TE(G; X; GH)= o2. 
RT (ctf, 2-c. + t) 
+0. (1-0). 
RT (Cf , Cf + CT + t) I+R 
T (c,, 
f + t, 2-c, )] 
I+R 
T (CM +t, c,, +C, 
) 
I 
+0. (, -0). 
RT (cT, 2-cm +t) 
+(i-o)'. 
RT (C', CM + CT + t) 
G 
I+R 
T (cT+ 
t, 2-c, )] 
[+R 
T (c, + t, C', + C, )l 
ExE (G; X; G, ) =0-RT 
(c 2-c. ) 
+(1_0). 
[R T (CT 
, cm 
+ CT ) 
)]-G 
[+R 
T (cm + t, 2- cm + t)] +R 
T (cl. +t, cm +C, +t 
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E; rE (G; X; G, ) = 0. 
[RT(cm, 2-cm+t)-_, 
0. (l_0). 
RT (C, c + CT + t) 
+R 
T (c., 2-c, )_ 
[ 
+R 
T (cm, cm + CT)] 
0)2. 
RT (CT 
3 cm + CT + t)- 
-2- 
[ 
+R 
T (CT, 
cm + CT 
). 
In EnE(G; X; GH) the terms in 0 reflect (successively) market equilibria if spillovers 
occur in both countries; if spillovers occur in H but not in R, if spillovers occur in F 
but not in H; and if spillovers occur in neither country. E7cE(G; X-, GF) is 
straightforward to interpret because only spillovers in F matter for market equilibria. 
In EnE(G; X; G2) the terms in 0 reflect (successively) market equilibria if spillovers 
occur in F; if spillovers occur in H but not in F; and if spillovers occur in neither 
country. An important simplification is provided by the fact that ETcE(G; X; GH) > 
EnE(G; X; GF) for all ObecauseCT ýý' CMwhich implies that GHis strictly preferred to 
GF-1 
Iff 
2-ERE(G; X; GH)>ERE(G; X; G2)9 
then E's best responses to {G; X} in (0, G)-space can easily be shown to fall into three 
distinct regions, which are ordered identically to those in Figure 3.2. Analogously to 
Figure 3.2, the inter-regional boundaries are ERE(G; X, GH) (upper) and ERE(G; X; 
G2)- ERE(G; X; GH) (lower). Both ERE(G; X; GH) and ERE(G; X, G2) - ERE(G; X-, 
GH) are strictly concave in 0, and ERE(G; X; G2) - ERE(G; X; GH) has an interior 
maximum. (The curvature of ERE(G; X; GH) is proved in end-note I to this Appendix, 
and that of ERE(G; X; ý 
G2) - ERE(G; X; GH) is proved indirectly during the 
construction of Figure 3.3 (see section 3.7.5): because ERE(G; X-, G2) - ERE(G; X; GH) 
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= VD 
. L:, 1%E(G; G; 
G2) 
- ERE(G; G; GH) at 0=0,1 and ERE(G; X; 
G2) 
- ERE(G; X; GH) 
ERE(G; G; G2) - ERE(G; G; GH) on 0E (0,1) (both proved below), and because 
FETIRVE(G; G; G2) - ERE(G; G; GH) is strictly concave in 0 with an interior maximum, 
ERE(G; X; G2) - ERE(G; X; GH) must have the same shape as ERE(G; G; G2) - ERE(G; 
G; GH). ) 
3.7.3. Els expected profits under JX-, G). 
EirE (X; G; 0) =0 
Eir (X; G; Gq) = 0. 
[R T (c., 2-c. ) 
+(1-0). 
RT (CT, cm +CT) 
E 
+R 
T (c + t, 2-c. + t)] 
[+R 
T (cr +t, cm +CT +t 
E7rE(X; G; GF)=(I-O)- 
RT (CIICII +CT+t) 
+0. (1-0). 
RT (cT, 2-cm +t) [+R 
T (c, + t, c", + CT )l 
[+R 
T (cT+t, 2-cm)] 
+02. [R T (ctf, 2-c. + t) +RT 
(CM 
+t, 2-c, )]-G 
ElrE (X; G; G2) = 0. 
[RT(cm, 2-cm) 
+, )]+ 
(1-0). RT 
(CT, 
c. +CT) 
2. G 
+R 
T (c., 2-c. 
[+R 
T (CT, 
cm + CT + t) 
1 
E7cE(X; G; GH) and E7r-r(X; G; G2) are both straightforward to interpret because only 
spillovers, in H matter for market equilibria. In E7rE(X, G; GF) the terms in 0 reflect 
(successively) market equilibria if spillovers do not occur in H, if spillovers occur in 
H but not in-F; and if spillovers occur in both countries. 
Note that E's best responses to (X; G) are more complex than those to (G; GI or (G; 
X) because nothing can be said a priori about E's choice between GH and OF (recall 
that - for all parameter values -E is indifferent between GH and GF in response to 
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{G; G), whereas GH strictly dominates GF in response to {G; Xj). Although ERE(X; 
G; GF) > ERE(X; G; GH) at 0=0,1, ERE(X, G; GF) is strictly convex in 0 whereas 
r'D 
.2 . &j, E(X; G; GH) is linear Therefore, two mutually-exclusive and exhaustive 
possibilities arise: either (a) ERE(X; G; GF) > ERE(X-, G; GH) for all 0c [0,1]; or (b) 
ERE(X; G; GF) > ERE(X; G; GH) on 0 r= [0, OL) and 0E (011,1], and ERE(X; G; GH) 
ERE(X-, G; GF) on 0E (0 Lq 0 H), where 0<0L<0H<1. In (a) GF strictly dominates 
GH, whereas in (b) E strictly prefers GFto Gil for small and large O-values but GH to 
GFfor intennediate O-values. (Case (a) applies in (S3) and (b) applies in (S 1) and 
(S2). However, the distinction does not qualitatively affect our analysis of equilibrium 
behaviour because in both (a) and (b) there is considerable similarity between the sets 
of parameter values where E enters with one plant: the issue at stake is where that 
plant is located. ) 
iff 
2- max JER, (X; G; Gj, ER, (X; G; GF)l > ERE (X; G; G2) 9 
then E's best responses to (X; G) in (0, G)-space can easily be shown to fall into three 
distinct regions, which are ordered identically to those in Figure 3.2. Analogously to 
Figure 3.2, the inter-regional boundaries are max(ERE(X*, G; GH), ERE(X, G; GF)) 
(upper) and ERE(X; G; G2) - max(ERE(X, G; GH), ERE(X, G; GF)j (lower). The 
curvatures of ERE(X; G; GH) and ERE(X; G; GF) have been established above (see 
end-note 2 to this Appendix). Because ERE(X; G; G2) is linear in 0, ERE(X; G; G2) - 
E'D 
. r,, vE(X; G; 
GH) is also linear in 0 but ERE(X; G; G2) - ERE(X; G; GF) is strictly 
concavein 0 
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3.7.4. Els expected profits under JX-, X). 
E, TE(X; X; O)=O 
E7rE(X; X; Gj =0 
[R (C c C, t) 
+(1-0). 
(C, c C, t) 
)]-G +R 
T (C" + t, C" + C, + t) 
11 
+RT(cT +t, c +c, +t 
E; rE (X; X; GF) = Rl' (c,., cm + c,. + t) + RT 
(c,. + t, c. + c. + t) -G 
EirE(X; X; G2)=2-(1-0)-RT(cT, cm +cl. +t)+2-0-(1-0)-RT (cm, cm +c,. +t) 
+o2 -RT(c., 2. c. +t)-2. G 
In {X; X; GH) only spillovers in H are relevant to E's payoff, and in {X; X; GF) 
spillovers (anywhere) are irrelevant to E's payoff. In EirE(X; X; G2) the terms in 0 
reflect (successively) market equilibria if spillovers do not occur in H; if spillovers 
occur in H but not in F-, and if spillovers occur in both countries. A useful 
simplification is provided by the fact that E7rE(X; X; GH) > E7rE(X; X; GF) for all 0>0 
(with equality at 0= 0): regardless of where E locates its single plant, its rivals' 
marginal costs total CM + CT +t in both countries; therefore, E's location decision is 
driven solely by the possibility of receiving spillovers from M if it chooses H. 
Iff 
a 2-ERE(X; X; GH) > ERE(X; X; G2), 
then E's best responses to (X; Al in (0, G)-space can easily be shown to fall into three 
distinct regions, which are ordered identically to those in Figure 3.2. Analogously to 
Figure 3.2, the inter-regional boundaries are ERE(X; X; GH) (upper), which is linear in 
0, and ERAX; X; G2) - ERE(X; X; GH) (lower), which is strictly concave in 0 
(following ERE(X; X; G2)). 
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3.7.5. Els best responses if M chooses G (Figure 3.3). 
First, note that ERE(G; X; GH) > ERE(G; G; GH) for all 0. This clearly holds at 0=0, 
because E faces less 'competition' in H under (G; X-, GH). For 0>0 it is sufficient to 
have 
, 0. 
[R T (cm, 2. cm +t) 
+(1-0). 
RT (CM, CM + CT + t) 
v L+RT(cm + t, 2- cm)] 
I+Rr 
(c,, + t, cm + cT 
RT (c,, 2-c, )+R T (CM +t, 2-c. ) 
which clearly holds at 0=0,1 and therefore for all 0 (because LHS is linear in 0). 
Second, note that ERE(G; X; G2) - ERE(G; X; GH) ': a ERE(G; G; G2) - ERE(G; G; GH) 
iff 
_IRT (c., c. + c,. ) -RT (c., 2-c. ) 
O. (j_0). 
-RT(c. +t, c. +c, )+R T (CM+t, 2 cij) 
1 
2ý 
RT (c 2-c. + t) -RT (c., 2- c )0* 
L 
J-RT 
(c., 2-c. + t) +RT (c., 2-c. 
Tedious algebra (expansion using the specific functional form of RT(., -)) shows that 
both expressions in (-) are strictly positive. Therefore, LHS =0 at 0=0,1 and LHS > 
0 otherwise. Because ERE(G; G; G2) - ERE(G; G; GH) is strictly concave in 0 with an 
interior maximum on [0,11, it therefore follows that ERE(G; X; G2) - ERE(G; X, GH) 
must take the same shape. 
Given the two preceding results plus (17) and (18), Figure 3.3 takes the forrn depicted 
iff ERE(G; G; GH) > ERE(G; X; G2) - ERE(G; X; GH). This is cmore restrictive' 
(sufficient but unnecessary for) than (17) (i. e. ERE(G; G; GH) > ERE(G; G; G2) - 
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ERE(G; G; GH)) because ERE(G; X, 02) - ERE(G; X; GH) > ERE(G; G; G2) - ERE(G; 
ED 
G; GH) (established above). It is 'more restrictive' than (18) (i. e. ERE(G; X, GH) > 
E'D 
ERE(G; X; G2) - ERE(G; X; GH)) because ERE(G; X, GH) > ERE(G; G; GH) 
(established above). 
3.7.6. Els best responses if M chooses X (Figure 3.4). 
First, we consider the upper part of Figure 3.4. Note that ERE(X; X; GH) > 
max (ERE(X; G; GH), ERE(X; G; GF)) for all 0. ERE(X; X-, GH) > ERE(X; G; GII) at 0= 
0 because E faces less 'competition' (as measured by the sum of rivals, marginal 
costs) in H under fX; X; GH}; and dERE(X, X; GH)ld 0> dERE(X, G; GH)ld 0 (sufficient 
for this is RT(cm, cm + cr + t) - 
RT(cm, cm + cT) > RT(cT, CM + CT + t) - 
RT(cT, cm + cT), 
which expansion using the specific functional form of RT(., -) shows to hold) because 
under JX; X; GH} only E benefits from a rise in 0 whereas both E and T benefit from 
rises in 0 under (X; G; GH). ERE(X; X; GH) > ERE(X; G; GF) at 0=0,1 because (a) at 
0=0E faces less 'competition' abroad under M X; GH); and (b) at 0=1E faces less 
ccompetition' both locally and abroad under (X, X; GH}. Whereas ERE(X, X-, GH) is 
linear in 0, ERE(X; G; GF) is strictly convex in 0, which establishes ERE(X; X; GH) > 
ERE(X-, G; GF) on OE [0,11. 
Second, we consider the lower part of Figure 3.4. At 0=0 we have ERE(X; X; G2) - 
ERE(X; X$ GH) = ERE(X, G; G2) - ERE(X; G; GH) > ERE(X; G; G2) - ERE(X; G; GF). 
The equality is proved using straightforward substitution from E's expected profit 
functions, and the inequality is proved in Section 3.7.3 above. If CT is 4sufficiently 
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larger' than cm, then we have ERE(X; G; G2) - ERE(X; G; Gil) > ERE(X-, G; G2) - 
ERE(X; G; GF) > EREM X; G2) - ERE(X; X; GH) at 0=1. The former inequality is 
proved in Section A3 above and the latter, which relies onCT'sufficiently larger' than 
cm, is proved as follows. At O= I the only element of 
ER(X; G; G2) - ERE (X; G; G., ) > ERE(X; X; G2)-ER E(X; 
X; GH ) 
that depends on CT is ERE(X; X; GH) on the RHS, and dERE(X, X; GH)IdCT I(0= 1) > 
0. Therefore, for the inequality above to hold for all cm, cT, t in (B) it is necessary and 
sufficient that it is satisfied at CT = cm. However, With CT = cm the above inequality is 
easily shown (via expansion using the specific functional forni of RT(., -)) to fail. 
Nevertheless, the inequality holds for the parameter values in (S 1), (S2), (S3); 
therefore, there exists some critical cT, (strictly) inside (B), where LHS = RHS. 
We have therefore tied down the relative positions of ERE(X; X; G2) - ER_r(X, X; GH), 
ERE(X, G; G2) - ERE(X; G; GH), and ERE(X; G; G2) - ERE(X; G; GF) at O= 0,1. it 
remains to consider the relative positions of these inter-regional boundaries on 0E (0, 
The following results are immediate given the two rankings proved above. First, 
ERE(X-, G; G2) - ERE(X; G; GH), which is linear in 0, intersects ERE(X; X; G2) - 
GH), which is quadratic (and strictly c rID 
X, 
oncave) in 0, once on 0>0. This 
follows, given their shapes, because the two are equal at 0=0 but ERE(X-, G; G2) - 
VD 
rdj, E(X; G; GH) > 
ERE(X; X; G2) - ERE(X; X; GH) at 0=1. Furthermore, d[ERE(X, X, 
G2) - ERE(x; X; GH)]ld0 > d[ERE(X; G; G2) - ERE(X; G; GH)]ld0 at 0=0, so ERE(X, 
G; G2) - ERE(X; G; Gii) = ERE(X; X; G2) - ERAX; X; GH) must have two real roots. 
Second, because both the LHS and the RHS are quadratic (and strictly concave) in 0, 
the equation ERE(X; G; G2) - ERE(X; G; GF) = ERE(X-, X; G2) - ERE(X; X; GH) must 
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have zero, one or two real solutions. We know from above that the relative positions 
of these two inter-regional boundaries are reversed between 0=0 and 0=1; 
therefore, there must be an odd number of intersections. This implies that ERE(X; G; 
G2) - ERE(X; G; GF) and ERE(X; X; G2) - ERE(X, X; GH) intersect once onO E 
(0,1). 
Our final task is to integrate (combine) our conditions on the upper and lower parts of 
Figure 3.4. The two conditions presented in the main text, (19) and (22), ensure that 
the lowest inter-regional boundaries in the upper part of Figure 3.4 lie above the 
highest inter-regional boundaries in the lower part of Figure 3.4 (i. e. that the 'upper' 
and 'lower' parts of Figure 3.4, as we have defined them, do not overlap). 
3.7.7. rs expected profit functions. 
The expected profit functions given below for T can be verified by following the 
derivations of E's expected profit functions given above. 
Err (G; G; 0) =2-[, _(1_0)2] -RD (cm, cm) +2- (1 - 0)2-R 
D (cT, cm)-G 
E; r,. (G; G; GH) = Eirr (G; G; GF)=ERE(G; X; G2)-G 
EirT (G; G; G2)"*"*-'ERE(G; G; G2)-G 
E; rj. X; 0) = 0. 
[RD (CM, CM ) 
CM )] 
+(1- 0). 
RD (cr, c. ) 
+R 
(C, + t, 
1 
+R 
(C, + t, CM )] 
EgT (G; X; GH) = ER_, (G; X; GII) 
E; r. r 
(G; X; GF) = ERE (G; X; GF) 
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E7rT (G; X; G2) = ERE (G; G; GH) 
E; rj. (X; G; 0)= 0. 
[R D (CM, C"f +t)]+(1_0). RD (c CM + t) G 
+RD(c., c. ) 
[+R 
D (cz" 
CM) 
EirT (X; G; Gj =0-RT 
(c., 2. c. +2-t) 
+(1-0). 
RT (c.  c. + c. +2- t) 
G 
[+RT(c., 
2-c. ) 
11 
+RT (c., c. + c, ) 
Eir,. (X; G; GF) = ERE(X; X; G2)-G 
Ezl, (X; G; G2) = ER_, (X; G; GJ-G 
D (CT, CM D( , E; rT (X; X; 0) R +t)+R CT r t' CM 
E7rT(X; X; G, 1)= 0. 
[R" (c, 2-c. +2- t) 
+(1-0). 
RT (c,., c, +c, +2. t) 
+RT(c,. + t, 2-c. ) 
11 
+RT (c, + t, c + c, ) 
1 
Eir, - 
(X; X; GF) = ERE (X; X; GF) 
Eir, (X; X; G2 
) 
--'ý ERE(X; G; GF 
) 
3.7.8. Ms expected profit functions. 
The expected profit functions given below for M can be verified by following the 
derivations of E's expected profit functions given above. 
Eirm (G; G; 0) =2- 
[l 
- (1 - 0)2]. R'(cm, cm)+2 . 
(1 
_ 
of 
-RD 
(cm, 
cT)-G 
E7r (G; G; GH) = Eirm (G; G; G, ) =0- [RT (c., 2 c. ) + RT(c., 2-c. + 
R" (c., c. + c, ) 2RT 
(c., 2. c,. ) 
+0. (1-0). 
[+R 
T (cm, cm + CT + t)1 
+ 0) 
[+R 
T (c., 
12-c. +t)]-G 
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Erm (G; G; GO =2-[, _(1_0)2] -RT (c,, 2-c, )+2- 
(I 
_ 0)2 -RT (c., 2-c,. ) -G 
Eir, w 
(G; X; 0) =0-RD 
(C, c + t) 
+(1-0). 
RD (cm, C, +t) J-G [+R 
D (cm, cm) 
11 
+R 
D (cm, 
c, 
) 
E; r, (G; X; G, u)=2-0'-R 
T (cm, 2- cm +t)+4-0-(1-0)-RT(c., c, +c, +t) 
(1 
_ 0)2 -R 
T (c., 2-c,. 
(G; X; GF) = 0. 
RT(cm, 2-cm+2-t)]. 
(l_0). 
RT (c., 2. c. +2- t) 
G 
[+R 
T (c., 2-c. ) 
1 
+RT (c., 2-c. ) 
E; rm (G; X; G2) = E7rm (G; G; Gj 
Eirm (X; G; 0) = 0. 
[R D (CM, CM) 
)]+(1_0). 
[R D (CM, CI. ) 
+R 
D (C + t, c', ' +R 
D (C + t, CT 
Eirm (X; G; Gj = 0. 
RT (cxf, 2-cm) 
+ t) 
+(1-0). 
RT (cm, 2-c,. ) 
+R 
T (cm +t, 2 . cm 
1 [+R 
T (cm +t, 2 . cl, + t) 
E7rm (X; G; Gj = (1 - 0) -RT 
(c., 2-c. + t) 
+0. (1-0). 
RT (cm, c + CT + t) [+R 
T (c. + t, 2-c,. )] 
[+R 
T (cm +t, CM +CT 
+0, IR 
T (c., 2-c. +t)+R 
T (CM 
+t, 2-cm)] 
Eirm (X; G; G2) = 0. 
[R"(cm, 2. cm)cm)]+(1_0). RT(c., 2. c. ) 
T +RT (c. + t, 2. 
l+R 
(c. + t, 2. 
Eir, v 
X; 0) = RD 
(CM, Cl. + t) + RD (CM + t' C7, ) 
Dru (X; X; GH) = 0. 
[RT (c., c, + c. + t) 
+t 
+(1-0). 
R" (c., 2-c,. + t) 
+RT (c. + t, c + c, 
1 
+R 
T (CM + t, 2. c. + t) 
1 
Eirm (X; X; GF) = RT (cm, 2-c,. +2- t) +RT 
(CM 
+t, 2. CT) 
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E7rm (X; X; G2) = Eirf 
(X; G; GF) 
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Sunk cost of greenfield-FDI, G (x 100) 
0 
L1 
I-d 
0 
c71 
Z 
Z 
0 
V, 00 0- 
ý G 
E6 E6 6 li 1 ý 
Table A3.1: Determination ot acquisition price in (SI) t=0.05; cm = 0.2; CT = 0.25 
Entry on LHS of cell (on RHS of cell in bold type) is BR to X (G). Ms preferred 
choice is underlined. 
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Sunk cost of greenfield-FDI, G (x 100) 
0 
0 
ij 
C-4 
cr 
b-. 
ýlz 
0 >-ei 
In -2 
0 
Z 
C> 
ýA 
0 
: 13 Ull 
1-ý 
0 1.. " 00 
OW 
P-N 
I-N 
(Sl 
P. -% 0-1^ 0. -ý 
Table A3.2: Imermination ot acquisition price in (S2) t=0.05; cm = 0.2; cT = 0.4 
Entry on LHS of cell (on RHS of cell in bold type) is BR to X (G). Ms preferred 
choice is underlined. 
312 
Sunk cost of greenfield-FDI, G (x 100) 
C 
C) 
I'd 
12 
z 
1... & 0-" LIN 00 0 t-j 
Pýl --% poý 1-1ý P-ý 
1 A P"% Pý% 1- % P ý 
'a. r6 
1-1ý 0-1 -1- 0-% 
- ý - ý 1 ý-N - % ? ý P N P % 0- ý kn 
0 
Lh 
C 
"A 
Table AM: Determination of acquisition price in (S3) - t=0.15; cm = 0.2; cr = 0.25 
Entry on LHS of cell (on RHS of cell in bold type) is BR to X (G). Ms preferred 
choice is underlined. 
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3.7.9. Endnotes to the Appendix. 
1 The proof that DrE (G; X; GH) > EgE (G; X, GF) for all 0 proceeds in two steps. First, 
we show that EirE (G; X; GH) is strictly concave in 0 Expanding EgE (G; X; Gil), the 
tenn on 02 is 
IRT (c., 2. c. + t) -RT (CM, CM +cT +t)-[R T (cT, 2-c. + t) - RT (cT, cm + cT + t)] 
+JR T (CM +t, 2. c, )-RT (c. +t, cm +cT)-[R T (CT +t, 2. cm)-R T (CT + t' Cm + CT )] 
Tedious algebra (expansion using the specific functional form of RT(. ' . 
)) shows that 
both expressions in (-I are strictly negative because CT > CM, thereby proving the strict 
concavity of EgE (G; X; GH). (The general result used here and elsewhere, which can 
be easily shown, is RT(a, cc) - RT(a, P) > RT(b, (x) - RT(b, P) iff (x >P and b>a or iff P 
>a and a>b. ) Second, given that EgE (G; X, GF) is linear in 0, the necessary-and- 
sufficient condition for EgE (G; X; GH) > EirE (G; X; GF) on 0E (0,1] is EmE (G; X; 
GH) > DrE (G; X; GF) at both end-points. This requires 
0=0: R T(cT +t, cm +cT)-R T (CT + t' CM +cT +t) >RT (CT' CM +cT)-R T (CT , Cm + CT +t) 
and 
0=1: RT (cm +t, 2-cm)-R 
T (CM 
+t, 2. c, +t) >RT (c., 2-c. ) - R" (cm, 2- cm + t) 
both of which can be shown to hold via tedious algebra (again, by expansion using the 
specific functional form of R 
T(., 
. )) if t>0. 
2 E7rE(X; G; GF) > EirE(X; G; GH) at 0=0i ff 
R" (C7,, cm + c,. + t) - Rr 
(cT, cm + cT) >RT (CT + t, CM + cT+t)-R 
T (CT + t, CM + CT), 
and E7rE(X-, G; GF) > E7rE(X-, G; GH) at 0=1 iff 
R'* (c,, f, 2-c. + t) -RT 
(c., 2-c. ) >RT 
(Cjf 
+t, 2. c, +t)-R 
T (CM 
+t, 2. c, ). 
Both conditions above can be shown to hold via tedious algebra (expansion using the 
specific functional fonn of RT(.,. )) because t>0. 
If cm < cT, then the strict convexity of E7rE(X, G; GF) in 0 is easily verifiable by 
expansion and inspection of the (sign of the) coefficient on 02. 
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